Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Shirley Johnson sued the City of Belzoni and two city employees for employment discrimination and sexual harassment. A jury rendered a verdict in Johnson's favor, resulting in a monetary award against each of the three defendants severally. Defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The City appealed from the circuit court's order granting Johnson's motion to enforce the defendants' supersedeas bond against the City alone. Finding that the trial court erred in enforcing a deficient supersedeas bond against the City to satisfy the judgments against the other two co-defendants, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a correction. View "City of Belzoni v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant Tammy Zunski appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment to the Frenchtown Rural Fire Department Board of Trustees (Board) against her right to know and right to participate claims. The issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the District Court correctly determined that the Board's actions at an August 8, 2011, meeting rescinded the actions taken at an improper July 20, 2011, meeting thereby defeating Zunksi's open meeting and public participation claims; and (2) whether the District Court correctly determined that the Board had responded to Zunski's document request in a reasonably timely manner. Zunski admitted that the Board had provided all documents responsive to her right to know request. Because of Zunski's admission, the Supreme Court concluded the district court properly found that no further controversy existed regarding Zunski's right to know claims: "[w]e are left with no reasonable expectation that the Board would fail to comply with any future right to know requests made by Zunski. The District Court correctly resolved Zunski's right to know claims." View "Zunski v. Frenchtown Rural Fire Dep" on Justia Law

Respondent-appellant N.A. was committed to Montana State Hospital for 90 days by a District Court order. N.A. appealed that order. Respondent was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. After some treatment at the Phoenix House, professionals there became concerned that he was a danger to himself and others. The State instituted an involuntary civil commitment proceeding. At his initial appearance, N.A. was informed of his right to a jury trial and the subsequent hearing that would occur, which would include a prehearing mental health evaluation. N.A. did not want evaluation by professionals who had evaluated him in the past because he believed them to be guilty of perjury. N.A. informed the court that he needed more time to find and choose an evaluator. The court gave N.A. a one-day continuance to obtain his chosen professional, but he failed to provide a name to his attorney in time for her to contact the evaluator. When the commitment proceeding resumed, the District Court found that N.A. had been given a reasonable choice of evaluator, and denied the continuance. After the State had finished presenting its case, N.A. moved for a jury trial, which the court rejected as untimely. Upon careful consideration of the District Court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court properly denied N.A.'s motions for continuance and for a jury trial, and his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not supported by sufficient evidence that he was prejudiced by his attorney's actions. View "Matter of N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four landlords, challenged the constitutionality of the City's Rent Escrow Account Program (REAP). The Housing Department places property into REAP when a landlord fails to repair habitability violations and tenants pay a reduced rent. The court concluded that placing plaintiffs' property into REAP did not violate plaintiffs' substantive due process rights where REAP served legitimate governmental goals and was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose; plaintiffs' procedural challenge could not support an as-applied substantive due process claim; and denial of leave to amend the complaint was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Sylvia Landfield Trust v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Appellant Lillian Hatheway appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board of Regents of the University of Idaho and the University of Idaho. Appellant worked for the University as an administrative assistant for nine years before she resigned. She sued for age discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, constructive discharge and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly dismissed all of Appellant's claims. View "Hatheway v. Bd of Regents - UI" on Justia Law

Louisiana's Patient's Compensation Fund served two objectives: (1) fostering a stable market for affordable insurance and (2) ensuring that victims of malpractice could recover for their injuries. Louisiana's Act 825 provided that any person who performed an abortion was liable to the mother of the unborn child for any damage occasioned or precipitated by the abortion. Plaintiffs, three healthcare providers, challenged the constitutionality of Act 825 facially, as applied to physicians enrolled in the Fund "who face or will face medical malpractice claims related to abortion," and as applied under the circumstances of this case. The court concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge subsection (A) of Act 825; plaintiffs had standing to challenge subsection (C)(2); the case was not moot; and the Eleventh Amendment did not bar plaintiffs' challenge to subsection (C)(2). On the merits, the court concluded that Act 825 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where subsection (C)(2) was rationally related to the promotion of informed consent. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court striking down subsection (C)(2). The court vacated its judgment regarding subsection (A) and dismissed the claim for want of jurisdiction. View "K. P., et al. v. LeBlanc, et al." on Justia Law

Landowners protested pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 76-2-205(6) to block the Board of County Commissioners of Missoula County from establishing a special zoning district north of Lolo, Montana. Landowners effectively blocked the zoning proposal pursuant to section 76-2-205(6). L. Reed Williams filed a complaint against Commissioners, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. Landowners intervened in the action. The district court denied Landowners' motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment to Williams and Commissioners, concluding that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and an unconstitutional violation of the right to equal protection and the right to suffrage. The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioners' adoption of the special zoning district and affirmed the district court, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Landowners' motion to dismiss Williams' complaint for failure to join them as necessary parties; (2) determining that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power; and (3) ruling that section 76-2-205(6) was severable from the remainder of the statute. View "Williams v. Bd. of County Commr's" on Justia Law

This case concerned efforts by the Town of Nags Head, North Carolina, to declare beachfront properties that encroach onto "public trust lands" a nuisance, and regulate them accordingly. In the related appeal of Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, the district court adjudicated the claims but concluded that it was inappropriate for a "federal court to intervene in such delicate state-law matters," and abstained from decision under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. The court reversed the district court's decision to abstain in this case where resolving the claims in this case was not sufficiently difficult or disruptive of that policy to free the district court from its "unflagging obligation to exercise its jurisdiction." Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko" on Justia Law

Droganes is a Kentucky fireworks dealer. In 2007, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) agents raided his business on suspicions that he was illegally selling “display” fireworks and seized more than 800,000 pounds of merchandise, only part of which proved to be contraband. Display fireworks are more powerful than consumer fireworks and are subject to greater regulation. Droganes pleaded guilty to distributing explosives without a license (18 U.S.C. 842(a)(1)) and agreed to forfeit the seized items determined by ATF to be display fireworks.” The government tendered a proposed forfeiture order encompassing all such fireworks, which the district court accepted. Droganes objected to the breadth of the order and the classification standard the government used to classify the fireworks and sought monetary sanctions for alleged failure to return the legal fireworks in a timely manner or to reimburse him. The district court rejected all of his claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court’s determination of forfeiture was consistent with Droganes’s plea agreement. The court acknowledged the “seemingly interminable delays in testing the seized fireworks, many of which the government knew not to be display fireworks.” View "United States v. Droganes" on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood and others filed suit challenging Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-196.05(B) as a violation of the federal Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396a. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-196.05(B) barred patients eligible for the state's Medicaid program from obtaining covered family planning services through health care providers who performed abortions in cases other than medical necessity, rape, or incest. The court concluded that the district court's entry of final judgment and a permanent injunction mooted Arizona's appeal of the district court's preliminary injunction. Therefore, the court dismissed that appeal (Case No. 12-17558), and considered only Arizona's appeal of the summary judgment order and permanent injunction (Case No. 13-15506). The court held that the Medicaid Act's free-choice-of-provider requirement conferred a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court also held that the Arizona statute contravenes the Medicaid Act's requirement that states give Medicaid recipients a free choice of qualified provider. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment and permanent injunction. View "Planned Parenthood v. Betlach" on Justia Law