Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Eugene, the Police Department (EPD), and others, alleging that they violated his First Amendment rights when they removed him from his position on the EPD K-9 team in retaliation for repeatedly airing concerns about work-related safety issues to his supervisors. The court concluded that the evidence presented to the jury did not reasonably permit the conclusion that plaintiff established a retaliation claim where, as here, a public employee reports departmental-safety concerns to his or her supervisors pursuant to a duty to do so, that employee did not speak as a private citizen and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and held that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hagen v. City of Eugene, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the termination of Jeffry Black, the former Executive Director of the Idaho Peace Officer Standards and Training Council (POST). Black asserted that the Idaho State Police (ISP) violated two provisions of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act ("the "Whistleblower Act") when it terminated him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ISP, holding that Black failed to engage in activity protected under the Act. Black appealed the district court's decision to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Black v. Idaho State Police" on Justia Law

Petitioners were current and former elected officials and appointed officers of the Village of Freeport. In 2008, Water Works Realty Corp. commenced lawsuits against the Village and Petitioners alleging, inter alia, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act. The Freeport Board of Trustees authorized the Village to defend and indemnify Petitioners, but after Petitioners refused to settle with Water Works due to Water Works' requirement that Petitioners sign a stipulation of discontinuance containing a nondisparagement clause, the Village withdrew Petitioners' defense and indemnification. Petitioners subsequently filed an action seeking a judgment directing the Village to provide a defense. Supreme Court denied the request. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the municipality could withdraw its defense and indemnification of Petitioners for their failure to accept a reasonable settlement offer, and Petitioners' First Amendment concerns with respect to the settlement's nondisclosure clause did not warrant a different conclusion. View "Lancaster v. Inc. Vill. of Freeport" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the District and others, alleging that strip searching incoming detainees violated the Fourth Amendment and, where men were not similarly strip searched, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. The court concluded, under Bame v. Dillard, that the Superior Court Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity because the Fourth Amendment right he was accused of violating was not clearly established at the time of any violation. The court agreed with the district court that there was no circumstantial evidence that the Marshal purposefully directed that women and men be searched differently at the Superior Court cellblock. According, the Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity because class members have failed to show that he violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Johnson, et al. v. Government of the District of Columbia, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the NYPD on plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment challenge to NYPD Interim Order 52 (IO-52). IO-52 requires the administration of a breathalyzer test to any officer whose discharge of his firearm within New York City resulted in death or injury to any person. The court concluded that the immediate objectives of IO-52 testing were personnel management of, and public confidence in, the NYPD; the identified objectives qualified as "special needs" for purposes of Fourth Amendment reasonableness review because they were distinct from normal law enforcement concerns and incompatible with the warrant and probable cause requirements for law enforcement searches; and the special needs greatly outweighed officers' reduced expectation of privacy with respect to alcohol testing at the time of any firearms discharge causing death or personal injury, thereby rendering warrantless, suspicionless IO-52 testing constitutionally reasonable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment to the NYPD on plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment challenge to IO-52. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and their companies filed suit alleging that the contraceptive mandate in the Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), violated their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court concluded that, even if the government had a compelling interest - from safeguarding the public health to protecting a woman's compelling interest in autonomy and promoting gender equality, the mandate was not the most restrictive means of furthering that interest. The court concluded that the district court erred in denying a preliminary injunction for plaintiffs on the grounds that their case was unlikely to succeed on the merits; the court reversed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction for the individual owners; because the district court premised its decision entirely on a question of law, the court must remand for consideration of the other preliminary-injunction factors; and the court affirmed the district court's denial of preliminary injunction with respect to the companies. View "Gilardi, et al. v. HHS, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant filed a request with the Administrative office of the Courts (AOC) pursuant to Nevada's Public Records Act (Act) seeking access to certain records related to Nevada's Foreclosure Mediation Program. The AOC agreed to provide some of the documents in redacted or statistical form but refused to disclose other information as either privileged or confidential. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the AOC to produce all of the requested documents in their original form. The district court denied the petition, concluding (1) the AOC was a judicial entity and thus not subject to the Act; and (2) the requested documents were otherwise confidential as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed without deciding whether the Act applied to the AOC, as the records in question were confidential as a matter of law. View "Civil Rights for Seniors v. Admin. Office of Courts" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the first African-American circuit court judge elected in Phillips County, Arkansas, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the commission and officials during the disciplinary proceedings against him. The district court denied plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order and stayed proceedings in accordance with the Younger abstention doctrine. The state disciplinary proceedings ended with a decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court. The district court then granted the commission and officials' Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, finding no justifiable federal controversy. The court concluded that Defendant Stewart, Executive Director of the commission, was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity as to plaintiff's claims for damages on the first cause of action; plaintiff had no justiciable claim for damages against any defendant in the second cause of action where plaintiff's allegations amounted to nothing more than a state law defamation claim and the district court did not abuse its discretion; and plaintiff's requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Simes, II v. Arkansas Judicial D. & D. Comm, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Officer Seymour and Sergeant Parker under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest. Plaintiff was arrested in the parking lot of a bar after Officer Seymour, who was working off-duty but in full uniform, asked her to move her car before it was towed. Plaintiff responded by cursing and speaking loudly. The court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Officer Seymour because the facts viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff showed that Officer Seymour lacked arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in denying qualified immunity to Sergeant Parker, who was not present during the alleged false arrest. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment in regards to Sergeant Parker. View "Wilkerson v. Seymour" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the police chief, filed suit against defendant, the mayor, alleging unconstitutional retaliation as well as state tort law claims. On interlocutory appeal, defendant challenged the district court's order denying qualified immunity and plaintiff cross-appealed the district court's dismissal of one of his tort claims. Because the court concluded that plaintiff acted pursuant to his official job duties, the court need not consider the remaining prongs of the First Amendment retaliation test since he could not show that defendant violated his First Amendment rights. Therefore, the court remanded, concluding that the district court erred in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's cross appeal, declining to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over a state law tort claim in an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order denying qualified immunity. View "Gibson v. Kilpatrick" on Justia Law