Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Bruce Whitman had been employed by defendant City of Burton as the police chief from 2002 until 2007. Codefendant Charles Smiley, the Mayor, declined to reappoint plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed suit under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), alleging that he was not reappointed because he had threatened to pursue criminal charges against the mayor if the city did not comply with a city ordinance and pay him for unused sick, personal and vacation time he accumulated in 2003. Defendants contended that plaintiff had agreed to forgo any payout for accumulated leave in order to avoid a severe budgetary shortfall and that plaintiff was not reappointed because the mayor was dissatisfied with plaintiff's performance as police chief. A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff; the trial court denied defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. Defendants then appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that plaintiff's claim was not actionable under the WPA because he had acted to advance his own financial interests and not out of an altruistic motive of protecting the public. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that nothing in the WPA's language addressed an employee's motivation for engaging in protected conduct, nor did any language mandate that the employee's primary motivation for pursuing a claim under the Act be a desire to inform the public of matters of public concern. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for consideration of remaining issues on which that court did not formally rule, including whether the causation element of the WPA had been met. View "Whitman v. City of Burton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a contract FBI employee, sued the government under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 et seq., alleging sex discrimination and retaliation. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and for summary judgment. The court concluded that subsection (g) created a security exemption to Title VII where access was denied to a premise where secure information was kept. Therefore, plaintiff could not be granted relief under Title VII where the government advanced numerous reasons for revocation of her access to the building where secured information was kept, all of which were related to security breaches she allegedly committed. View "Toy v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of NGA with a top secret security clearance, informed the NGA of his marriage after the investigation for his security clearance had been completed but before he had begun work. The NGA conducted a reinvestigation into his security clearance and then revoked the security clearance. Plaintiff commenced this action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., against the NGA and its Director to reverse the NGA's decision, to reinstate his security clearance, and to award him back pay, benefits, and attorneys' fees. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to review a security clearance determination. The court concluded that plaintiff's speculative and conclusory allegations of constitutional violations were essentially recharacterizations of his challenge to the merits of the NGA's security clearance determination and that the court did not have jurisdiction to review such a determination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hegab v. Long" on Justia Law

AGC sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Caltrans and its officers, on the grounds that Caltrans' 2009 Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program unconstitutionally provided race- and sex-based preferences to certain groups. On appeal, AGC challenged the district court's adverse summary judgment rulings. The district court held that Caltrans' substantial statistical and anecdotal evidence provided a strong basis in evidence of discrimination against the four named groups, and that the program was narrowly tailored to benefit only those groups. The court dismissed AGC's appeal because AGC did not identify any of its members who have suffered or will suffer harm as a result of Caltrans' program, and therefore AGC had not established that it had associational standing to bring suit. View "Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Cal. Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law

This action arose out of Plaintiffs' alleged breach of a conservation restriction appurtenant to their Hudson, Massachusetts home. Plaintiffs and members of the Hudson Conservation Commission clashed over Plaintiffs' compliance efforts. In the meantime, a Hudson Police captain filed charges against Plaintiff for criminal harassment and threat to commit a crime based on Plaintiff's alleged misconduct to his neighbors. All charges were later dropped against Plaintiff. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the Town of Hudson, the Commission, and several state and local officials, alleging that Commission members, an administrator, and a building inspector violated the equal protection clause by selectively enforcing local laws against them and that the conduct of town officials and other defendants were so outrageous as to constitute substantive due process violations. The district court dismissed the suit. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' complaint did not plead facts sufficient to support any of their federal claims. View "Freeman v. Town of Hudson" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Iowa Department of Revenue assessed the value of Qwest Corporation's Iowa operating property. Qwest protested the assessment by challenging the general assembly's previous decision to tax the personal property of incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) but not competitive long distance telephone companies (CLDTCs) or wireless providers operating in Iowa. Specifically, Qwest argued that the tax scheme which taxed ILECs for the value of their personal property but not CLDTCs and wireless providers violated Qwest's equal protection rights. The State Board of Tax Review (Board) concluded that Qwest's constitutional rights were not violated. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and upheld the Board's assessment on Qwest, holding that imposing a tax on Iowa-based personal property of ILECs but not on that of CLDTCs or wireless service providers did not violate the Iowa Constitution, as the differential tax treatment of these enterprises is rationally related to legitimate state interests in encouraging the development of new competitive telecommunications infrastructure while raising revenue from those providers that historically had a regulated monopoly and continue to enjoy some advantages of that monopoly. View "Qwest Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Review" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned and operated certain water and sewer facilities in the City of Fort Wayne. The facilities were divided into two separate geographic areas - the North System and the Aboite System. In 2002 the City passed a resolution appropriating and condemning the North System. The City assessed damages in the amount of $14,759,500. Plaintiff challenged the condemnation proceedings alleging that the City failed to follow the proper eminent domain or condemnation statutes. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The City subsequently reaffirmed its initial resolution appropriating and condemning Plaintiff's North System and adopted a resolution assessing damages in the amount of $16,910,5000. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the trial court and requested a trial by jury. The trial court refused the trial request and granted the City's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Plaintiff had a right to the trial court's review of the record which included a full evidentiary hearing before a jury. View "Util. Ctr., Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly a participant in the Justice Department's Witness Security Program, brought suit pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, alleging that he was terminated from the Program without being afforded procedural due process. Plaintiff also alleged that following his termination he was placed in a Segregated Housing Unit (SHU) for 188 days and that this confinement violated due process and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim concerning his termination based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction in light of 18 U.S.C. 3521(f). However, with respect to SHU detention, the district court should have sua sponte granted plaintiff leave to replead before sua sponte dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "J.S. v. T'Kash" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the District of Columbia and others regarding the pretrial conditions of his confinement. The District agreed that the the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), requirement did not apply to plaintiff but urged the court to affirm the grant of summary judgment on his federal claims for failure to exhaust. The court joined its sister circuits and held that the PLRA exhaustion requirement did not apply because plaintiff was not a "prisoner" at the time he filed his complaint. Summary judgment was therefore inappropriately granted on his federal claims. As to his intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim, the court held that it had been abandoned because neither plaintiff's proposed amended complaint nor amicus brief, which he adopted, referenced that claim, and his pro se appellate brief provided no argument why the dismissal should be reversed. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and remanded plaintiff's federal claims to the district court. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Lesesne v. Doe, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three applicants for attorney positions under the Honors Program in 2006, alleged that they were not selected for interviews because of their political affiliations. Plaintiffs claimed that senior officials at the DOJ created records describing how an individual exercised First Amendment rights, in violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, in the form of annotations to plaintiffs' applications and internet printouts concerning their political affiliations. The court held that summary judgment was inappropriately granted on plaintiffs' Privacy Act claims under 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) and (e)(7). In light of the destruction of plaintiffs' records, a permissive spoliation inference was warranted because the senior DOJ officials had a duty to preserve the annotated applications and internet printouts given that DOJ investigation and future litigation were reasonably foreseeable. On remand, the district court shall construe the evidence in light of this negative spoliation inference, which would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that two of the plaintiffs were harmed by creation and use of the destroyed records. View "Gerlich, et al v. DOJ, et al" on Justia Law