Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011 Wisconsin reduced subsidies for the Wisconsin Care Program, which funds grants for organizations administering programs for disabled persons who live in group homes. The plaintiffs are developmentally disabled and suffered the largest cuts. Persons who had received smaller payments bore smaller cuts. For some (frail elderly) per capita payments increased. Plaintiffs claim that making larger absolute cuts for persons whose care is most expensive violated the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act and that reduction in payments increases the risk that they will be moved from group homes to institutions. The district judge noted that states have waived sovereign immunity with respect to the Rehabilitation Act, as a condition to receiving federal funds. The Supreme Court has held that the portions of the ADA that are not designed to implement disabled persons’ constitutional rights cannot be used to override states’ sovereign immunity. The district court concluded that the relevant provisions of the ADA do not concern the Constitution and that other claims were premature because no plaintiff has been moved to an institution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that without information about care provided to other disabled persons, there is no useful theory of discrimination. View "Amundson v. WI Dep't of Health Servs." on Justia Law

The Clinics filed suit challenging California Welfare and Institutions Code 14131.10, which eliminated certain Medi-Cal benefits that the state deemed optional, including adult dental, podiatry, optometry, and chiropractic services. The court reversed the district court's holding that the Clinics have a private right of action to challenge the Department's implementation of the state plan amendments (SPA) prior to obtaining approval; affirmed that the Clinics have a private right of action to bring a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the validity of section 14131.10; and reversed the district court's interpretation of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq., holding that section 14131.10 impermissibly eliminated mandatory services from coverage. View "California Ass'n of Rural Health Clinics v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Cynthia Pfeifer filed suit against Defendant-Appellee Federal Express Corporation in the District of Kansas, alleging that the company fired her in retaliation for receiving workers' compensation benefits. Plaintiff filed suit fifteen months following the termination within the applicable state statute of limitations, but outside the limit of six months enumerated in her employment agreement. The district court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the contract clause was reasonable and was not a violation of public policy. Because no Kansas law appeared to control the outcome of the case, the Tenth Circuit certified two questions to the Kansas Supreme Court regarding the ability of parties to shorten the applicable statute of limitations by contract, and if not, then was the six-month limitation unreasonable in this case? The Kansas Court responded that the contract clause in question here did violate public policy. Because of that answer, the Court did not respond to the Tenth Circuit's second question. In light of these answers, the federal district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Pfeifer v. Federal Express Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, the Chief Administrative Officer (OCAO), of the United States House of Representatives, for alleged racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Congressional Accountability Act (CAA), 2 U.S.C. 1301-1438. The court concluded that the Speech or Debate Clause did not require the dismissal of this action; plaintiff could proceed with all of her claims under the CAA, subject to the applicable strictures of the Speech or Debate Clause; and, accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Howard v. Chief Admin. Officer of the U.S." on Justia Law

The California Supreme Court held that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the California Constitution; state voters then passed a ballot initiative, Proposition 8, amending the state constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Same-sex couples who wished to marry filed suit in federal court, challenging Proposition 8. State officials refused to defend the law, so the district court allowed the initiative’s official proponents to intervene, declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional, and enjoined its enforcement. State officials declined to appeal. The intervenors appealed. The Ninth Circuit certified a question, which the California Supreme Court answered: official proponents of a ballot initiative have authority to assert the state’s interest to defend the constitutionality of the initiative when public officials refuse to do so. The Ninth Circuit concluded that petitioners had standing and affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the intervenors did not have standing to appeal. Article III of the Constitution confines the power of federal courts to deciding actual “Cases” or “Controversies.” A litigant must demonstrate a personal and tangible harm throughout all stages of litigation. The intervenors had standing to initiate this case against the California officials responsible for enforcing Proposition 8, but once the district court issued its order, they no longer had any injury to redress and state officials chose not to appeal. The intervenors had not been ordered to do or refrain from doing anything. Their “generalized grievance” is insufficient to confer standing. The fact that a state thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override settled law to the contrary. View "Hollingsworth v. Perry" on Justia Law

Kebodeaux was convicted by special court-martial of a federal sex offense. After serving his sentence and receiving a bad-conduct discharge from the Air Force, he moved to Texas where he registered with state authorities as a sex offender. Congress later enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which requires federal sex offenders to register in the states where they live, study, and work, 42 U.S.C. 16913(a). SORNA applies to offenders who, when SORNA became law, had completed their sentences. When Kebodeaux moved within Texas and failed to update his registration, the federal government prosecuted him and the district court convicted him under SORNA. The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that SORNA’s registration requirements, as applied to Kebodeaux, fall within the scope of congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress did not apply SORNA to an individual who was, before its enactment, “unconditionally released,” but to an individual already subject to federal registration requirements. SORNA somewhat modified registration requirements to which Kebodeaux was already subject, to make more uniform "a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration requirements." At the time of his offense and conviction, Kebodeaux was subject to the Wetterling Act, which imposed similar registration requirements and was promulgated under the Military Regulation Clause (Art. I, s. 8, cl. 14), and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The same power that authorized Congress to promulgate the Uniform Code of Military Justice and punish Kebodeaux’s crime also authorized Congress to make the civil registration requirement at issue a consequence of conviction. Imposing a civil registration requirement that would apply upon the release of an offender like Kebodeaux is “eminently reasonable,” as is assignment of a special role to the federal government in ensuring compliance with federal sex offender registration requirements. View "United States v. Kebodeaux" on Justia Law

Respondent was employed by Petitioner. After Respondent was terminated, she filed a complaint with the West Virginia Human Rights Commission alleging that she was unlawfully discriminated against. The director of operations for the Commission issued a finding that no probable cause was found in Respondent's complaint and ordered it dismissed. After the assistant attorney general (Sheridan) conducted an administrative review hearing, the Commission found probable cause was alleged in the complaint. Sheridan then filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Respondent in proceedings before the Commission. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Sheridan, arguing that he was conflicted from representing Respondent because he had acted in a judicial capacity while conducting the administrative review. The administrative law judge denied the motion. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court (1) declined to issue the writ insofar as it requested that Respondent's claims be dismissed; (2) declined to order that a subpoena be issued to allow Petitioner to access documents reviewed during the administrative review; but (3) issued the writ to state that Sheridan could not represent Respondent in proceedings before the Commission. View "State ex rel. Ten S. Mgmt. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n" on Justia Law

In early 2013, S.R.B.'s father filed a petition for his involuntary commitment. The petition alleged S.R.B. was mentally ill and there was a reasonable expectation of a serious risk of harm if left untreated. The petition alleged that S.R.B. called a nearby school looking for his daughter, wife, and lover, of which he had none. The petition also alleged S.R.B.'s neighbor saw S.R.B. "walking around his house this morning with nothing on but his underwear shorts." The father requested emergency treatment, noting S.R.B. was not taking his medication. S.R.B. appealed the trial court's order for hospitalization and treatment at the North Dakota State Hospital for ninety days. The Supreme Court held the trial court's findings were insufficient to support the trial court's order, and remanded for expedited findings. On remand, the trial court entered additional findings and issued an amended order. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence that supported the order for hospitalization and treatment. View "Interest of S.R.B." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant George Lopez conducted mediations in a program created and managed by the Administrative Office of Courts of the State of Utah. In 2006, he was removed from the panel of mediators that mediated certain domestic matters. Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court alleging that his removal from that list of mediators violated his right to due process and his right to equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. He also alleged breach of contract, breach of implied contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Upon review of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Tenth Circuit found that because Plaintiff's primary argument was based on his alleged contractual rights as a public employee, and because the Court found that there was no implied contract (because evidence in the record revealed Plaintiff was not a public employee), Plaintiff's arguments necessarily failed. View "Lopez v. Admin Office of the Court" on Justia Law

Swanson purchased a lakeside home, next to the home of Whitworth, the elected mayor of Chetek. Swanson obtained a permit for “remodel-repair” and began work, including installation of a three-foot high fence between his property and Whitworth’s and along the street. Whitworth repeatedly told a building inspector that he should not have issued a permit; repeatedly entered the Swanson house without permission; used his influence to cause another inspector to delay a fence permit; told the fence installation team that Swanson was a drug dealer and unlikely to pay; and caused municipal prosecution of Swanson for construction of the fence in violation of a five-foot setback that did not apply to Swanson’s fence. Meanwhile, another neighbor of Swanson, installed a fence that encroached on part of Swanson’s property, without a permit, and was not prosecuted. Swanson filed a class-of-one equal protection suit and defamation and slander claims. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment for Whitworth, finding that Swanson did not show a similarly situated individual who received more favorable treatment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A clear showing of animus, absent a “robust comparison” to a similarly situated individual, may sustain a class-of-one equal protection claim. View "Swanson v. Whitworth" on Justia Law