Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In Texas, individuals under the age of 25 cannot obtain driver’s licenses unless they submit a driver education certificate to the Department of Public Safety (DPS). Driver education certificates, in turn, are only available from private driver education schools licensed by the TEA. The named plaintiffs were all deaf individuals who contacted a variety of TEA-licensed private driver education schools, all of which informed the named plaintiffs that the schools would not accommodate them. Because they cannot obtain driver education certificates, the named plaintiffs cannot obtain driver’s licenses. Plaintiffs requested injunctive and declaratory relief requiring the TEA to bring driver education into compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. The district court denied the TEA's motion to dismiss but certified its order for immediate appeal.On appeal, plaintiffs essentially argued that the TEA’s pervasive regulation and supervision of driver education schools transforms these schools into agents of the state. The Fifth Circuit held, however, that the mere fact that the driver education schools are heavily regulated and supervised by the TEA does not make these schools a "service, program, or activity" of the TEA. "Admittedly, this case is further complicated by the fact that the benefit provided by driver education schools - a driver education certificate - is necessary for obtaining an important governmental benefit - a driver’s license. Given the broad remedial purposes of the ADA, it would be extremely troubling if deaf young adults were effectively deprived of driver’s licenses simply because they could not obtain the private education that the State of Texas has mandated as a prerequisite for this important government benefit. [. . .] the DPS may well be required to give exemptions to certain deaf individuals who cannot obtain driver education certificates, given that using these certificates as an eligibility criteria allegedly 'screen[s] out or tend[s] to screen out' deaf people and may not be 'necessary for the provision of the' driver’s license program. But the named plaintiffs have not sued the DPS, so we need not decide this issue." View "Ivy v. Williams" on Justia Law

Paul Stavenjord, a Buddhist inmate, asked to receive a Kosher diet and to be permitted to purchase a prayer shawl. Prison officials at the Alaska Department of Corrections denied his requests. Stavenjord filed a complaint alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and various constitutional provisions. The superior court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Stavenjord had failed to demonstrate: (1) that a Kosher diet and prayer shawl were necessary for the practice of his religion; (2) that he was sincere in his requests for religious accommodation; and (3) that the Department's lack of accommodations substantially burdened the practice of his religion. Under Alaska's summary judgment standard, the initial burden falls on the moving party: the Department. Furthermore, religious necessity was not an element of RLUIPA. Because summary judgment was granted by placing the initial burden on the non-moving party and by focusing on Stavenjord's failure to make an evidentiary showing not required under RLUIPA, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stavenjord v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Attorney Daniel Faber filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of three assistant attorneys who alleged alleging gender discrimination in connection with their salaries. The Attorney General filed a motion to stay litigation pending resolution of his motion to dismiss the complaint based on an immunity defense. The federal district court entered a memorandum opinion and order granting the Attorney General’s motion to stay all proceedings, including discovery; the stay was lifted a few months later. Prior to lifting of the stay, Faber filed an Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) request in his own name seeking employment data for every attorney who had been employed by the Attorney General’s Office since January 1987. The records custodian of the Attorney General’s Office denied the IPRA request, stating that “[t]his request is being denied as these records involve a current lawsuit and appear to circumvent the discovery process and the current Order Staying Discovery (attached).” Faber filed a complaint for damages and a petition for writ of mandamus in the state district court against the Attorney General alleging that his IPRA request had been wrongfully denied. The state district court found that the stay of discovery entered by the federal court did not preempt the statutory rights granted to New Mexico citizens by IPRA, and that the Attorney General violated IPRA by denying Faber’s request. The court also issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Attorney General to comply and ruled that damages would be considered at a later date. Faber subsequently moved for an award of damages. The state district court awarded damages of $10 per day from the date of the wrongful denial to the date the stay was lifted and thereafter “damages of $100 per day until the records are provided,” and $257.19 in costs to Faber. The Attorney General appealed the state district court’s award of damages. The determination of the IPRA violation was not at issue on appeal. The issue in this case focused on what type of damages were authorized by the Legislature in Section 14-2-13 12(D). The Supreme Court held that Section 14-2-12(D) permitted compensatory or actual damages because the plain language, purpose, and history of IPRA indicated that neither punitive nor statutory damages were intended by the Legislature. The Court also held that Faber was not eligible for nominal damages. View "Farber v. King" on Justia Law

Employee filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission contending that her employment by Employer had been terminated because she became pregnant. The Commission found that Employer had participated in a discriminatory practice in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4112. Employer filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4112.06. The common pleas court granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition for review was not timely served on the parties because Employer failed to properly initiate service by the clerk within thirty days of the date the Commission’s order was filed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Employer had one year to obtain service of a petition to review an order of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings initiated pursuant to section 4112.06; and (2) therefore, a petition to review an order of the Commission must be served by a clerk of courts on all parties who appeared before the Commission and on the Commission itself within one year of the date the petition was filed as required by Ohio R. Civ. P. 3(A). View "Hambuechen v. 221 Market North, Inc." on Justia Law

In August 2012, the United States filed a civil suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., alleging that the failure of the Florida to provide a kosher diet program to all of its prisoners with sincere religious grounds for keeping kosher was a substantial burden on those prisoners' religious exercise. The complaint requested both injunctive and declaratory relief under the statute. After the district court denied Florida's motion to dismiss the complaint, the State issued a new policy in March 2013, formally titled "Procedure 503.006" and informally referred to as "the Religious Diet Program." In addition to outlining the contents of the meals, Procedure 503.006 contains a number of provisions that determine a prisoner's eligibility for the program. When the United States learned about Procedure 503.006 in April 2013, it filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction the court entered required Florida to provide the kosher diet, and prevented the State from enforcing the eligibility provisions of Procedure 503.006. The court's order did not, however, mention the need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria for preliminary injunctions established by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). While this interlocutory appeal was pending, the district court held monthly status conferences between the parties. But the court did not make any need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings regarding the preliminary injunction, nor did it issue an order finalizing the preliminary injunction. As a result, the preliminary injunction expired by operation of law on Thursday, March 6, 2014. "The preliminary injunction in the present case passed on to injunction heaven [. . .] And with it died this appeal," unless there existed an exception to the mootness doctrine. Finding no exception, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the mooted issue, and vacated the portion of the district court's order that addressed it. View "United States v. Sec'y, Florida Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, petitioner Gregory DuPont, appealed: (1) a circuit court order affirming the revocation by the respondent City of Nashua (City), through its chief of police, of his license to carry a loaded pistol or revolver; and (2) a Superior Court order denying his motion for preliminary injunctive relief in a proceeding brought against respondents Peter McDonough, Sean Haggerty, Christopher Casko, and John Barthelmes, challenging the denial of his request for an armed security guard license. In 1998, the petitioner was convicted in Massachusetts of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor, a misdemeanor that carried a potential maximum prison sentence of two and a half years. Petitioner’s 1998 conviction rendered him ineligible, under Massachusetts law, to possess or carry a firearm, at least as of the 1998 amendments to the Massachusetts firearms laws. In 2005, upon the petitioner’s petition for review, the Massachusetts Firearm Licensing Review Board (FLRB) found that the petitioner was “a suitable person to possess a license to carry firearms, and his right to possess a firearm therefore is fully restored in the Commonwealth.” In 2007, the City’s chief of police issued the petitioner a license to carry a pistol or revolver, and that license was renewed in 2012. In 2009, the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) issued the petitioner an armed security guard license. Sometime prior to June 29, 2010, Sergeant Lobrano of DOS became aware of the 1998 conviction and determined that it disqualified the petitioner, under federal law, from possessing firearms. Accordingly, Lobrano notified the petitioner that he was revoking the petitioner’s armed security guard license. On the same day, Lobrano issued the petitioner an unarmed security guard license. The petitioner appealed Lobrano’s decision to a hearings examiner, who upheld it. In 2011, while the parties were awaiting decision on their cross-motions for summary judgment, DOS’s attorney, respondent Casko, offered the petitioner a settlement. The petitioner agreed to the terms of the offer and the case was non-suited. In February or March 2013, petitioner applied to the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for a Curios and Relics License. The Nashua Police Department conducted a background check on the petitioner in 2013 and, in doing so, learned of the 1998 conviction (why the City had not discovered the 1998 conviction previously, despite having conducted at least two prior background checks on the petitioner, was not explained in the record). Nashua Police determined that the 1998 conviction disqualified the petitioner from both the federal license for which he had applied and his state license to carry, and advised that the ATF deny petitioner his federal Curio and Relics license, and that his state license to carry be revoked. Petitioner appealed the revocation to the circuit court, and, following that court’s affirmance of the DOS' decision, he appealed to the Supreme Court court. On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial courts erred in: (1) upholding the revocation of his license to carry; (2) upholding the DOS’s decision to rescind the 2011 settlement; (3) failing to find that the City was bound by the 2011 settlement; (4) misinterpreting 18 U.S.C. sections 921(a)(20) et seq.; (5) disregarding the findings and conclusions of the FLRB’s decision restoring his right to possess firearms; and (6) failing to “give full faith and credit to the provisions of the public acts, records and judicial proceedings in Massachusetts.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that its interpretation of section 921(a) better fulfilled Congress’s purpose of “defer[ring] to a State’s dispensation relieving an offender from disabling effects of a conviction.” Here, Massachusetts acted clearly and directly to remove the restriction the petitioner’s 1998 conviction had placed upon his civil right to keep and bear arms. The Court held that Massachusetts restored the petitioner’s civil rights within the meaning of 921(a)(20). The Court reversed both trial courts’ decisions resting upon the contrary conclusion and remanded for further proceedings. View "DuPont v. Nashua Police Department" on Justia Law

Sterling Suffolk Racecourse, LLC (SSR) applied for a license to place a casino in certain areas of Massachusetts. Caesars Entertainment Corporation and three Massachusetts affiliates (collectively, Caesars) were the proposed operators of the casino. The Massachusetts Gaming Commission issued an investigatory report concluding that Caesars was unsuitable as an operator, which caused Caesars to accede to SSR’s request that it withdraw from their contractual relationship. Caesars brought this action under 28 U.S.C. 1983 against certain Commission officials in their individual and official capacities and also brought a state law claim subject to supplemental jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the federal claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as beyond the scope of federal affordable relief and dismissed the state law claim as standing alone. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Caesars alleged no cognizable protected property interest, its Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims were correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim; and (2) Caesars’ class-of-one Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim could not be recognized against a state actor given the breadth of discretion provided by the Massachusetts casino licensing statute. View "Caesars Mass. Dev. Co., LLC v. Crosby" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the creation in Westhampton Beach of an "eruv," a delineated geographic area significant to certain adherents of Judaism. The district court dismissed the complaint based on Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c) and plaintiffs appealed. The court rejected defendants' two jurisdictional challenges and concluded, on the merits, that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for a violation of the Establishment Clause against any of defendants. Two of the remaining three defendants are plainly not state actors and claims against these defendants must be dismissed for lack of state action. As to the remaining defendant, LIPA, plaintiffs have not plausibly pleaded that there was no secular purpose to the governmental action here. LIPA entered into a paid licensing agreement allowing the installation of items of religious significance on utility poles. Further, no reasonable observer who notices the strips on LIPA utility poles would draw the conclusion that a state actor is thereby endorsing religion, even assuming that a reasonable observer is aware that a state actor was the entity that contracted with a private party to lease the space. Finally, there is no risk of excessive government entanglement with religion. Accordingly, the court found no merit in plaintiffs' arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Village of Westhampton Beach" on Justia Law

The State of Tennessee operated the Arlington Developmental Center, an institutional home for people with mental disabilities. In 1992, the United States sued Tennessee under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act alleging that, among other things, Tennessee had failed to provide Arlington’s residents with adequate food, medical care, supervision, and shelter. After a trial on the merits, the district court found that Arlington’s conditions violated the due-process rights of its residents. The court ordered the State to submit a plan to improve conditions there. Since then, People First of Tennessee has presented 19 applications for attorneys’ fees to the district court. Tennessee consented to pay every dollar of fees requested in the first 18 applications filed by intervenors-appellees People First of Tennessee (a total of about $3.6 million, including over $400,000 for the period at issue here). But the State objected to People First’s 19th application, which for the most part sought fees for a contempt motion that the district court had stricken from the docket and that People First never renewed. The 19th application also sought fees for hours that People First’s attorneys had chosen to spend monitoring the State’s compliance with the consent decree, even though the State had already paid $10.6 million in fees to a monitor whom the court had appointed for that same purpose. Despite those circumstances, the district court awarded People First $557,711.37 pursuant to the application, holding that People First had been a “prevailing party” with respect to its contempt motion. The State appealed the district court's award. After review, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's judgment, reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Tennessee" on Justia Law

The Northern Nevada Correctional Center (NNCC) convicted Appellant, an NNCC correctional officer, of providing legal services for a fee (an “MJ29” violation). Appellant challenged the MJ29 discipline through an informal grievance followed by a first-level formal grievance. After Appellant was informed by NNCC’s associate warden that he had exhausted the grievance process on this issue, Appellant filed a complaint in district court arguing that NNCC, among other things, improperly filed the MJ29 disciplinary charge and violated his due process rights by refusing to hear his grievance appeals. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Appellant failed to exhaust the grievance process and that Appellant had no liberty interest in a disciplinary appeals process. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in concluding that Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; but (2) correctly determined that Appellant failed to state a due process claim. View "Abarra v. State" on Justia Law