Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Until 1998, Vanaria was employed by the Cook County Probation Department. He was terminated following investigation of allegations that he had sought sexual favors in exchange for looser conditions of probation. In 2002 the county rehired Vanaria, who was a political operative. He began working at a county hospital in a position excluded from decrees prohibiting hiring decisions based on politics. The hospital did not conduct background investigations of patronage hires. A pharmaceutical representative alleged that Vanaria had attempted to condition her participation in a hospital program on her giving him a massage. An investigation resulted in oral counseling for Vanaria, but no discipline. In 2007, Vanaria offered Krystal, an unemployed massage therapist, a position as a physical therapist. When she stated that she was not qualified as a physical therapist, he explained that he could make things happen because people owed him favors. He provided her with legitimate application forms and insurance paperwork. When Krystal returned to his office with her Social Security card, Vanaria asked Krystal to close the door and told her that if she truly wanted the job, she had to kiss and massage him. Krystal agreed to have Vanaria visit her at her home massage studio, where they had sexual contact. Krystal eventually called the hospital’s HR department and learned that no position had ever existed, Vanaria eventually pled guilty to official misconduct and bribery. The district court rejected Krystal’s Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), equal protection, and due process claims and state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Wilson v. Cook County" on Justia Law

A large group of African-American police officers and firefighters sued the City of Indianapolis, alleging that the examination process it uses to rank candidates for promotion in the police and fire departments has a disparate impact on black candidates and is intentionally discriminatory. They filed lawsuits targeting promotion decisions made in successive promotion cycles starting inv2002, but most of the challenged decisions were based on scores generated by testing administered by the police department in 2008 and the fire department in 2007. The district court dismissed many of the claims as either time-barred or substantively flawed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the district court mistakenly assumed that allegations of intentional discrimination necessarily defeat a disparate-impact claim, here the disparate-impact claims fail because they are stated as legal conclusions, without any factual content to support an inference that the examination procedures caused a disparate impact on black applicants for promotion. The disparate-treatment claims lacked evidentiary support and were properly resolved on summary judgment. Although the second complaint concerns a different set of promotion decisions, it attacked the same eligibility list that was at issue in the first case and was, therefore, barred. View "Adams v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a state prisoner housed at Red Onion State Prison (ROSP), filed suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000 cc et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging ROSP's 2010 Ramadan policy. ROSP had devised a new eligibility policy for 2010 where, in addition to signing up to participate in Ramadan, inmates had to provide some physical indicia of Islamic faith. The court vacated the district court's summary judgment order granting defendants qualified immunity on plaintiff's claims for monetary relief where defendants have failed to establish as a matter of law that the 2010 Ramadan policy, as applied to plaintiff, did not violate his First Amendment rights and where their alleged actions violated plaintiff's clearly established rights; vacated the district court's decision that the prison's abandonment of the policy mooted the claims for equitable relief where defendants failed to meet their "heavy burden" of establishing that it was "absolutely clear" that the 2010 Ramadan policy would not be reinstated; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wall v. Wade" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, African American officers who worked in a state penitentiary, filed suit under 41 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983 against supervisors for race based harassment and retaliation. On appeal, the officers challenged the district court's dismissal of their claims against Lieutenants Stoner, Haney, and Runge and against Sergeants Miles and Furby. The court concluded that the evidence revealed acts, comments, and inaction by Sergeant Miles sufficient to make out prima facie harassment claims against him, which must be reinstated and remanded; there was insufficient evidence of harassment by the other supervisors and therefore the claims against Lieutenant Stoner, Runge, and Haney, and Sergeant Furby were affirmed; the retaliation claims by supervisors were affirmed; and Sergeant Miles has not shown that he was entitled to qualified immunity on the officers' harassment claims, nor have Lieutenants Stoner and Haney shown they were entitled to qualified immunity on the retaliation claims of Officer Ellis. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ellis, et al. v. Houston, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a police detective used excessive force when arresting him for disorderly conduct. On appeal, the detective appealed the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss his official capacity claims where plaintiff was unable to introduce evidence adequate to support such claims; the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the question concerning whether the officers "could have just left the scene;" the district court did not commit plain error by allowing plaintiff to elicit testimony regarding alternative courses of action; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on the use of excessive force by using a modified version of instruction 4.40 from the Eighth Circuit Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions. View "Retz v. Seaton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former captain of a village fire department, filed this action against the department, its fire chief, and the board of fire commissioners (collectively, Defendants) after the board chose to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff alleged political discrimination in violation of the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 1983, retaliation in violation of the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act, and tortious interference with contractual relations. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all counts. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants presented legitimate, business-related grounds for their employment decisions, and Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the proffered explanations were pretextual. View "Pierce v. Cotuit Fire Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a public assistance recipient who was accepted to rent an apartment owned by RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC. Plaintiff’s caseworker indicated that Coach Lantern would have to include a Housing and Urban Development (HUD) tenancy addendum in Plaintiff’s lease for Plaintiff to be able to use her voucher for subsidized rent. Coach Lantern refused to include the addendum in Plaintiff’s lease. Because Plaintiff could not use the voucher unless Coach Lantern included the addendum in her lease, Plaintiff did not rent the apartment. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission alleging that Coach Lantern’s policy of refusing to include the HUD tenancy addendum in her lease constituted a refusal to participate in the voucher program, which amounted to discrimination against Plaintiff on the basis of her status as a public assistance recipient in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Coach Lantern. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Coach Lantern because the undisputed facts showed that Coach Lantern did not discriminate against Plaintiff in violation of the MHRA. View "Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, three individuals ran for the Colorado House of Representatives, House District 61: Kathleen Curry was a write-in candidate; Roger Wilson was the Democratic nominee, and Luke Korkowski was the Republican nominee. Under Colorado law, individual contributions to Ms. Curry were capped at $200, and individual contributions to each of her opponents were capped at $400. Contributors to Ms. Curry’s campaign sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The district court rejected the claims and granted summary judgment to the state officials. The Tenth Circuit reversed on the equal-protection claim; and in light of this, declined to address the summary-judgment ruling on the First Amendment claims. View "Riddle v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

In Wisconsin, Register of Deeds is an elected position. If a vacancy occurs mid-term, the governor may appoint an interim Register for any unexpired portion of the term. The Marinette County Register announced her mid-term retirement. Chasensky, then employed as Chief Deputy Register of Deeds, sought the interim appointment. Chasensky was interviewed by Esser, Walker’s appointments official, who informed Chasensky that he would forward her application to Governor Walker for appointment to the position. Esser subsequently learned that Chasensky was involved in a personal bankruptcy proceeding. Esser informed Chasensky that Walker would not appoint her as interim Register. Chasensky claims that Werwie, Walker’s official spokesperson, publically broadcast that she was not appointed because she was in a bankruptcy proceeding and that “[d]erogatory comments and innuendo regarding [her] bankruptcy, personal financial matters and character which impugned and harmed [her] professional and personal reputation were intentionally publically disclosed by Governor Walker and Mr. Werwie” when Governor Walker spoke on the FOX television network. Werwie publically announced that Walker had planned to appoint her until he learned of her bankruptcy. In her suit alleging violation of privacy rights, employment rights, and of 11 U.S.C. 525(a) (bankruptcy discrimination), the district court held that the defendants waived qualified immunity by failing to raise it before their motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Chasensky’s privacy and equal protection claims. View "Chasensky v. Walker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit challenging the legality of the toll charged by the MWAA for use of the Dules Toll Road. The district court dismissed the complaint on numerous grounds. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were barred neither by the standing requirement of Article III nor the prudential restrictions the court has recognized on its own judicial power; under the Elizabeth River Crossings OpCo, LLC v. Meeks framework, the tolls charged for passage on the Dules Toll Road are user fees, not taxes, under Virginia law; and therefore, their collection by the MWAA did not run afoul of the Virginia Constitution and did not violate the due process rights of motorists. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint. View "Corr v. Metropolitan Washington" on Justia Law