Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Complainants, an attorney and the Office of the Chief Public Defender, submitted a request for a declaratory ruling to the Connecticut Medical Examining Board asking whether physician participation in the execution of condemned inmates using lethal injection was permitted. Complainants then sent a letter regarding their request for a declaratory ruling. The Board convened an executive session to obtain legal advice about issues raised in the letter. Complainants then filed a complaint with the Commission, alleging that Plaintiffs, the Board and its chairperson, violated the Freedom of Information Act by convening in executive session during the meeting for "purposes not permitted" under the Act. The Commission determined the executive session was impermissible under the Act. The trial court upheld the Commission's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the letter did not constitute notice of a pending claim as defined by Conn. Gen. Stat. 1-200, and therefore, the Board was not permitted to convene in executive session under the Act. View "Chairperson, Conn. Med. Examining Bd. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Police officers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1988, alleging, inter alia, that the Lafayette PD Defendants imposed a "code of silence" to prevent police officers from reporting certain civil rights abuses and corruption within the police department and that these defendants retaliated against them for objecting to these practices. On appeal, police officers challenged the district court's grant of a protective order requiring, among other things, that a particular website they operated be "taken down" in its entirety, which was issued at the request of officials and entities within the Lafayette PD. Concluding that the court had appellate jurisdiction over the appeal, the court held that the district court erred in concluding that the entirety of the website was substantially likely to cause prejudice; the district court's determination that the entire website demonstrated a substantial likelihood of impacting the jury venire was overbroad and clearly erroneous; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Marceaux, et al. v. Lafayette City-Parish Con. Gov't, et al." on Justia Law

The City of Providence, Rhode Island enacted two ordinances to reduce tobacco use by young people. The Price Ordinance restricted the City's tobacco and cigarette retailers from reducing prices on tobacco products through coupons and multi-pack discounts. The Flavor Ordinance restricted sales of certain flavored tobacco products other than cigarettes. The National Association of Tobacco Outlets challenged the ordinances, alleging, inter alia, that the ordinances were preempted by federal and state law. The district court upheld the ordinances. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the Price Ordinance was an appropriate regulation of price, it fell outside the First Amendment; (2) because the Flavor Ordinance was an appropriate sales regulation, it was not preempted; and (3) neither ordinance conflicted with state law. View "Nat'l Ass'n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. Providence, R.I." on Justia Law

After the Department denied Memorial's application for a Certificate of Need to perform elective percutaneous coronary interventions (PCIs), Memorial filed suit alleging that the PCI regulations were an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and unreasonably discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that the requirements did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause where the minimum procedure requirement did not burden interstate commerce and the minimum procedure requirement protected public safety. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all of Memorial's remaining claims. View "Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and others after he was fired from the police department for violating department policies. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to establish that any of the personnel, internal affairs, or disciplinary decisions about which he complained was made by a final policy maker for the City such that municipal liability attached; plaintiff's First Amendment claims failed because he could not establish that his speech played a substantial part in the police department's decision to conduct internal affairs investigations or terminate him; and plaintiff's false arrest, imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims also failed because he has not presented any evidence that he was arrested without probable cause and the evidence could not be read to establish that there was a causal connection between either of the individual defendants' actions and plaintiff's arrest, imprisonment, and prosecution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to all defendants. View "Carter, Jr. v. City of Melbourne, FL, et al." on Justia Law

Press intervenors appealed the district court's decision denying them access to court proceedings and a sealed internal police document (Report) and continuing to redact parts of hearing transcripts. The court concluded that the district court erred by declining to order release of the full transcript of the contempt hearing, but that given the minimal relevance of portions of the Report that were not testified to at the contempt hearing to the substance of that proceeding, the Report did not become a judicial document to which the First Amendment right applied. Accordingly, the court affirmed as to the Report, reversed as to the hearing transcript; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Newsday v. County of Nassau" on Justia Law

The Alaska State Commission for Human Rights dismissed Gregg Conitz's complaint against his employer, Teck Alaska Incorporated. In his complaint, Conitz alleged the company discriminated in its promotion decisions. The superior court dismissed Conitz's appeal as moot, finding that the same claims had already been decided by a federal court and that the doctrine of res judicata precluded further claims if remanded to the Commission. Conitz appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior courts decision. View "Conitz v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights" on Justia Law

The South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation, Unemployment Insurance Division disqualified Plaintiff from unemployment insurance benefits based on Plaintiff's alleged failure, without good cause, to accept work she was capable of performing. After Plaintiff missed a telephonic hearing on her appeal, an ALJ entered an order of dismissal and denied Plaintiff's request to reopen for failure to show good cause. The circuit court affirmed, concluding that the Department did not err in refusing to reopen Plaintiff's claim. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, holding that Plaintiff did not provide evidence of untimely receipt of her notice of the hearing to carry her burden to show good cause, and therefore, Plaintiff received sufficient due process. View "Eiler v. Dep't of Labor & Regulation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Sheriff of the City of Hampton, Virginia, in his individual capacity and in his official capacity, alleging that the Sheriff retaliated against plaintiffs in violation of their First Amendment rights by choosing not to reappoint them because of their support of his electoral opponent. The court concluded that, as to the claims of Plaintiffs Sandhofer, Woodward, and Bland, the district court properly analyzed the merits of the claims; as to the claims of Plaintiffs Carter, McCoy, and Dixon, the district court erred by concluding that plaintiffs failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the Sheriff violated their First Amendment rights; nevertheless, the district court properly ruled that the Sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity on Carter's McCoy's, and Dixon's claims seeking money damages against the Sheriff in his individual capacity, and that the Sheriff was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity against those claims to the extent they sought monetary relief against him in his official capacity; and the Sheriff was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on Carter's, McCoy's and Dixon's claims to the extent the remedy sought was reinstatement. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bland v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, representative of the estate of her deceased son, filed suit against the City of New York, police officers, and others, alleging that they were liable for her son's death. A jury found in favor of defendants. The court held that, where a municipality acted in a governmental capacity, a plaintiff could not recover without proving that the municipality owed a "special duty" to the injured party. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving a special relationship, and where the plaintiff failed to meet this burden, the analysis ended and liability could not be imputed to the municipality that acted in a governmental capacity. The distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance was irrelevant to the analysis and the existence of a special relationship was a question of law that could be properly submitted to the jury. In this instance, the court found no error entitling plaintiff to a new trial and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Velez v. City of New York" on Justia Law