Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
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James King sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and individual government employees under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, alleging physical abuse by U.S. officials. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both claims. King appealed only the Bivens claim, making the FTCA judgment final. The individual defendants argued that the FTCA's "judgment bar" precluded the Bivens claim. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants, stating that the FTCA judgment barred the Bivens claim.King then filed a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court to reopen the FTCA judgment to withdraw his FTCA claim and avoid the judgment bar. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that attorney error or strategic miscalculation is not a valid basis for reopening under Rule 60. King appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, as attorney error or strategic miscalculation does not justify reopening a final judgment under Rule 60. The court emphasized the public policy favoring the finality of judgments and noted that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is only available in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, which were not present in this case. View "King v. United States" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs-Appellants Thomas Sheppheard, Tyler Randall, and Adam Perry, on behalf of minor child J.P., filed a class action lawsuit against the Governor of West Virginia and the Acting Cabinet Secretary of the West Virginia Department of Homeland Security. They sought relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging unconstitutional conditions of overcrowding, understaffing, and deferred maintenance in West Virginia's prisons, jails, and juvenile centers. They claimed these conditions amounted to deliberate indifference to their health and safety.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia dismissed the case for lack of standing. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish that their injuries were traceable to the actions of the Governor or the Secretary, or that their injuries would be redressed by a favorable decision. The court noted that the issues were largely due to funding decisions by the West Virginia legislature, which was not a party to the suit. The court also highlighted that the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, not the Governor or the Secretary, had the authority to address the conditions in the facilities.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not show that their injuries were caused by the Governor's or the Secretary's actions. The court also found that the requested relief, such as appropriations and policy changes, could not be granted by the court as it lacked the power to compel the Governor or the Secretary to take such actions. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs' injuries were not redressable through the requested judicial intervention. View "Sheppheard v. Morrisey" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Jere Eaton sued the City of Stamford and police officer Steven Estabrook, alleging that Estabrook used excessive force during a protest on August 8, 2020. Eaton claimed that Estabrook lifted her by her bra strap, drove her backward several feet, and dropped her on the ground without warning, violating her Fourteenth Amendment rights and committing assault and battery under Connecticut state law. Estabrook and the City of Stamford moved for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity and state governmental immunity.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that while there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Estabrook used excessive force, Estabrook was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time that his actions were unconstitutional. The court also granted summary judgment on Eaton’s state law claims, concluding that Estabrook was entitled to state governmental immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the use of excessive force. However, the appellate court concluded that Estabrook was not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage because the same factual disputes also affected whether his actions were clearly established as unconstitutional at the time. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court upheld the district court’s decision regarding state governmental immunity for the state law claims. View "Eaton v. Estabrook" on Justia Law

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Detective Genaro Hernandez, a Dallas Police Department detective, was involved in a shooting investigation outside The Green Elephant bar in August 2019. Hernandez, who also worked for the Stainback Organization, allegedly pursued false charges against the bar's owner, Shannon McKinnon, and a security guard, Guadalupe Frias, to benefit his private employer. Despite the Special Investigation Unit finding no criminal offense by the plaintiffs, Hernandez bypassed standard procedures and directly sought prosecution from the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office, leading to the plaintiffs' indictment for tampering with evidence. The charges were later dropped when Hernandez's conflict of interest was revealed during Frias's trial.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Hernandez, alleging federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution, and state-law claims for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and civil conspiracy. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the federal malicious-prosecution claim but allowed the federal false-arrest claim and the state-law claims to proceed. Hernandez appealed, arguing he was entitled to governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Hernandez's actions, despite being motivated by personal interests, fell within the scope of his employment as a detective. The court held that Texas law provides broad immunity to state actors for actions within their employment scope, regardless of intent. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's decision denying dismissal of the state-law claims and remanded the case for further proceedings on the remaining federal claim. View "Frias v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

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In 2020, allegations emerged that certain officers in the Vallejo Police Department were bending the points of their badges after using potentially lethal force. The department hired an independent investigator to look into these claims but did not release the investigation's findings. The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California (ACLU) requested records related to the investigation under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). The department released some records but withheld the investigative report, claiming it was a confidential personnel record.The ACLU filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Solano County Superior Court, challenging the department's response. The court ordered the disclosure of parts of the investigative report and related materials, with redactions to protect the identities of officers, witnesses, and their families. Both parties sought writ review of this decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the documents sought by the ACLU were not confidential personnel records but were subject to public disclosure under section 832.7, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code. This section pertains to records relating to the report, investigation, or findings of incidents involving the discharge of a firearm by a peace officer. The court also found that the redaction of officer names could not be sustained on the grounds relied upon by the superior court. However, due to the extensive volume of potentially disclosable materials and minimal briefing on redaction issues, the court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding redactions. View "City of Vallejo v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

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Eugene Sikora, a former prisoner, claims that the State of Iowa failed to release him from prison when his sentence was over. He was convicted of three felonies in 2016 and sentenced to concurrent five-year terms, which were suspended for probation. In 2017, his probation was revoked, and he was imprisoned until March 2019. Sikora alleges that due to a miscalculation, he was imprisoned for nearly five months longer than allowed, as the defendants did not credit him for 292 days served in county jails and a custodial residential center.Sikora filed a suit over three years after his release, seeking money damages for wrongful imprisonment. He named the State of Iowa and the director of the Iowa Department of Corrections as defendants, asserting five tort claims, including violations of his constitutional rights and negligence. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit, arguing sovereign immunity and other defenses. The district court dismissed some of Sikora’s claims but allowed others to proceed. However, after the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Burnett v. Smith, which overruled the precedent allowing constitutional tort claims, the district court dismissed Sikora’s remaining claims and denied his motion to amend his petition to add new defendants and claims.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that sovereign immunity barred Sikora’s claims. The court concluded that all of Sikora’s claims were essentially false imprisonment claims, which are barred by sovereign immunity under Iowa Code section 669.14(4). The court also rejected Sikora’s arguments that constitutional torts and claims against individual state employees could proceed, emphasizing that the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA) provides the exclusive mechanism for such claims and explicitly prohibits claims based on false imprisonment. View "Sikora v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

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The case involves members of the Auburn University Board of Trustees and various Auburn University employees (defendants) who were sued by Patti Northcutt and her husband, Walter Northcutt (plaintiffs). Patti, a former employee and doctoral student at Auburn, alleged that the defendants retaliated against her for previous lawsuits and grievances she had filed, which were settled through agreements. She claimed that the defendants breached these settlement agreements and interfered with her ability to complete her doctoral program and obtain employment at Auburn.The plaintiffs initially filed their complaint in the Lee Circuit Court, which they amended multiple times. The third amended complaint included claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, and procedural due process violations, as well as state-law claims for breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved to dismiss these claims, asserting federal qualified immunity and State immunity under the Alabama Constitution.The Lee Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss the First Amendment and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims but denied the motion regarding the other claims. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to dismiss the remaining claims.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition in part, directing the trial court to dismiss the claims for monetary damages against the employee defendants in their individual capacities under § 1983 for equal protection and procedural due process violations, based on federal qualified immunity. The Court also directed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees related to state-law claims for prospective injunctive relief, based on State immunity. However, the Court denied the petition regarding the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees related to federal-law claims for prospective injunctive relief and the state-law claims for monetary damages against the employee defendants in their individual capacities. View "Ex parte B.T. Roberts" on Justia Law

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Faya Rose Toure sued the City of Selma, Chief of Police Spencer Collier, and police officer Devon McGuire following her arrest for fourth-degree theft of property and attempting to elude. Toure claimed McGuire and Collier committed assault and battery, false arrest, unlawful imprisonment, invasion of privacy, negligence, wantonness, abuse of legal process, unreasonable seizure, and defamation/libel. She also accused the City of negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and fostering a custom of police abuse. Toure sought $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages.The defendants filed for summary judgment, citing peace-officer and State-agent immunity. They provided evidence including deposition testimonies, incident reports, and body camera footage showing McGuire witnessed Toure removing a campaign sign and subsequently attempting to elude him. Toure argued she removed the sign believing it was illegally placed and felt intimidated by McGuire, who was in an unmarked vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City but denied it for McGuire and Collier.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found that McGuire and Collier were performing discretionary functions within their law enforcement duties, entitling them to immunity. The court determined that McGuire had at least arguable probable cause for Toure's arrest, and Toure failed to provide substantial evidence that McGuire or Collier acted willfully, maliciously, or beyond their authority. Consequently, the court held that McGuire and Collier were entitled to peace-officer and State-agent immunity and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment in their favor. The petition for a writ of mandamus was granted, and the writ was issued. View "Ex parte McGuire" on Justia Law

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In 2018, South Carolina excluded Planned Parenthood from its Medicaid program, citing state law prohibiting public funds for abortion. Planned Parenthood and patient Julie Edwards sued, claiming the exclusion violated the Medicaid any-qualified-provider provision, which allows Medicaid beneficiaries to obtain services from any qualified provider. Edwards preferred Planned Parenthood for gynecological care but needed Medicaid coverage. They filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 to enforce rights under the federal Medicaid statutes.The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and enjoined the exclusion. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded the case in light of Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion Cty. v. Talevski, which addressed whether another spending-power statute created §1983-enforceable rights. On remand, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its decision.The Supreme Court of the United States held that Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under §1983. The Court emphasized that spending-power statutes rarely create enforceable rights and that the any-qualified-provider provision lacks the clear rights-creating language necessary to support a §1983 action. The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic" on Justia Law

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Matthew Mungai, a Black man of Kenyan origin, sued the University of Minnesota, alleging racial discrimination and harassment while he was a student. He claimed violations under Title VI, Title IX, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), the Fourteenth Amendment, and negligence. Mungai detailed several incidents of racial harassment by students and staff over three years, including derogatory comments and threats. He reported some incidents to university staff and the Student Conflict Resolution Center (SCRC).The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Mungai's claims, finding that his amended complaint failed to state a claim. Mungai appealed, focusing on his Title VI claim and challenging the dismissal with prejudice of his Title VI, MHRA, Fourteenth Amendment, and § 1983 claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court adopted the deliberate indifference standard for third-party harassment claims under Title VI, similar to Title IX. To establish liability, Mungai needed to show that the University was deliberately indifferent to known acts of harassment by individuals under its control. The court found that Mungai's allegations did not plausibly show that he reported the incidents to an appropriate person with authority to take corrective action. Additionally, the court found that Mungai did not provide sufficient facts to establish that the University acted with deliberate indifference.The court also upheld the district court's dismissal with prejudice of Mungai's MHRA, Fourteenth Amendment, and § 1983 claims. The MHRA claim was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Fourteenth Amendment claim could not be brought directly, and the University was not a "person" under § 1983.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Mungai v. University of Minnesota" on Justia Law