Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the constitutionality of Arizona's Proposition 100. Proposition 100 commands that Arizona state courts could not set bail for serious felony offenses as prescribed by the legislature if the person charged has entered or remained in the United States illegally and if the proof was evident or the presumption great as to the charge. After reviewing the record, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and partial dismissal, concluding that plaintiffs have not raised triable issues of fact as to whether Proposition 100 and its implementing procedures violated the substantive and procedural due process guarantees of the United State's Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, nor whether the Proposition 100 laws were preempted by federal immigration law. The court concluded that the Arizona Legislature and Arizona voters passed the Proposition 100 laws to further the state's legitimate and compelling interest in seeing that those accused of serious state-law crimes were brought to trial. View "Lopez-Valenzuela v. County of Maricopa" on Justia Law

IRTL challenged the constitutionality of several Iowa campaign-finance laws, an administrative rule, and two forms. The court concluded, inter alia, that IRTL lacked standing to challenge the definitions of "political committee" and "permanent organization" because it faced no credible threat or present or future prosecution; the first two sentences of Iowa Code subsection 68A.404(3), the second sentence of subsection 68A.404(3)(a), the entirety of subsection 68A.404(4)(a), the first and third sentences of Iowa Administrative Code rule 351-4.9(15), and Form Ind-Exp-O were constitutional as applied to IRTL and groups whose major purpose was not nominating or electing candidates; the first and third sentences of subsection 68A.404(3)(a), the second sentence of Iowa Administrative Code rule 351-4.9(15), the entirety of subsections 68A.404(3)(a)(1) and 68A.402B(3), and Form Dr-3 were unconstitutional as applied to IRTL and groups whose major purpose was not nominating or electing candidates; and Iowa Code section 68A.503 was constitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Iowa Right To Life Committee v. Tooker, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Shannon Cavanaugh suffered a serious head injury after she was tasered by a Woods Cross City police officer. She sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The jury found for the City and the officer who tasered her. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff argued the trial court erred: (1) in refusing to exclude certain testimony from the officer concerning his beliefs prior to using the taser; (2) in refusing to grant Plaintiff a new trial due to insufficient evidence she was an immediate threat; (2) in refusing to instruct the jury on what constitutes "resisting arrest;" and (4) refusing to submit Plaintiff's excessive force question to the jury. Rejecting all of Plaintiff's ground for appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court. View "Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Defendant, the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, alleging that, in retaliation for Plaintiff's anti-regulatory stance, Defendant used his oversight powers to retaliate unlawfully against Plaintiff. The federal district court dismissed the complaint on immunity grounds. At issue before the First Circuit Court of Appeals was the scope and extent of the immunities offered to state officials, such as Defendant, whose duties encompass both prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions. The First Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that, notwithstanding Defendant's dual roles, Defendant was, with one exception, entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiff's suit. View "Goldstein v. Galvin" on Justia Law

Petitioner Justin Czyzewski appealed a Superior Court ruling that denied his request for a declaration that although he was convicted of attempted sexual assault, he was not required to register as a sex offender under New Hampshire law. Although the record did not contain the details of his conviction for attempted sexual assault, the trial court noted that the petitioner "engaged in conduct in an online chat room with an undercover police detective, whom [he] believed to be a 13-year old female." The petitioner lived in Pennsylvania but, as the trial court stated, "was required to register as a sex offender [there] because he would be required to register in New Hampshire." Upon review, the Supreme Court could not " subscribe to the petitioner's statutory interpretation," and affirmed the Superior Court's ruling. View "Czyzewski v. New Hampshire Department of Safety" on Justia Law

Glenn Coyne, a Grand Junction Police Department (GJPD) officer, answered Plaintiff Misti Lee Schneider 's 911 call about an altercation with her teenage son and, during a visit to her home late the next night, raped her. Shortly thereafter, Officer Coyne was arrested and fired, and a few days later committed suicide. Plaintiff sued the GJPD under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of her substantive due process right to bodily integrity. She alleged that inadequate hiring and training of Officer Coyne, inadequate investigation of a prior sexual assault complaint against him, and inadequate discipline and supervision of him caused her to be raped. In district court, the defendants did not contest Plaintiff's allegations about Officer Coyne's conduct. They moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Officer Coyne did not act under color of state law and that Plaintiff could not prove that they caused the rape or were deliberately indifferent to the risk that it would happen. The district court denied summary judgment on the first ground, holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Coyne acted under color of state law. It granted summary judgment on the second ground, concluding that Plaintiff could not prove essential facts to establish 1983 liability. Plaintiff appealed that ruling; defendants cross-appealed the color of state law ruling. "The events alleged in this case are tragic, and Officer Coyne's alleged conduct was a terrible crime. The state cannot prosecute Officer Coyne because he is dead, and Ms. Schneider is left with suing his supervisors and employer. . . . to hold [defendants] liable for Officer Coyne's actions, she faces stringent proof requirements under 1983 law, proof she is unable to muster." Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Court dismissed defendants' cross-appeal as moot. View "Schneider v. City of Grand Junction" on Justia Law

In 1995, when he was fourteen years old, Plaintiff was adjudicated a delinquent child with respect to certain firearm charges. In 2010, Plaintiff applied for an unrestricted Class A license to carry firearms. The City of Boston denied the application, finding that Plaintiff had a disqualifying conviction. Plaintiff filed a complaint for judicial review, alleging, among other things, that he did not have any convictions or adjudications on his juvenile record that would disqualify him under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, 131(d)(i) from obtaining a license. The municipal court dismissed the case, finding that Plaintiff was statutorily disqualified from possessing a license to carry a firearm due to his adjudication as a delinquent child for possession of a firearm without license. Plaintiff appealed, alleging that section 131(d)(i), as applied to his circumstances, violated his right to keep and bear arms under the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the challenged statute did not infringe on Plaintiff's Second Amendment rights. Remanded. View "Chardin v. Police Comm'r of Boston" on Justia Law

Higher Taste sued the Park district under 42 U.S.C. 1983, requesting a declaration that Resolution 40-05 violated its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and an injunction barring the resolution's enforcement. The district court granted Higher Taste's motion for a preliminary injunction, expressly ruling that Higher Taste had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The parties later executed a written settlement agreement. Higher Taste then moved for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b), which permitted an award to the "prevailing party" in certain civil rights actions, including those brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the motion. The court reversed and concluded that, because Higher Taste was a prevailing party within the meaning of section 1988, it should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. On remand, the district court should determine in the first instance whether such special circumstances exist. View "Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the Secretary's denial of their claims for Medicare coverage for dental services. Plaintiffs contended that this denial was premised on the Secretary's unreasonable interpretation of the Medicare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, which contravened the intent of Congress and violated plaintiffs' right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. The court concluded that, although the statutory provision for exclusion of dental services was ambiguous in the sense that plausible divergent constructions could be urged, the Secretary's interpretation of the statute was reasonable. The court also concluded that the Secretary's statutory interpretation warranted Chevron deference and the Secretary's statutory interpretation was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fournier v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Alpha Marketing brought this cause of action against the Arkansas Lottery Commission seeking declaratory relief that Alpha's registered trademarks of "Arkansas Lottery," "Arkansas Lotto," and "Lottery Arkansas" were valid and that it held exclusive rights to use them. Alpha also sought injunctive relief enjoining the Commission's alleged acts of trademark infringement and monetary damages. Alpha later amended its complaint, alleging ultra vires acts and an unconstitutional taking. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss Alpha's lawsuit on the basis that the Commission had sovereign immunity from the trademark-infringement claims. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commission was an entity of the State entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity; (2) Alpha's claims for injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief were barred by the defense of sovereign immunity; (3) the exceptions for waiver; ultra vires, arbitrary, capricious, or bad-faith acts; and takings did not apply. View "Ark. Lottery Comm'n v. Alpha Mktg." on Justia Law