Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Robert Snyder operated a business in a building that he owned in the city of Waltham, Massachusetts. After Snyder fired an employee who served as a member of the Waltham city council, the former employee complained to the city building department that Snyder’s use of his building violated a local land use ordinance. Code enforcement officers investigated Snyder’s use of his property and fined him under the ordinance. Snyder contested the fines in the district court, alleging that the city and five individuals violated his rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by singling him out for differential treatment for reasons unique to him. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of the two defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that the local government officials did not violate any clearly established federal law, and therefore, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Snyder v. Collura" on Justia Law

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) condemned a fifteen-acre parcel owned by Michael Carlson despite the fact that it needed just over one acre for its planned project. At issue in this case was whether Utah Code 72-5-113 authorized UDOT’s condemnation of the excess property and whether the taking failed for lack of a “public use” as required under the Takings Clause of the Utah Constitution or United States Constitution. The Supreme Court agreed with UDOT’s construction of section 113 and granted summary judgment in favor of UDOT without expressly addressing the constitutionality of the taking. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s endorsement of UDOT’s statutory authority to condemn excess property for transportation purposes; but (2) reversed and remanded to allow the district court to determine the constitutionality of UDOT’s condemnation of Carlson’s excess property. View "Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Sorenson is a purveyor of telephones for the hearing-impaired that have words scrolling on a screen during a call. Sorenson's technology uses the Internet to transmit and receive both the call itself and the derived captions (IP CTS). Sorenson gives its phones out for free, with the captioning feature turned on. On appeal, Sorenson challenged the FCC's promulgation of rules regarding IP CTS under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court concluded that the FCC's rule requiring all new users to register and self-certify their hearing loss, but only if the provider sold the IP CTS equipment for $75 or more, was arbitrary and capricious because the FCC failed to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action. Further, the FCC's requirement that IP CTS phones "have a default setting of captions off, so that all IP CTS users must affirmatively turn on captioning," was unsupported by the evidence and, rather, contradicted by it. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review. View "Sorenson Communications Inc., et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

In 2013, the City of Worcester, Massachusetts adopted the Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance and the Pedestrian Safety Ordinance, which prohibited coercive or risky behavior by panhandlers, other solicitors, and demonstrators seeking the attention of motor vehicle drivers. Two plaintiffs were homeless people who solicited donations from the City’s sidewalks. The third plaintiff was a City school committee member who had customarily displayed political signs near traffic during the campaign season. Plaintiffs brought suit challenging the new ordinances as violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied a preliminary injunction against enforcing the ordinances, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of any of their constitutional claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction as to all provisions of the ordinances except for the Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance’s prohibition against nighttime solicitation, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "Thayer v. City of Worcester" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 85.02, which prohibits use of a vehicle "as living quarters either overnight, day-by-day, or otherwise." The court concluded that section 85.02 provides inadequate notice of the unlawful conduct it proscribes, and opens the door to discriminatory enforcement against the homeless and poor. Accordingly, section 85.02 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an unconstitutionally vague statute. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Lane, Director of CITY, a program for underprivileged youth operated by Central Alabama Community College (CACC), discovered that Schmitz, a state representative on CITY’s payroll, had not been reporting for work. Lane terminated her employment. Federal authorities later indicted Schmitz on charges of mail fraud and theft concerning a program receiving federal funds. Lane testified, under subpoena, regarding the events that led to Schmitz’s termination. Schmitz was convicted. Meanwhile, CITY experienced significant budget shortfalls. CACC’s president, Franks, terminated Lane and 28 others, citing those shortfalls. Franks rescinded all but two (Lane and another) of the terminations days later. Lane sued Franks in his individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliation for testifying against Schmitz. The district court granted Franks summary judgment, finding the individual-capacity claims were barred by qualified immunity and the official-capacity claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Lane acted pursuant to his official duties when he investigated and terminated Schmitz. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed in part, first holding that Lane’s sworn testimony outside the scope of his ordinary job duties was protected by the First Amendment. Lane’s testimony was speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. The critical question is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties. Corruption in a public program and misuse of state funds involve matters of significant public concern; the form and context of the speech, sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding, fortify that conclusion. There is no government interest that favors Franks: there was no evidence that Lane’s testimony was false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed confidential information. Franks is entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity. Based on existing Eleventh Circuit precedent, Franks reasonably could have believed that a government employer could fire an employee because of testimony given outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities. View "Lane v. Franks" on Justia Law

Gonzalez sued his former employer, the Waterfront Commission of the New York Harbor, a bi-state instrumentality of New Jersey and New York that was created in 1953 to investigate, deter, combat, and remedy criminal activity in the Port of New York-New Jersey. He sought to enjoin disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Commission as a violation of his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the First Amendment. The Commission had determined that Gonzalez, an employee (detective) since 1999 had made false statement in an affidavit concerning another employee’s discrimination suit. The district court denied Gonzalez’s motion and ultimately stayed and administratively terminated the suit, finding that the Younger abstention doctrine precluded federal interference with the ongoing state disciplinary proceedings. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its 2013 decision, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, clarifying the abstention inquiry and defining the outer boundaries of the abstention doctrine. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that the decision to abstain was appropriate under the Sprint decision. View "Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm'n of NY Harbor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a public transit officer and Metropolitan Council under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officer violated plaintiff's constitutional rights when the officer arrested plaintiff at a downtown bus stop. The court concluded that the officer had at least arguable probable cause for the arrest based on plaintiff's nonverbal conduct and the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim; though the court agreed that the use of force in this case may have been unreasonable, and acknowledged that plaintiff described being pepper sprayed as a painful experience, plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence that he suffered more than de minimus injury; therefore, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim; the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's retaliatory arrest claim because the officer had at least arguable probable cause for the arrest; but the officer was not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity from plaintiff's retaliatory use of force claim where plaintiff's First Amendment right to make comments and to obtain the officer's badge number was not clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Peterson v. Kopp, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as trustee for the next of kin of her deceased son, filed suit against five police officers and the city, alleging violations of the son's (1) Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable seizure, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and (2) the Minnesota wrongful death statute, Minn. Stat. 573.02. The court concluded that Officer Devick was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions during his initial encounter with the son where a reasonable officer faced with the same circumstances would not have known that the decision to kick and hit the son in an attempt to detain him clearly violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions during the second encounter with the son where plaintiff failed to establish that the punches, kicks, knee strikes, and tasers they used on the son were unconstitutional. Even if the conduct was unconstitutional, it was not clearly established at the time. The court agreed with the district court's finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence showing that the officers intentionally apprehended the son in a way that they believed was prohibited by law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of official immunity and dismissal of the wrongful death claim against the individual officers. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the vicarious liability claim against the city. View "Smith v. City of Minneapolis, et al." on Justia Law

Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence after his vehicle was stopped by a police officer responding to a telephone call and information obtained from an individual claiming she had observed the vehicle driving erratically. The Division of Motor Vehicles issued an order administratively revoking Respondent’s license. The Office of Administrative Hearings reversed Respondent’s license revocation, finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the officers had an articulable reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, and therefore the initial traffic stop was invalid and the resulting license revocation was improper. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that both the initial stop and the arrest were valid. Remanded for an order reinstating Respondent’s administrative license revocation. View "Dale v. Ciccone" on Justia Law