Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff was arrested for violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 578.095, which prohibits flag desecration, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Cape Girardeau, the arresting police officer, and the prosecuting attorney. Both the arresting officer and attorney stated that they were unaware of the Supreme Court's decisions in Texas v. Johnson and United States v. Eichman, which struck down statutes criminalizing flag desecration as unconstitutional. Plaintiff's charges were dismissed against him and he was released from jail. On appeal, the officer challenged the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and award of attorney's fees. The State, which intervened, appealed the district court's order declaring its flag desecration statute facially unconstitutional and the award of attorney's fees. The court concluded that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity where a reasonably competent officer in his position would have known that plaintiff's expressive conduct was constitutionally protected and would have concluded no arrest warrant should issue for the expressive conduct engaged in by plaintiff. The court concluded that Mo. Rev. Stat. 578.095 was overbroad and criminalizes a substantial amount of expressive activity. Further, the statute was not susceptible to an appropriate narrowing construction and, therefore, the district court did not err in holding the statute to be facially unconstitutional. The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding the officer and the state jointly and severally liable for attorney's fees and costs; the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees based on the rate for the St. Louis legal market, instead of Cape Girardeau; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Cape Girardeau. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Snider, III v. Peters" on Justia Law

Sheridan Liquors operated with a City of Peoria liquor license. Adnan owned the store; his brothers, Mike and Jalal managed the business, which included a check-cashing service. Mike and Jalal were indicted under the Money Laundering Control Act, 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3). To support the check-cashing operation, they withdrew large amounts of cash from Sheridan Liquors’ bank account and, knowing of federal reporting requirements, structured the withdrawal of more than $4 million to evade the requirements. Mike was convicted. Jalal fled the country. The city charged violation of a code section that prohibits any liquor licensee or its agent from engaging in activity in or about the licensed premises that is prohibited by federal law, claiming that the brothers conspired to unlawfully structure financial transactions. Sheridan Liquors maintained that Mike’s federal conviction should not have preclusive effect against it because Adnan was never permitted to present a defense in the federal proceeding. Sheridan argued that its insurance coverage had limits of $10,000 for cash on the premises and that structuring the transactions below $10,000 was not done to evade reporting requirements. The city presented testimony regarding loitering, litter, and potential drug use around the store. The Illinois Liquor Control Commission and the trial, appellate, and supreme courts affirmed revocation of the license, finding that Adnan’s due process rights were not violated. The court noted the 148-page transcript of the two-and-one-half-hour local hearing and that Sheridan had an opportunity to present evidence and defenses. Procedural due process does not guarantee an outcome, but only a meaningful opportunity to be heard. View "WISAM 1, Inc. v. IL Liquor Control Comm'n" on Justia Law

Zagami, LLC owned the Landmark Americana Tap and Grill in the Borough of Glassboro. In 2006, Zagami applied to the Borough for a renewal of its liquor license. Luis Perez, a citizen residing in Glassboro, opposed the renewal. In a letter to the Glassboro Borough Council, Perez complained of several serious infractions allegedly committed by Zagami, including serving alcohol to minors and bribing public officials with free meals and drinks. As a result of those allegations, the Council scheduled a liquor license renewal hearing and invited Perez and Zagami to participate. At the hearing, Perez testified that, among other things, Landmark flouted fire-safety regulations, served alcohol to visibly intoxicated patrons, and encouraged bouncers to physically harm rowdy customers. Zagami disputed the allegations, calling them unsubstantiated. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Council voted to renew Zagami’s liquor license. A year later, Zagami filed a defamation complaint against Perez for statements that he made during the liquor license renewal hearing. Perez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that his remarks were made in the course of a quasi-judicial proceeding and thus were entitled to absolute immunity. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the Appellate Division denied leave to appeal. The Supreme Court granted Perez’s motion for leave to appeal to this Court and summarily remanded the matter to the Appellate Division for consideration on the merits. On remand, the Appellate Division found that Perez’s statements during the liquor license proceeding were entitled to absolute immunity and dismissed the defamation complaint with prejudice. Perez filed a complaint against Zagami in 2010 for malicious use of process., alleging Zagami had instituted its defamation complaint as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) designed to punish Perez for speaking out against Zagami at the liquor license renewal hearing and to discourage his participation in future public proceedings. Zagami filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and Perez filed a cross-motion to amend his complaint to include as defendant the law firm retained by Zagami during the defamation suit. Finding that Zagami’s defamation suit was supported by probable cause, the trial court granted Zagami’s motion to dismiss the malicious use of process claim and denied Perez’s cross-motion to amend the complaint. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed both determinations of the trial court. The panel determined that Zagami’s defamation suit was not supported by probable cause and that Zagami should have been aware that Perez’s statements were privileged at the time it filed suit. Accordingly, the panel reversed the trial court’s grant of Zagami’s motion to dismiss the malicious use of process claim. The Supreme Court granted certification to review only whether the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA) permitted a private right of action against an individual who was not acting under color of law. The Court concluded that a private CRA cause of action only may be pursued against persons acting under “color of law”; the Attorney General, however, is authorized to file CRA actions against persons whether or not they acted under "color of law." View "Perez v. Zagami, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging California's Political Reform Act of 1974, Cal. Gov. Code 81000-91014 (PRA), which requires political committees to report certain information about their contributors to the State. Plaintiffs are political committees that supported the November 2008 passage of Proposition 8 and argued that their donors have been harassed as a result of the PRA disclosures. Plaintiffs sought an injunction exempting them from the PRA's future reporting deadlines and declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the State to purge all records of their past PRA disclosures. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State on all counts. The court held that Family PAC v. McKenna directly precluded plaintiffs' challenge to the $100 contribution threshold and the government's interest in disclosing contributions to ballot initiative committees is not merely a pre-election interest. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment with regard to plaintiffs' facial challenges to the post-election reporting requirements. In regard to plaintiffs' as-applied challenges, the court concluded that plaintiffs' request for an injunction does not present a live controversy where the information that plaintiffs seek to keep private has been publicly available on the Internet and in hard copy for nearly five years; plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief did not fall within the mootness exception for cases that are capable of repetition, yet evading review; and plaintiffs' claim for forward-looking relief is not ripe for judicial review. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded with instructions. View "ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Mohammad Usman Chaudhry's family and three organizational plaintiffs filed suit after Usman was shot and killed by an LAPD officer. The Coroner took custody of his body but did not notify his family until twenty-one days later and the delay prevented Usman's family from burying him in accordance with the religions customs of Islam. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged most of the district court's orders granting defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The City and the officer cross-appealed. The court concluded that plaintiffs waived claims against some defendants by not addressing them in their opening brief. The court held that California's prohibition against pre-death pain and suffering damages limits recovery too severely to be consistent with 42 U.S.C. 1983's deterrence policy; thus, California's survival statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 377.34 does not apply to section 1983 claims where the decedent's death was caused by the violation of federal law; and therefore, the court reversed the district court's finding that section 377.34 is not inconsistent with section 1983 and the district court's striking of the jury's $1,000,000 verdict in favor of the Estate. The court remanded to the district court to consider in the first instance a motion for remittitur. The district court erred in dismissing the Estate's Cal. Civ. Code 52.1 claim and in denying its post-trial motion to amend the judgment where the City conceded that a successful claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment provides the basis for a successful claim under section 52.1. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to amend the judgment to reflect the Estate's success on that claim. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of Usman's parent's section 1983 claim against the officer for violating their Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. The court concluded that the court's decision recognizes that parents have a liberty interest in the companionship of their adult children and have a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment when the police kill an adult child without legal justification. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County defendants on the negligence claim under California law; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on Usman's siblings' intentional infliction of emotional distress and section 1983 substantive due process claims; reversed as to their negligence claim against the County; and vacated the district court's attorneys' fees award. View "Chaudhry, et al v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City, the NYPD, and four individual State and Federal law enforcement officials under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1988 and State law. Plaintiff claimed that a Federal agent presented false testimony to the State grand jury that returned the indictment against him. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's Bivens and section 1983 claims were foreclosed by Rehberg v. Paulk; plaintiff's allegation that his indictment was premised on faulty laboratory results failed to support a plausible fair trial claim; the district court correctly held that plaintiff failed to state a claim for abuse of process as to either the individual NYPD defendants or the agent; the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claim of malicious prosecution; plaintiff failed to plead facts showing that defendants acted with discriminatory animus, as required to state a claim under sections 1981 or 1985; and the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim against the City and the NYPD for municipal liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's second amended complaint. View "Morales v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In April 2011, Appellant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and pleaded guilty to DUI. The Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) did not notify Appellant until August 2012 that he would be disqualified from using his commercial driver’s license for one year and that his driver’s license would be suspended for ninety days. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension and disqualification. Appellant filed a petition for judicial review, challenging the proceedings instituted nearly a year and a half after his DUI conviction. The district court affirmed the OAH decisions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the administrative proceedings were promptly instituted as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 16-3-113; and (2) Appellant did not establish that the delay deprived him of procedural due process. View "Dubbelde v. State ex. rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that BOE is failing to provide them with meaningful access to its voting program, in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794(a), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132. The district court concluded that pervasive and recurring barriers existed at poll sites operated by BOE and granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The district court later ordered a remedial plan after the parties had the opportunity to develop and propose a joint plan of relief. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that BOE failed to grant voters with disabilities meaningful access to its voting program. The court also found that the district court's remedial order was a proper exercise of the district court's authority to grant equitable relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Disabled in Action, et al. v. Bd. of Elections in the City of New York, et al." on Justia Law

Employee Chester Rouse filed a wrongful termination suit against the Grand River Dam Authority (GRDA) and Daniel S. Sullivan. The petition alleged GRDA and Mr. Sullivan terminated him in retaliation for filing an overtime complaint under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Rouse also alleged the termination of his employment for filing this complaint violated Oklahoma public policy protecting whistleblowers who make external reports of unlawful activity by their employers. The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, ruling: (1) sovereign immunity barred Rouse's claim based on the federal Fair Labor Standards Act; and (2) the Oklahoma Whistleblower Act provided employee's remedy for the alleged wrongful termination, not state tort law. Rouse appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly ruled that Rouse failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and properly dismissed this suit. View "Rouse v. Grand River Dam Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against federal officials and others after they were sexually assaulted while being transported from an immigration detention center. Plaintiffs claimed violations of their Fifth Amendment due process right to freedom from deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm, alleging that the officials knew of violations of a contractual provision requiring that transported detainees be escorted by at least one officer of the same gender, and that the officials understood the provision aimed to prevent sexual assault. On appeal, Defendants Robertson and Rosado, federal officials who worked as ICE Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives (COTRs), challenged the denial of their motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The court concluded that plaintiffs properly alleged that Robertson and Rosado had actual knowledge both of the violations of the Service Agreement provision and of that provision's assault-preventing objective. However, because the complaint did not plausibly allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, Robertson and Rosado were entitled to qualified immunity and the district court erred in denying their motion to dismiss. View "Doe, et al. v. Robertson, et al." on Justia Law