Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, owner of a bar and nightclub, filed suit challenging the noise ordinance of Ocean Springs, arguing that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. The court focused on the language of the ordinance that prohibits noise that "annoys... a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities." The court concluded that this language imposed an admittedly objective standard of conduct in its enforcement. Therefore, the court held that the ordinance sets an explicitly objective standard in accordance with Supreme Court precedent, and therefore it is not unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Munn v. City of Ocean Springs, MS" on Justia Law

This case concerns compliance reports regarding improving conditions in two correctional facilities under a settlement agreement between the United States and Erie County. The NYCLU sought to intervene in order to have the reports unsealed. The court held that the public's fundamental right of access to judicial documents, guaranteed by the First Amendment, was wrongly denied when the compliance reports in this case were sealed. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision and ordered that the judicial documents be unsealed. View "United States v. Erie County" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of qualified immunity in an Eighth Amendment case brought by a Colorado state prisoner. Plaintiff Homaidan Al-Turki filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against several prison officials, including Defendant Mary Robinson (a prison nurse) based on these officials’ failure to provide him with any type of medical evaluation or treatment while he was suffering through several hours of severe abdominal pain from what turned out to be kidney stones. The district court granted qualified immunity to the other prison officials, none of whom were medical professionals, but denied Defendant Robinson’s summary judgment motion for qualified immunity. Defendant then filed this interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the issues this case presented to the Tenth Circuit were: (1) whether the hours of severe pain Plaintiff experienced constituted a sufficiently serious medical need to satisfy the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference test; and (2) whether Defendant’s alleged actions violated clearly established law. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court on both issues. View "Al-Turki v. Robinson, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was blind, requested transportation subsidies from a Maine state agency. The agency refused the request. After an unsuccessful appeal to an administrative hearing officer, Plaintiff brought suit in the federal district court. A magistrate judge recommended dismissal but suggested that Plaintiff reframe his action as one for judicial review under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff subsequently sought leave to amend his complaint to assert a claim for judicial review. The agency objected, arguing that Plaintiff’s proposed claim was barred by Maine’s general thirty-day statute of limitations for judicial review of administrative decisions. The district court allowed Plaintiff to file his proposed amended complaint and concluded that the hearing officer should have granted Plaintiff relief. The agency appealed, arguing that Plaintiff’s action for judicial review was time-barred. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s judicial review action under 29 U.S.C. 722(c)(5)(J) arises out of a post-1990 congressional enactment within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 1658, which enactment does not explicitly incorporate any specific limitations period; and (2) accordingly, the right to judicial review that the statute creates is subject to the general catch-all limitations period contained in section 1658(a). View "Millay v. State of Maine Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Keith Thompson was killed when a county sheriff ended a two-hour high-speed chase by firing an assault rifle into the vehicle Keith had stolen. Plaintiffs, Keith's parents, filed suit against the sheriff and the County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the sheriff used excessive force. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that there was no constitutional violation in the sheriff's use of deadly force and he was entitled to qualified immunity. Because there was no Fourth Amendment violation of the seizure of Keith, plaintiffs' section 1983 claims failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Thompson, et al. v. Mercer, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Coons and Novack filed suit challenging the constitutionality of two provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (Affordable Care Act): the individual mandate and the establishment of the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB). Plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the Arizona Health Care Freedom Act, Ariz. Const. art. XXVII, section 2, is not preempted by the Affordable Care Act. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the individual mandate does not violate Coons' substantive due process right to medical autonomy; affirmed the dismissal of Coons' challenge, based on lack of ripeness, to the individual mandate for violation of his substantive due process right to informational privacy; affirmed the district court's holding that the Affordable Care Act preempts the Arizona Act; and, with respect to Novack's challenge to IPAB, the court vacated the district court's decision on the merits of the claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Coons v. Lew" on Justia Law

Chris Hogan lost his job with the Utah Telecommunications Open Infrastructure Agency("UTOPIA"). Claiming he was fired for revealing a conflict of interest in contract awards, he threatened to sue the agency for wrongful termination. Shortly after making this threat, he was subject to several unflattering media articles about his job performance and his termination dispute with the agency’s leaders. Several of the stories claimed his threats to sue the agency amounted to extortion or blackmail. One of the stories was written pseudonymously by Michael Winder, the mayor of West Valley City where UTOPIA did much of its business. Hogan sued UTOPIA, the mayor, the City, and a number of other people he believed were involved in the publication of the articles. He claimed the articles were defamatory, portrayed him in a false light, invaded his privacy, were an intentional infliction of emotional distress, a deprivation of his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, and a civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. 1985. He also sued UTOPIA for First Amendment violations, breach of contract, wrongful termination, and other violations of state law in a separate lawsuit. The district court dismissed all of the claims, and finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "because the articles' critical statements are explained by their context, we agree with the district court's conclusion that the articles were neither defamatory nor otherwise tortiously offensive. And we further agree that Hogan's federal law claims cannot go forward because he has insufficiently pleaded that the defendants' actions were exercises of their power under state law and that the defendants conspired to punish Hogan for bringing his claims to court." View "Hogan v. Winder, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that police officers used excessive force when they shot and killed her sixteen-year-old son (Anthony). The district court granted the police officers' motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims. The officers responded to an activated burglar alarm at a liquor store, were involved in a car chase with Anthony, and when one of the officers exited his vehicle, Anthony drove towards him. The shots were fired at Anthony when he was driving towards one of the officers. The court concluded that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have believed that Anthony posed a threat of serious physical harm to the officer when the officer fired the shots. In any event, the officers were entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly established law. Plaintiff failed to point to any case that clearly establishes the unconstitutionality of using deadly force to end a car chase that threatened the physical safety of the officers and others in the area. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McGrath v. Tavares, et al." on Justia Law

Brooklyn Coons (called "Brook" by her estate) died from being shaken and possibly struck on the head while in the care of her father's girlfriend. Her estate, the remaining plaintiff in this case, alleged that Defendant Linda Gillen, a social worker, knew that Brook was in danger and subject to abuse but did not respond to reports of the abuse, increasing Brook's vulnerability to danger. The estate sued Defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating Brook's right to substantive due process. The district court granted Defendant summary judgment, holding that she was entitled to qualified immunity because she did not take any affirmative action that increased the child's vulnerability to danger and because there was no clearly established law that her alleged conduct violated Brook's due-process rights. Finding that Defendant’s conduct was not a violation of clearly established law, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Estate of B.I.C., et al v. Gillen" on Justia Law

In this case, a city clerk in a Faulkner Act municipality refused to accept for filing a petition for referendum on the ground that the petition did not have a sufficient number of qualifying signatures. Members of a Committee of Petitioners brought an action in lieu of prerogative writ to have the challenged ordinance put on the ballot. They also brought suit under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c). Ultimately, the trial court granted the Committee members the relief they sought, placing the ordinance before the voters and awarding them, as the prevailing party, attorney’s fees for the deprivation of a substantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act. The Appellate Division affirmed all but the trial court’s finding of a civil rights violation. The Appellate Division determined that the Committee members did not suffer a deprivation of a right because the court provided the ultimate remedy - the referendum. Accordingly, the award of attorney’s fees was vacated. Upon review, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that the city clerk violated the right of referendum guaranteed by the Faulkner Act. Furthermore, the Court held that the violation of that right deprived the Committee members a substantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act. The vindication of that right under the Civil Rights Act entitled the Committee members to an award of attorney’s fees. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "Tumpson v. Farina" on Justia Law