Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Duit, an Oklahoma highway contractor, contracted with the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department (ASHTD) to reconstruct I-30 between Little Rock and Benton. Duit encountered soil conditions that, it alleges, differed materially from information provided by the ASHTD during bidding. Duit’s claims for compensation were denied by the ASHTD, the Arkansas State Claims Commission, and the General Assembly. Duit sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the “in re Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Duit alleged violations of the Federal Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. 101, and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses and sought to “enjoin Defendants from accepting federal aid … until . . . they fully comply with the federally mandated differing site clause.” The court dismissed the FAHA claim because that statute is enforced exclusively by an executive agency, dismissed the due process claim because Duit’s interest in future highway contracts is not a protected property interest and because the state appeals process for claim denials satisfies procedural due process requirements. The court declined to dismiss the equal protection claim, concluding Duit sufficiently alleged that the Commission treated out-of-state-contractor Duit differently from similarly situated in-state contractors without a rational reason. The Eighth Circuit held that Duit lacks standing to bring its equal protection claim and that the court erred in not dismissing that claim. View "Duit Constr. Co. Inc. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Robert Dumler was arrested for driving under the influence and transported to the sheriff’s office. On several occasions before a breath alcohol test was administered Dumler requested that he be permitted to confer with an attorney. The requesting officer never gave Dumler an opportunity to confer with an attorney, and Dumler did not repeat his request for an attorney after he failed his breath test. The suspension of Dumler’s driving privileges was upheld in administrative proceedings. Dumler petitioned the district court for review, arguing that his statutory right to counsel was violated. The district court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because Dumler did not ask to consult with an attorney after he failed to breath test, he had not invoked his statutory right to an attorney and, therefore, that right was not violated. The Supreme Court remanded with directions, holding (1) the district court applied an incorrect legal standard on the question of whether Dumler’s post-testing right to counsel was violated, and therefore, a remand was required; and (2) suppression of the alcohol testing result is the appropriate remedy for the denial of a driver’s statutory right to counsel. Remanded. View "Dumler v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered a workplace injury to his back and applied for permanent partial disability. The Workers’ Compensation Division denied benefits. Appellant requested a contested case hearing. During discovery, the Division served interrogatories and requests for production requesting information regarding Appellant’s work history since the time of his injury. Appellant objected to a number of the interrogatories and requests, asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The hearing examiner compelled Appellant to answer the discovery, but Appellant continued to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The hearing examiner dismissed the contested case as a discovery sanction. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant was justified in asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because he reasonably believed his answers to the discovery requests could be used in a criminal prosecution against him; and (2) the hearing examiner abused his discretion by acting arbitrarily and capriciously in dismissing the case as a discovery sanction without engaging in the proper balancing of Appellant’s and the Division’s conflicting interests. View "Debyah v. State, ex rel., Dep’t of Workforce Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Maine dairy farmer, had a business dispute with Defendant, his neighbor, and the former Commissioner of the Maine Department of Agriculture (DOA). Soon after taking office, the Commissioner recused himself from regulatory matters involving Plaintiff. The DOA eventually took four adverse regulatory actions against Plaintiff, including the action of ceasing to protect Plaintiff from the regulatory authority of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The DEP then issued several notices of violation of Plaintiff’s license conditions. As a result, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began administrative and judicial proceedings against Plaintiff that resulted in Plaintiff losing his farm. Plaintiff brought this suit for damages against Defendant, claiming that Defendant had violated his First Amendment rights through the adverse actions taken by the DOA. The district court awarded summary judgment against Plaintiff. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was correctly granted with respect tot he three adverse regulatory actions that the DOA was alleged to have taken after the Commissioner’s purported recusal; but (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the Commissioner’s retaliatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in the one alleged adverse action that occurred prior to the recusal. Remanded. View "McCue v. Bradstreet" on Justia Law

Wharf Resources, Inc., a mining company, terminated Lisa Davis for “disruptive behavior in the workplace.” Several months later, Davis filed a gender discrimination claim and a retaliatory discharge claim with the South Dakota Department of Labor, Division of Human Rights (Department). The Department concluded that there was no probable cause for Davis’s claims. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) affirming the Department’s finding of no probable cause; (2) determining that Davis was terminated for permissible factors; and (3) affirming the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the Department. View "Davis v. Wharf Res. (USA), Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal prison inmate, filed suit alleging that the BOP failed to adequately respond to his requests for records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and that several policies adopted by the BOP violate the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the BOP on the FOIA claims and dismissed the constitutional claims. The court concluded that because it cannot determine whether the BOP conducted an adequate search based upon the declarations in the record, the judgment of the district court on the Code 408 FOIA claim is vacated and the court remanded for further proceedings. The court held that sovereign immunity does not bar plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the BOP and the individual defendants in their official capacities; plaintiff exhausted all the administrative remedies “available” to him with respect to his claim that defendants unlawfully retained interest earned on money held in inmates’ deposit accounts; the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim that the prices charged for commissary items and telephone calls are “too high;” the court vacated the district court’s order insofar as it dismisses plaintiff’s claim that Code 334 is unconstitutional and remanded for further proceedings; and the court affirmed as to the remaining claims. View "DeBrew v. Atwood" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of a felony requiring his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed an order that Petitioner be removed. Petitioner petitioned for review, arguing that because Padilla v. Kentucky described deportation as a “penalty,” his removal violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment or related constitutional protections unless a court conducted an individual assessment to determine whether his order of removal was a proportional punishment relative to his underlying criminal conviction. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Padilla has not signaled a break from long-settled law that removal operates simply as “a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want,” not as a punishment within the meaning of the Constitution intended to acutely sanction a noncitizen for his underlying criminal conviction. View "Hinds v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were five women who were formerly incarcerated at the Hillside Community Corrections Center in Oklahoma City. They filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against multiple defendants, alleging they were sexually abused and harassed in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiffs’ complaint named fifteen defendants, including Defendant-Appellant Charlotte Day and Defendant-Appellant Mary Pavliska, both of whom were guards at Hillside during the relevant period. Plaintiffs alleged Day and Pavliska were aware of the abuse and did nothing to prevent it. The claims against several defendants were dismissed without prejudice. The remaining defendants (except the alleged perpetrator Anthony Bobelu) moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to all movants except Day and Pavliska. The district ruled a jury could conclude from the evidence presented that Day and Pavliska were deliberately indifferent to a known substantial risk of serious harm to the Plaintiffs. In an interlocutory appeal, Day and Pavliska argued to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that the district court erred by ruling they were not entitled to qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Day’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Pavliska. View "Castillo v. Day" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, eight male, "out-of-status" aliens who were arrested on immigration charges and detained following the September 11th attacks, filed a putative class action asserting various claims arising out of the discriminatory and punitive treatment they suffered while confined at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) or the Passaic County Jail (Passaic). The district court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that: (1) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a substantive due process claim against the DOJ defendants, against Hasty with regard to both official and unofficial conditions, and against Sherman with regard to official conditions only, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (2) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an equal protection claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (3) the free exercise claim is dismissed as to all defendants; (4) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged their Fourth Amendment strip search claim against Hasty and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (5) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; and (6) the MDC plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any claims against Zenk.  The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims brought by the Passaic plaintiffs. View "Turkmen v. Hasty, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s position of employment with the Emergency Services Division of the State of Montana Department of Military Affairs was eliminated during implementation of the Division’s reduction-in-force policy. After her position was eliminated, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Department of Labor and Industry Hearings Bureau alleging that the Division terminated her in retaliation for her complaint that sexual favoritism had occurred within the Division. The Bureau dismissed the complaint, and Plaintiff chose not to appeal. Instead, Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau of the Department of Labor and Industry, restating her claims. The Department dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff later filed the present complaint in the district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were time-barred under the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by holding that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to the procedures set forth in the MHRA, and as a result were time-barred. View "Lay v. Dep’t of Military Affairs" on Justia Law