Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After individuals associated with Occupy Columbia were removed by law enforcement from a 24-hour per day protest on the grounds of the South Carolina State House, Occupy Columbia filed suit against defendants, including the Governor, seeking injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the South Carolina Constitution, and South Carolina's common law. The court granted in part and denied in part. On appeal, defendants sought review of the district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendants. The court affirmed, concluding that Occupy Columbia has alleged a violation of a clearly established First Amendment right - the right to protest on State House grounds after 6:00 p.m. in the absence of a valid time, place, and manner restriction. View "Occupy Columbia v. Haley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Daniel Brown appealed a superior court decision granting summary judgment to the State on his claim of employment discrimination in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. He argued that summary judgment was improper because genuine material issues of fact remained as to whether his membership in the Vermont National Guard was a motivating factor in the State's decisions not to promote him, and ultimately to terminate him from his position. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Brown v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Reynolds, a 62-year-old white male with more than 30 years’ experience with the U.S. General Services Administration, was passed over for a promotion from Building Management Specialist, to Building Manager. Bell, a 32-year-old black employee, got the job over Reynolds and three other candidates, all older than 40. Reynolds sued, alleging age discrimination in violation of the “federal sector” provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 633a; he also claimed race, sex, and retaliation discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16. The district court entered summary judgment on the retaliation claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; Reynolds dropped his claims of racial and sex discrimination. After trial, the district court rejected the age-discrimination claim for lack of evidentiary support and refused to allow Reynolds to amend his complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the district court’s findings defeated the age-discrimination claim regardless of whether a “but-for “requirement or a more lenient “mixed motives” standard applied.View "Reynolds v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The taxpayers in this case were out-of-state natural gas marketing companies, out-of-state local distribution companies that were certified as public utilities in their states, and out-of-state municipalities. Each taxpayer bought natural gas from producers or other marketers then delivered it to pipelines under contracts allowing the taxpayers to withdraw equivalent amounts of gas at a later time from out-of-state distribution points. The taxpayers filed requests for ad valorem tax exemption, claiming the natural gas was exempt under Kan. Const. art. 11, 1, which exempts merchants' inventory from ad valorem taxation but does not exempt tangible personal property owned by a public utility. The Kansas Court of Tax Appeals determined the natural gas was not exempt because the taxpayers were public utilities pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 79-5a01. The Supreme Court held (1) the taxation at issue did not violate the Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (2) section 79-5a01 was constitutional as applied to the out-of-state local distribution companies; but (3) section 79-5a01 was unconstitutional as applied to the out-of-state natural gas marketing companies and those taxpayers that were out-of-state municipalities because those entities were not public utilities under the meaning of the statute. View "In re Property Valuation Appeals of Various Applicants" on Justia Law

The Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) revoked Plaintiffs' hunting licenses after finding that each Plaintiff did not meet the criteria to claim resident status under Iowa Code chapter 483A and that establishing residency solely for the purposes of hunting was improper under section 483A.1A(10). In each case, an administrative law judge affirmed the DNR's decision. The district court affirmed the agency action, concluding (1) to be considered a landowner for the purposes of obtaining landowner hunting privileges, a person must be a resident of Iowa, and (2) the ALJ's findings that Plaintiffs were not Iowa residents were supported by substantial evidence, notwithstanding the facts and each owned land in Iowa and paid taxes in Iowa. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decisions of the ALJs in Plaintiffs' respective cases were supported by substantial evidence; and (2) Iowa's licensing scheme, which distinguishes between resident landowners and nonresident landowners, is not an unconstitutional impairment of privileges protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. View "Democko v. Iowa Dep't of Nat. Res." on Justia Law

Berwick Iron & Metal Recycling, Inc. operated a metal and automobile recycling business under an existing conditional use permit. In 2010, Berwick Iron applied for a conditional use permit to install and operate a metal shredder. On remand, the Berwick Planning Board voted to approve the conditional use permit. The superior court vacated the Board's judgment, concluding that the Board erred in applying the ordinance governing air emissions. Both parties appealed. On cross-appeal, the abutters argued, among other things, that the superior court erred in concluding that the Board did not violate the abutters' due process rights by communicating ex parte with representatives from Berwick Iron. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded for entry of a judgment affirming the Board's decision, holding that, despite the Board's ex parte communications with Berwick Iron, the Board did not violate the abutters' due process rights or err in applying its ordinance. View "Duffy v. Town of Berwick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Eugene, the Police Department (EPD), and others, alleging that they violated his First Amendment rights when they removed him from his position on the EPD K-9 team in retaliation for repeatedly airing concerns about work-related safety issues to his supervisors. The court concluded that the evidence presented to the jury did not reasonably permit the conclusion that plaintiff established a retaliation claim where, as here, a public employee reports departmental-safety concerns to his or her supervisors pursuant to a duty to do so, that employee did not speak as a private citizen and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and held that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hagen v. City of Eugene, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the termination of Jeffry Black, the former Executive Director of the Idaho Peace Officer Standards and Training Council (POST). Black asserted that the Idaho State Police (ISP) violated two provisions of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act ("the "Whistleblower Act") when it terminated him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ISP, holding that Black failed to engage in activity protected under the Act. Black appealed the district court's decision to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Black v. Idaho State Police" on Justia Law

Petitioners were current and former elected officials and appointed officers of the Village of Freeport. In 2008, Water Works Realty Corp. commenced lawsuits against the Village and Petitioners alleging, inter alia, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act. The Freeport Board of Trustees authorized the Village to defend and indemnify Petitioners, but after Petitioners refused to settle with Water Works due to Water Works' requirement that Petitioners sign a stipulation of discontinuance containing a nondisparagement clause, the Village withdrew Petitioners' defense and indemnification. Petitioners subsequently filed an action seeking a judgment directing the Village to provide a defense. Supreme Court denied the request. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the municipality could withdraw its defense and indemnification of Petitioners for their failure to accept a reasonable settlement offer, and Petitioners' First Amendment concerns with respect to the settlement's nondisclosure clause did not warrant a different conclusion. View "Lancaster v. Inc. Vill. of Freeport" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the District and others, alleging that strip searching incoming detainees violated the Fourth Amendment and, where men were not similarly strip searched, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. The court concluded, under Bame v. Dillard, that the Superior Court Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity because the Fourth Amendment right he was accused of violating was not clearly established at the time of any violation. The court agreed with the district court that there was no circumstantial evidence that the Marshal purposefully directed that women and men be searched differently at the Superior Court cellblock. According, the Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity because class members have failed to show that he violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Johnson, et al. v. Government of the District of Columbia, et al." on Justia Law