Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, appealed from the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff sought an Order to Show Cause, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from levying against his SSI benefits to enforce a child support order. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 659(a) authorized levy against SSI benefits provided under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., to satisfy the benefits recipient's child support obligations. The court concluded that SSI benefits were not based upon remuneration for employment within the meaning of section 659(a); section 659(a) did not preclude plaintiff's claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the exception to federal jurisdiction for divorce matters did not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment to the extent the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the agency defendants and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against Bank of America because his complaint had not alleged facts establishing that the bank was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Sykes v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the District alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 706 and 794a. Plaintiffs' claims involved disputes with the District over the manner in which the District implemented individualized education programs. The court concluded that plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1491, before filing their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in the district court. Further, the futility, inadequate remedy, and contrary to law exceptions were not applicable in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant summary judgment in favor of the District. View "J.B., et al. v. Avilla R-XIII School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former members of the armed forces, brought suit against defendants, two former Secretaries of Defense, alleging that they were victims of rape and sexual misconduct by fellow servicemembers during their military careers. Plaintiffs sought money damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The court held that no Bivens action will lie where special factors counsel hesitation in creating an implied right of action and special factors clearly counsel hesitation in implying a cause of action for injuries arising out of military service. The court concluded that judicial abstention was the proper course in this case pursuant to Chappell v. Wallace, United States v. Stanley, and Feres v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Cioca v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed suit against the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy and others, alleging violation of his constitutional rights in an administrative decision which suspended him from practice before naval courts. The disciplinary proceedings stemmed from plaintiff's filing of an appellate brief containing statements he knew were false and misleading. The court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that the Navy JAG had authority to discipline plaintiff; plaintiff received ample due process and his Fifth Amendment rights were not violated during the proceedings against him; and the record did not support plaintiff's Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551, 701, and 706, claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims and denied his request for mandamus review. View "Partington v. Houck, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michael Battaglia worked for defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) since 1985. He alleged he received a demotion in retaliation for making certain workplace complaints and comments. In suing UPS, he alleged that his demotion violated the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) and the Law Against Discrimination (LAD). Plaintiff also alleged breach of contract, relying on employee manuals stating that employees would not be disciplined for complaints. The trial court dismissed the contract claim for lack of evidence. Following numerous arguments over jury instructions, the court directed the jury that it could consider evidence involving credit cards, meal practices “and other things” on the CEPA claim. The jury found UPS liable on the CEPA and LAD claims, and awarded plaintiff $500,000 in economic damages and $500,000 in emotional distress damages. UPS made numerous post-trial motions, and the court granted its request for remittitur of the emotional distress award, reducing it to $205,000. The parties cross-appealed. The appellate panel affirmed the CEPA claim and dismissal of plaintiff's contract claim, but reversed the LAD verdict for lack of evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision to the extent that it dismissed the LAD claim and affirmed the CEPA verdict. Under the LAD, an employee who voices complaints and allegedly suffers a retaliatory employment action need only demonstrate a good-faith belief that the complained-of conduct violates the LAD. An identifiable victim of actual discrimination is not required. An LAD plaintiff may only recover an award for future emotional distress if evidence of permanency is offered in the form of an expert opinion. In order to succeed on a fraud-based CEPA claim, a plaintiff must reasonably believe that the complained-of activity was occurring and was fraudulent. View "Battaglia v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the OHA after she was terminated. At issue on appeal was whether plaintiff's appeal must be dismissed for failure to order the necessary portions of a trial transcript. Plaintiff ordered the portion of the trial transcript that contained her testimony and the remaining portions of the transcript were not transcribed and were not available. The court could not properly review the issues in the case based on the record plaintiff provided and, therefore, the court did not address the merits of plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim. Accordingly, the court granted the OHA's motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal based on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b). View "Kelly v. Omaha Housing Authority, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the Hays County Sheriff's Office for over twenty years, filed suit alleging constitutional violations against Hays County; the Sheriff's Office; and Sheriff Gary Cutler, in his official and individual capacities. Plaintiff claimed that the comments he made during the Sheriff's Election motivated his demotion. The court found that defendants failed to show that they would have terminated plaintiff in the absence of his protected speech and, in the alternative, plaintiff was speaking as a citizen and his letter to the editor was protected speech under the First Amendment. The court concluded that plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute as to a material fact relating to his claim of First Amendment retaliation and that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Haverda v. Hays County, et al." on Justia Law

Driver was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The Director of Revenue (DOR) subsequently suspended Driver's license and disqualified him from driving a commercial motor vehicle. Driver filed a petition for a trial de novo in the trial court challenging the constitutional validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 302.700 and 302.755, which disqualify drivers who are convicted of an alcohol-related traffic offense from driving a commercial vehicle for not less than one year. The trial court ruled that sections 302.500 and 302.700 violated the U.S. Constitution based on National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (hereinafter NFIB) and reinstated Driver's driving privileges, including his commercial driver's license (CDL). The Supreme Court (1) reversed the trial court's judgment as to the constitutional validity of section 302.700 under NFIB, holding that NFIB was inapplicable to Driver's argument; and (2) denied Driver's due process and equal protection arguments, finding that they were without merit. View "Bone v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Deputy defendant Johnny Barrientos of the Dona Ana County Sheriff's Department appealed a district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment in a 28 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by Lucia Fancher, individually and on behalf of the estate of her son, Nick Dominguez. Fancher alleges Barrientos used excessive force when he shot Dominguez seven times following a confrontation. Dominguez died as a result of one or more gunshot wounds. Barrientos argued he was entitled to qualified immunity because his use of deadly force was objectively reasonable and did not violate clearly established law. The district court granted Barrientos's motion for summary judgment to the extent Fancher's claim arose from the firing of the initial shot, but denied the motion to the extent the claim arose from the subsequent six. The Tenth Circuit concluded after its review that it lacked jurisdiction to hear two of the three arguments Barrientos raised on appeal. The Court was unpersuaded by Barrientos' third argument. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the denial of his motion for summary judgment. View "Fancher v. Barrientos, et al" on Justia Law

Appellants claimed that ATF lacked statutory authority to issue a demand letter to firearms licensees classified as a "dealer" or "pawnbroker" in certain states, and even if it possessed statutory authority, that its decision to issue the demand letter to the chosen licensees was arbitrary and capricious. The court concluded that 18 U.S.C. 923(g)(5)(A) "unambiguously authorized the demand letter," and the court's "inquiry ends at Chevron step one." The court rejected appellants' claim that section 923(g)(1)(A), 923(g)(1)(B), 923(g)(3)(A), and 923(g)(7) must be read to limit ATF's demand letter authority; the demand letter did not run afoul of section 926(a)'s prohibition; and the appropriation rider at issue did not prohibit ATF from issuing the demand letter because it fell short of consolidating or centralizing records. The court addressed the remaining claims, concluding that ATF's decision was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "10 Ring Precision, Inc., et al. v. Jones" on Justia Law