Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the constitutionality of the issuance and form of automated speeding citations issued under Maryland's speed camera program. The court found that the notice and hearing afforded by Maryland's speed camera statute satisfied due process where notice sent by first-class mail was reasonably calculated to provide actual notice of the speeding violation and civil penalties; the availability of a trial in state court, upon plaintiffs' election, provided adequate opportunity to be heard on any objections prior to the imposition of the statutory penalties; and any flaws in the citation or enforcement process could have been challenged in the state courts and plaintiffs failed to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the towns. View "Snider Int'l Corp. v. Town of Forest Heights, MD" on Justia Law

Marcia Eisenhour sued Weber County, three of its county commissioners, and a state judge. According to Eisenhour, the judge sexually harassed her and the County retaliated against her for reporting the harassment. She claimed violations of Utah's Whistleblower Act, the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. Eisenhour challenged that ruling and the district court’s exclusion of her testimony on disciplinary proceedings involving the judge. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: (1) the exclusion of Eisenhour's testimony during the disciplinary proceedings involving Judge Storey; and (2) the award of summary judgment on the claims against the County for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, liability under Title VII, and violation of the Whistleblower Act relating to the refusal to rehire her. However, the Court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed on: (1) the claim against the County under the Whistleblower Act and the First Amendment claim based on closing of the Justice Court; and (2) the claims against Judge Storey based on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. View "Eisenhour v. Weber County, et al" on Justia Law

The City of Greenwood Village, Colorado fired Police Sergeant Patrick Cillo after an incident involving officers under his command. Sgt. Cillo alleged the City's real motive for firing him was opposition to the union chapter he led. Sgt. Cillo and his union sued the City and three individuals. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Sgt. Cillo survived summary judgment as to the first three "Pickering/Connick" factors and that the individual defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cillo, et al v. City of Greenwood Vilage, et al" on Justia Law

An immigration judge found petitioner Nadia Maatougui removable for marriage fraud in 2004. Petitioner then asylum and four other forms of relief from removal. The Immigration Judge denied the requests, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Petitioner claimed on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that the IJ and BIA erred in denying her a hardship waiver and cancellation of removal based on their credibility determinations and the weight they gave the evidence in her case. Under case law, the Tenth Circuit determined it did not have jurisdiction to overturn their credibility determinations or evidence weighing, and thus could not grant relief on that claim. Petitioner also claimed that changed conditions in her native Morocco and the ineffective assistance of her prior counsel at a hearing in 2004 merited reopening her case. The Tenth Circuit concluded petitioner failed to present new, material, previously unavailable evidence that justified reopening her case. View "Maatougui v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

In two cases, Montgomery County took a portion of properties owned by Respondents. Because the parties disputed the value paid for either taking the County filed a complaint for condemnation. During the proceedings, the circuit court imposed discovery violation sanctions precluding Respondents from introducing evidence as to the fair market value of the taken properties. Respondents were therefore unable to generate a genuine issue of material fact concerning the County's appraisal valuations. As a result, the circuit court granted summary judgment for the County on the issue of just compensation. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that summary judgment on the question of just compensation is not available in condemnation proceedings because a property owner cannot be deprived of the constitutional right to have a jury determine just compensation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) permitting summary judgment does not violate the constitutional right to have the opportunity for a jury trial to ascertain just compensation in compensation actions provided the landowner litigates the case according to the Maryland Rules; and (2) summary judgment was properly granted in each case because there was no genuine dispute of material fact and the County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Montgomery County v. Soleimanzadeh" on Justia Law

In 2008 the EEOC received a charge of discrimination from a woman who claimed Mach Mining had denied her applications for coal mining jobs because of her gender. After investigation, the agency determined there was reasonable cause to believe Mach had discriminated against a class of female job applicants at its Johnston City site and notified the company of its intention to begin informal conciliation. The parties did not reach agreement. In 2011, the EEOC told Mach that further efforts would be futile and filed a complaint two weeks later. Mach asserted failure to conciliate in good faith. The district court certified for interlocutory appeal the question whether an alleged failure to conciliate is subject to judicial review in the form of an implied affirmative defense to an EEOC suit. The Seventh Circuit disagreed with other circuits and responded that it is not. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act directs the agency to try to negotiate an end to an employer’s unlawful employment practices before seeking a judicial remedy, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b), but finding the requirement to create an implied failure-to-conciliate defense would add an unwarranted mechanism by which employers could avoid liability for unlawful discrimination. Such a defense would be contrary to the statutory prohibition on using what was said and done during conciliation “as evidence in a subsequent proceeding.” View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Mach Mining, LLC" on Justia Law

Individual plaintiffs alleged that they were illegally stopped, searched, or detained by the U.S. Border Patrol for the Sandusky Bay Ohio Station, based upon their Hispanic appearance, race and ethnicity. They claimed that in the three years the station has been open, 61.8% to 85.6% of those apprehended have been Hispanic, and use of racial slurs by agents. Plaintiffs sought equitable relief and monetary damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents and 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986, and claimed that agents had violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101, and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The complaint alleged conspiracy between the Border Patrol and municipalities, police chiefs and individual officers, to violate the civil rights of Hispanics. An amended complaint added the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, as a source of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs settled their claims with local agencies. The district court denied plaintiffs’ request to add claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671 and dismissed, determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs had failed to establish waiver of sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The APA section 702 waiver of sovereign immunity extends to all non-monetary claims against federal agencies and their officers sued in their official capacity, regardless of whether plaintiff seeks review of “agency action” or “final agency action” as set forth in section 704.View "Muniz-Muniz v. U.S. Border Patrol" on Justia Law

A writer for the Kentucky New Era, Inc., a newspaper serving the city of Hopkinsville and the neighboring area, requested records from the Hopkinsville City Clerk, including copies of arrest citations and police incident reports involving stalking, harassment, or terroristic threatening. The City Clerk withheld some records and redacted from others certain types of personal data. The City then initiated an action essentially seeking a declaration that its decisions to withhold and to redact records did not violate the Kentucky Open Records Act (ORA). The circuit court ultimately ruled that the City's redactions of social security and driver's license numbers, of home addresses, and of telephone numbers comported with the ORA. The court of appeals upheld the redactions and held that the City had the right to redact the names of all juveniles in the records. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly applied the ORA's privacy exemption in concluding that the redactions at issue in this case were in accordance with the ORA. View "Ky. New Era, Inc. v. City of Hopkinsville" on Justia Law

Stephen O.'s parents were concerned that he had suffered a possible psychotic break. They reported his behavior to a mental health clinician. The clinician obtained an ex parte order to take Stephen into custody and transport him to the hospital in Juneau for examination and treatment. The police took him into custody, but due to bad weather he remained in jail for six days before he was transported for evaluation. After a contested hearing, the superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that Stephen was gravely disabled under AS 47.30.915(7)(B) and issued an order for a 30-day involuntary commitment. Stephen appealed that order. Because the superior court’s conclusion that the man was gravely disabled was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, the Supreme Court reversed and vacated the superior court’s 30-day involuntary commitment order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Stephen O." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the Secretary of State, in his official capacity, and other state defendants. Plaintiff claimed race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied the state defendants' motion for summary judgment on the race discrimination and retaliation claims; concluded that plaintiff could pursue his Title VII claims against all defendants but that the Eleventh Amendment barred his section 1983 claims against the Secretary and his claims for monetary damages against the Secretary and Chief Hedden in their official capacities; denied Chief Hedden qualified immunity; and denied summary judgment to the state defendants as to mitigation of damages and punitive damages but granted summary judgment to the state defendants on the section 1981 claims, hostile work environment claims, and claim of deprivation of a protected property or liberty interest. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects, except the court reversed its denial of qualified immunity to Chief Hedden on plaintiff's 1983 equal-protection retaliation claim. The right to be free from retaliation was clearly established as a First Amendment right and as a statutory right under Title VII; but no clearly established right exists under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation. View "Burton v. Arkansas Secretary of State, et al." on Justia Law