Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, a political blog and a Chicago television station began reporting that Illinois State Rep. Froehlich offered his constituents reductions in county property taxes in exchange for political favors. The reports highlighted Satkar Hospitality, reporting that it and its owners donated hotel rooms worth thousands of dollars to Froehlich’s campaign. Satkar Hospitality and Capra appealed their tax assessments for 2007 and 2008 and won reductions, but after the publicity about Rep. Froehlich, both were called back before the Board of Review for new hearings. They claim that in these second hearings, the Board inquired not into the value of their properties but into their relationships with Rep. Froehlich. The Board rescinded the reductions. Satkar and Capra sued the Board and individual members under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district courts concluded that the individual defendants were entitled to absolute quasi‐judicial immunity and the Board itself is not. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but also held that the damages claims against the Board cannot proceed. They are not cognizable in federal courts, which must abstain in suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging state and local tax collection, at least if an adequate state remedy is available. View "Satkar Hospitality, Inc. v. Rogers" on Justia Law

In 2008, the FBI issued its Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) to implement newly revised Department of Justice guidelines, addressing use of race and ethnicity in investigations. Under this guidance, the FBI may identify and map “locations of concentrated ethnic communities” to “reasonably aid the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities … assist domain awareness,” and collect “[f]ocused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community.” The ACLU submitted a Freedom of Information Act request, seeking release of documents concerning policy on collecting such information, and records containing information actually collected. The FBI initially released 298 pages (48 partially redacted) of training material, previously released for a similar request by the ACLU’s Atlanta affiliate. The ACLU filed suit. With additional releases, the FBI identified 1,553 pages of potentially responsive records: training materials, “domain intelligence notes,” “program assessments,” “electronic communications,” and maps. The district court held that the FBI appropriately withheld records under a FOIA exemption for law enforcement information whose release could “interfere with enforcement proceedings,” 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(A). The Sixth Circuit affirmed; release of publicly available information selectively used in investigations may reveal law-enforcement priorities and methodologies and interfere with enforcement. The ACLU’s proposed procedure for resolving the dispute was inadequately protective of sensitive information; in camera review was appropriate. View "Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, in his official capacity as the Director of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD), bringing a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Florida's statutory scheme for involuntarily admitting intellectually disabled persons to residential services, Florida Statutes 393.11. The court certified questions to the Supreme Court of Florida regarding the scope of the APD's obligations under the statute. View "J.R. v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Cooney divorced; she obtained sole custody of their sons. Later, her ex‐husband petitioned for change of custody. A court‐appointed expert diagnosed Cooney as having Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, in which a person produces or feigns physical or emotional symptoms in another person under her care. A therapist reported to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services that Cooney was abusing the children; DCFS investigated and entered an indicated finding of mental injury. Cooney filed an appeal, during which the ALJ recorded proceedings on microcassettes. Cooney retained a private court‐reporting company to transcribe the hearing as it occurred, creating the “Fishman transcripts.” After the appeal was denied, Cooney sought judicial review. Ultimately, Cooney filed a federal complaint, alleging that the DCFS representatives conspired to deprive her of her due process rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983; she claimed that the DCFS transcripts were “altered” at defendants’ direction, and that this caused delay and expense to convince the court to use the Fishman transcripts. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that no reasonable jury could infer conspiracy from the mere existence of discrepancies in the transcripts, and ordered Cooney to show cause why a Rule 38 award should not be entered against her. View "Cooney v. Casady" on Justia Law

Officer Dennis Nelson, a police officer with the Orem City Police Department (OCPD), was terminated from his position for using excessive force during a booking at the Orem City Jail. The Orem City Employee Appeals Board (Board) upheld the termination. The court of appeals upheld the Board's decision, concluding (1) the OCPD's decision to terminate Nelson was not inconsistent with prior instances of discipline under OCPD's excessive force policy; (2) alternatively, the Board justified any disparate application of OCPD's policy; and (3) the Board did not violate Nelson's procedural due process rights at his hearing before the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in applying an abuse of discretion standard of review; and (2) the court of appeals correctly found that any procedural due process violations at the hearing were harmless. View "Nelson v. City of Orem" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the city alleging that the city's zoning scheme violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court concluded that the zoning ordinances at issue were content-neutral, time, place and manner regulations subject to intermediate scrutiny; the zoning scheme was narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest; and there were reasonable alternative avenues in which plaintiffs could operate an adult entertainment business despite the zoning ordinances. Accordingly, the zoning ordinances did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Peterson, et al. v. City of Florence" on Justia Law

Based on misconduct that he allegedly committed in his previous positions as a police officer and deputy sheriff, the Transportation Security Administration suspended and ultimately revoked Gargiulo’s security clearance, which was necessary for his job as a Federal Air Marshall. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed. On appeal, Gargiulo argued that the agency deprived him of constitutional due process by not timely providing him with documentary materials relied upon in deciding to suspend his security clearance. Although he was given notice of the reasons for the suspension of his security clearance as early as August 2008, he was not provided with copies of the documentary materials until May 2009, three months after he was suspended from his job. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that security clearance decisions do not implicate any due process rights. View "Gargiulo v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Petitioners, residents of Maui, challenged the Maui County Council's (MCC) passage of two bills related to the development of a residential community on 670 acres of land in Wailea (Wailea 670 project), arguing that MCC and its committee, the Land Use Committee (LUC) failed to satisfy the requirements of the State open meetings law, known as the Sunshine Law. Specifically, Petitioners claimed (1) the recessing and reconvening of two meetings without providing additional notice and opportunity for public oral testimony violated the Sunshine Law; and (2) the circulation of memoranda among the board membership outside a duly noticed meeting violated the Sunshine Law. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of Respondents, MCC, County of Maui, and the land developer. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the LUC and MCC did not violate the Sunshine Law by reconvening the two meetings beyond a single continuance without posting a new agenda and without accepting public oral testimony at every reconvened meeting; and (2) the MCC violated the Sunshine Law by distributing written memoranda among its members outside of a duly noticed meeting, but the violation did not require invalidation of MCC's passage of the Wailea 670 bills. View "Kanahele v. Maui County Council" on Justia Law

Hester, a white male, began working for the Department’s laboratory in 1994. In 2007 he was reprimanded for failing to timely report test results. Hester later applied for promotion. Liu interviewed him, but chose another white male. When the supervisory position opened again, Hester again applied and was interviewed. Liu chose a white female in her mid-twenties, Gentry, who had been working in the lab for four years, citing Gentry’s performance record and concern that Hester did not have a good working relationship with others. In 2009, Hester received a form listing his “performance deficiencies.” A second performance appraisal report found that Hester still did not meet expectations for “job knowledge” and “communication.” The Department terminated his employment. Hester, then in his 50s, could be fired only for just cause. The State Employees Appeals Commission rejected his challenge. Hester sued, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that Indiana was immune from liability for private damages under the ADEA, and that Hester did not adequately show that the Department discharged Hester because of a protected characteristic. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hester v. IN Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed suit claiming that the USCIS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and the Due Process Clause, by denying the husband's I-130 petition without affording them the opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff's ex-husband regarding his statement that their marriage was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that there was no statutory right of cross-examination in I-130 visa adjudications. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs' due process rights were violated where the immediate relative status for an alien spouse was a right to which citizen applicants were entitled and that protected interest was entitled to the protections of due process; plaintiffs' showed sufficient prejudice; and additional process was due in this case pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the due process claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ching v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law