Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Lebanon sought to annex several hundred acres of nearby property. The owners of the property subject to the annexation, including Appellees, filed a lawsuit against the City to invalidate the annexation ordinance. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City, by intentionally manipulating the annexation boundaries to guarantee a successful annexation, violated Appellees’ constitutional rights. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the boundaries of territory to be annexed must be “natural or regular” and that the boundaries of the proposed annexation in this case did not meet this standard. The Supreme Court reversed and declared the annexation valid, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in applying a “natural or regular” standard; and (2) the City’s annexation fully complied the the statutory requirements and did not violate Appellees’ constitutional rights. View "City of Lebanon v. Goodin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the City's Ordinance No. 2886-12, which generally prohibits targeted picketing within 50 feet of a residential dwelling. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of the City's motion to dismiss. At issue are sections 62-79 and 62-77. The court concluded that the Ordinance's ban on targeted picketing, section 62-79, was content-neutral, furthered a significant government interest, was narrowly tailored, and left open ample alternate channels for speech. Therefore, section 62-79 was facially constitutional and the district court dismissed plaintiff's challenge as to section 62-79. The court concluded however, that section 62-77 granted private citizens unbridled discretion to invoke the City's power to regulate speech in public fora abutting private residences. Accordingly, the court concluded that the loitering provision was facially unconstitutional and invalid. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Bell, et al. v. City of Winter Park, FL, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging, among other things, that defendants violated their First Amendment and substantive due process rights by closing down Royal Crown's day care facility in retaliation for a letter of complaint that Royal Crown sent to a New York State senator. On appeal, the individually named defendants challenged from the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and from the denial of their motion to reconsider. The court concluded that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity solely because closing down Royal Crown may have been justified under the Health Code; defendants' motivation in closing down Royal Crown was material to Royal Crown's First Amendment and substantive due process claims and the court did not have jurisdiction to consider whether the dispute about defendants' motivation was genuine; properly assuming on this interlocutory appeal that defendants retaliated against Royal Crown for speech protected by the First Amendment, defendants' action was not objectively reasonable; Royal Crown's First Amendment and substantive due process rights to be free from retaliation and irrational government action in response to its letter to the Senator were clearly established at the time that defendants closed down plaintiff's day care facility; and therefore, defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Royal Crown Day Care LLC v. Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kenneth Lahm appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to defendants, Detective Michael Farrington and the Town of Tilton. Plaintiff sued defendants for negligence. Farrington interviewed an alleged victim who was recovering from severe burns and bruises at Concord Hospital, and who stated that she believed she had been sexually assaulted. The alleged victim claimed that, three days earlier, she had gone home with plaintiff after drinking approximately four beers at a bar. She claimed that, upon arriving at plaintiff's house, plaintiff gave her two drinks containing Red Bull, after which she "passed out" and did not remember anything until waking three days later in plaintiff's bed, without any clothes, and discovering severe burns and bruises on her body. Following plaintiff's arrest and the search of his house, an evidentiary probable cause hearing was held, at which a judge found probable cause that plaintiff had committed second-degree assault. Plaintiff hired private investigators, who interviewed, among other people, neighbors who recalled seeing the alleged victim outside plaintiff's house during the time she claimed to have been passed out. The investigators also interviewed a friend of plaintiff, a medical doctor who said that he spoke to the alleged victim by phone about her injuries, and that she told him they had been caused by her having accidentally fallen onto a wood stove. Plaintiff claimed that, once the prosecution received this and other "exculpatory information," which he provided to the court, it dropped the pending charge against him. Plaintiff sued Farrington and the Town, alleging that Farrington had conducted a negligent investigation prior to his arrest, and that the Town was vicariously liable. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis, among other grounds, that Farrington "did not have a legal duty to investigate beyond establishing probable cause before arresting and bringing a criminal charge against [Lahm]." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that immunizing police officers from "extended liability" was an interest that outweighs plaintiff's claimed interest in requiring a "reasonable investigation beyond just finding probable cause" prior to arrest. Because Farrington owed no duty to plaintiff, he could not be found liable for negligence on these facts. Absent tortious conduct by Farrington, the Town could not be vicariously liable for his conduct. View "Lahm v. Farrington" on Justia Law

In 2008, Shields, an Illinois prisoner was lifting weights and ruptured the pectoralis tendon in his left shoulder. Although he received some medical attention, he did not receive the prompt surgery needed for effective treatment. Due to oversights and delays by those responsible for his medical care, too much time passed for surgery to do any good. He has serious and permanent impairment that could have been avoided. After his release from prison, Shields filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that several defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Shields was the victim not of any one person’s deliberate indifference, but of a system of medical care that diffused responsibility for his care to the point that no single individual was responsible for seeing that he timely received the care he needed. As a result, no one person can be held liable for any constitutional violation. Shields’ efforts to rely on state medical malpractice law against certain private defendants also failed. View "Shields v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

After plaintiff sought to obtain records from the SSA related to his father's disability status in order to support his efforts to obtain proceeds of his father's life insurance policy, plaintiff filed suit pro se alleging that the failure to provide the requested records violated the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. The SSA eventually voluntarily provided the requested records to plaintiff. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of his claim for damages and litigation fees under the Privacy Act and FOIA. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claim for damages under the Privacy Act because the Act guarantees access only to an individual's own records and does not require federal agencies to provide information that pertains to a requesting individual, but is contained in another individual's records. However, because FOIA allows for fee shifting where, as here, a federal agency voluntarily complies with a requested disclosure following the filing of a FOIA lawsuit, the court vacated that portion of the district court's judgment denying plaintiff's request for $350 in litigation costs and remanded with instructions. View "Warren v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Denver police arrested Marvin Booker on a warrant for failure to appear at a hearing regarding a drug charge. During booking, Booker died while in custody after officers restrained him in response to alleged insubordination. Several officers pinned Booker face-down to the ground, one placed him in a chokehold, and another tased him. The officers sought medical help for Booker, but he could not be revived. Booker’s estate sued Deputies Faun Gomez, James Grimes, Kyle Sharp, Kenneth Robinette, and Sergeant Carrie Rodriguez, alleging they used excessive force and failed to provide Booker with immediate medical care. Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied their motion because disputed facts precluded summary judgment. The Defendants appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Estate of Marvin L. Booker, et al v. Gomez, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a real estate broker in Puerto Rico who was a vocal critic of the Puerto Rico Real Estate Examining Board. After the Board denied Plaintiff’s application for a license to establish a bilingual real estate school, Plaintiff filed suit against the Board and several individuals associated with it, claiming that the Board denied her a license in retaliation for her public criticism of the Board, thereby violating her First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, concluding that the Board had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason - the tardiness of Plaintiff’s application - for rejecting the application. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed vacated the district court’s judgment, holding that Plaintiff’s allegations plausibly stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Remanded. View "Maloy v. Ballori-Lage" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) raising constitutional challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119; raising statutory challenges to actions of HHS and the Commissioner relating to the implementation of the ACA and prior Medical legislation; and attacking the failure of defendants to render an "accounting" that would alter the American people to the insolvency towards which Medicare and Social Security programs were heading. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's dismissal of their claims. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that 26 U.S.C. 5000A, which was sustained as a valid exercise of the taxing power, violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of the taking of private property without just compensation and violated the origination clause. The court concluded that plaintiffs' substantive attack on the Social Security Program Operations Manual System (POMS) provisions was clearly foreclosed by its decision in Hall v. Sebelius, holding that the statutory text establishing Medicare Part A precludes any option not to be entitled to benefits. The court rejected plaintiffs' second statutory claim attacking an interim final rule. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to provide a legal argument for their claims against the Commissioner and Secretary, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claim to an "accounting." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Assoc. Amer. Physicians, et al. v. Sebelius, et al." on Justia Law

After Scott Schuette, who was working as a police officer at the time, responded to an accident at the local high school he began experiencing mental health problems. Schuette was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Schuette filed a claim petition seeking workers’ compensation benefits for PTSD. A compensation judge denied Schuette’s claim, finding that Schuette’s PTSD lacked a physical component and was thus not a compensable injury under Minnesota law. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed, determining (1) to be compensable under Lockwood v. Independent School District No. 877, an injury must include a physical component; and (2) the compensation judge’s findings that Schuette’s PTSD did not result in a physical brain injury had substantial evidentiary support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the compensation judge’s findings were not manifestly contrary to the evidence; and (2) applying the doctrine of stare decisis, Schuette’s request to overrule Lockwood was declined. View "Schuette v. City of Hutchinson" on Justia Law