Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners and other members of the East Meadow Teachers Association displayed picketing signs from their cars parked where parents were dropping their children off at Woodland Middle School. The Board of Education of the East Meadow Union Free School District (District) charged Petitioners with misconduct related to the demonstration, claiming that Petitioners created a safety risk by parking their cars so that students had to be dropped off in the middle of the street instead of at curbside. Petitioners were found guilty of misconduct. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings against them violated their right to free speech. Supreme Court denied the petitions. The Appellate Division reversed after applying the two-part balancing test set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the picketing demonstration was a form of speech protected by the First Amendment; but (2) Petitioners’ interests in engaging in constitutionally protected speech in the particular manner they employed on the day in question were outweighed by the District’s interests in safeguarding students and maintaining effective operations at the middle school. View "Santer v. Bd. of Educ. of E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, school committees of Woonsocket and Pawtucket and unnamed students, parents, and the superintendents from both districts, brought suit against the legislative and executive branches of Rhode Island’s state government challenging the state’s school funding formula. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Education Clause as well as violations of their substantive due process and equal protection rights because the formula failed to allocate adequate resources to less affluent communities. The superior court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) prior case law as well as the separation of powers doctrine warranted dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Education Clause claim; and (2) Plaintiffs’ complaint was insufficient to establish potential substantive due process claims. View "Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee " on Justia Law

Respondent-appellant Maurice Thill appealed a district court order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in finding Thill remained a sexually dangerous individual. View "Interest of Thill" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics against ten federal officers, in their individual capacities, based on their alleged roles in contributing to the death of ICE Special Agent Zapata and the serious injury of Agent Avila. The agents were ambushed and shot by drug cartel members in Mexico using weapons they allegedly obtained unlawfully in the United States. The court concluded that the district court did not explicitly rule on defendants' qualified immunity defense; the district court failed to make an initial determination that plaintiffs' allegations, if true, would defeat qualified immunity; and the district court did not identify any questions of fact it needed to resolve before it would be able to determine whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Because the district court did not fulfill its duty under Backe v. LeBlanc, Wicks v. Miss. State Emp't Servs., Helton v. Clements, and Lion Boulos v. Wilson, the court had jurisdiction to review the district court's discovery order and vacated it. The court remanded with instructions for the district court to follow the procedures outlined in Backe, Wicks, Helton, and Lion Boulos. View "Zapata, et al. v. Melson, et al." on Justia Law

Respondent, the father of G.G., appealed a superior court order which, after de novo review, upheld a finding by the 10th Circuit Court – Portsmouth Family Division that the respondent had abused and neglected G.G. Respondent challenged the superior court’s denial of his request to cross-examine or subpoena G.G. after the court admitted her videotaped interview into evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that given the plain language of the pertinent statutes and the court’s inherent authority to control the proceedings before it, trial courts have the discretion in abuse and neglect proceedings to determine whether any witness, including the child, should be compelled to testify. The record was unclear as to whether the trial court adequately considered the competing interests of respondent and the child. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's decision and remanded this case for further proceedings: "[w]hen the court is considering whether to compel G.G. to testify in this case, the court may wish to consider whether she testified at the respondent's criminal trial and, if so, whether her testimony in the criminal proceeding would suffice for the instant proceeding." View "In re G.G." on Justia Law

In 2011, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents in New Hampshire arrested six aliens who had prior criminal convictions or arrests. The arrests were part of a nationwide enforcement program. The Union Leader, a New Hampshire newspaper, requested the names and addresses of the six individuals arrested in New Hampshire. The ICE provided the Union Leader with I-213 forms from which the aliens’ names, addresses, and other personal information had been redacted. The Union Leader subsequently filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint to compel disclosure of the arrestees’ names and addresses. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ICE, concluding that FOIA exempted the requested information from disclosure as an unwarranted invasion of the arrestees’ privacy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the arrestees’ privacy interests, and therefore, the withheld information subject to this appeal was not exempt from disclosure. Remanded. View "Union Leader Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. " on Justia Law

In 2005, Ardonis Greer pled guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. In 2007, Greer began serving his period of probation. Subsequently, Greer was erroneously issued a discharge certificate stating that he was discharged from supervision. In 2010, Greer pled no contest to intimidating a witness. Thereafter, the Department of Corrections (DOC) discovered that Greer was still purportedly serving the probation term from his 2004 conviction and initiated revocation proceedings against Greer. The Division of Hearings and Appeals ordered Greer’s probation revoked. Greer filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the DOC lost jurisdiction to revoke his probation when it issued the discharge certificate. The circuit court reversed the Division’s decision. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the erroneous issuance of a discharge certificate did not deprive the DOC of jurisdiction to revoke Greer’s probation because his court-ordered term of probation had not expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DOC retained jurisdiction over Greer despite the erroneous issuance of the discharge certificate; (2) Greer’s due process rights were not violated; and (3) the circuit court, sitting in certiorari, was not empowered to equitably estop the DOC from revoking Greer’s probation. View "Greer v. Wiedenhoeft" on Justia Law

In 2011, the then-Governor of Puerto Rico appointed Plaintiff to the position of Advocate for Persons with Disabilities. In 2013, new legislation established an Office of the Ombudsman for Personal with Disabilities. Plaintiff was subsequently informed that an Ombudsman had been appointed and that his position had been abolished by legislative act. Plaintiff sued the Governor and other officials for attempting to oust him from his job as Advocate, claiming that it was unconstitutional for Puerto Rico to abolish the Advocate position without an individualized hearing. The district court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiff. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order, concluding that the court erred in finding that Plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits where there was no viable claim that the abolition of the Advocate Office independently violated some constitutional proscription. View "Diaz-Carrasquillo v. Garcia-Padilla" on Justia Law

After Appellant was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated (DWI), the director of revenue suspended Appellant’s driving privileges for a minimum of ten years. Appellant later filed a petition for limited driving privileges. The circuit court dismissed Appellant’s petition, determining that Appellant was statutorily ineligible for limited driving privileges pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 302.309.3(6)(b) due to his felony conviction. Appellant appealed, asserting that section 302.309.3 violated the equal protection clause of the state and federal constitutions by allowing DWI court participants and graduates to obtain reinstatement of limited driving privileges while denying a similar opportunity to non-participants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to establish that section 302.309.3 violated his right to equal protection. View "Amick v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Department of Public Utilities imposed on Petitioners, electric companies, monetary assessments for the Storm Trust Fund (“assessment”) pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 12P, 18, which specifically prohibited Petitioners from seeking recovery of the assessment in any rate proceeding. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the recovery prohibition, both as required by the statute and impose by the Department’s order, claiming it was an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Department’s order, holding (1) the mere obligation to pay the assessment, regardless of whether recovery was permitted or precluded, did not rise to the level of a compensable per se taking; (2) Petitioner’s claim that the assessment constituted a taking by way of a confiscatory rate was inadequate on the facts as presented to the Court; and (3) the Department’s order imposing the assessment and articulating the recovery prohibition did not constitute a regulatory taking because the order simply required Petitioners to pay an assessment that served a legitimate public purpose and did not interfere with Petitioners’ overall property rights. View "Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law