Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Complainants were disabled residents of a condominium. Complainants filed a complaint against the condominium's board of directors (the Condo) and their property management company, alleging that the Condo had discriminated against them by refusing to grant a reasonable accommodation for their disabilities. Specifically, Complainants alleged that the Condo refused to provide keys to the side and back doors to their building. The Office of Administrative Hearings ruled that Complainants had not proven that giving them the keys to the side and back doors was necessary and reasonable. The Appeal Board of the Commission on Human Relations (Board) disagreed and determined that the Condo (1) was required to prove that giving Complainants keys was an unreasonable financial burden, and (2) failed to establish that giving Complainants keys presented an undue burden. The circuit court reversed. The court of special appeals vacated the circuit court's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Condo was required to prove that providing keys to Complainants was unreasonable in light of the costs attendant in doing so; and (2) the Board properly performed the requisite balancing test when it concluded the Condo unreasonably denied Complainants' requests to be given the disputed keys. View " Cameron Grove Condo. Bd. of Dirs. v. Comm'n on Human Relations" on Justia Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the government’s sovereign immunity from tort suits, but excepts from that waiver certain intentional torts, 28 U. S. C. 2680(h). Section 2680(h) contains a proviso that extends the waiver of immunity to claims for six intentional torts, including assault and battery, that are based on the “acts or omissions” of an “investigative or law enforcement officer” “who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests.” A federal prisoner, sued the United States under the FTCA, alleging assault and battery by correctional officers. The district court granted the government summary judgment; the Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the “law enforcement proviso” applies only to tortious conduct that occurs during the course of executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest. The Supreme Court reversed. The law enforcement proviso extends to law enforcement officers’ acts or omissions that arise within the scope of employment, regardless of whether the officers are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity, or are executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest. Congress intended immunity determinations to depend on a federal officer’s legal authority, not on a particular exercise of that authority. Nor does the proviso indicate that a waiver of immunity requires the officer to be engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity. View "Millbrook v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the City of Lancaster under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Article I, Section 4 of the California Constitution, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief from the City's policy of permitting prayers that mention Jesus. Plaintiffs argued that both the invocation at issue and the City's prayer policy amounted to an establishment of religion. The invocation did not proselytize, advance, or disparage any faith. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the City, through its prayer practice, placed its official seal of approval on Christianity where the City has taken every feasible precaution to ensure its own evenhandedness. Therefore, the court held that the district court correctly determined that neither the invocation at issue nor the City's prayer policy constituted an unconstitutional establishment of religion. For the same reasons that plaintiffs' First Amendment claim failed, their state claim failed as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rubin, et al v. City of Lancaster" on Justia Law

AOF appealed from the district court's order denying their motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of Lakeland City. Lakeland filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the city's practice of opening each city commission legislative session with a sectarian prayer violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and Article I, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. The city maintained, inter alia, that Resolution 4848, adopted a few months after AOF complained in March 2010 about its practices in selecting invocation speakers, did not violate the Establishment Clause or the Florida Constitution. The court affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the city and the mayor, in part, because the court concluded that AOF failed to demonstrate that the adoption of Resolution 4848 resulted in proselytizing or advancing the Christian religion over all others solely because the speakers who were selected included sectarian references in their prayers. The court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to decide AOF's challenge to the city commission's pre-March 2010 speaker selection practice as violative of the Establishment Clause and the Florida Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Atheists of Florida, Inc., et al v. City of Lakeland, Florida, et al" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services removed Woods, then seven years old from his parents’ home in 1991 and placed him in a residential treatment facility. There had been many reports of sexual abuse among residents of the facility and Woods, claiming to have been abused by another resident, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely because Woods failed to bring his claim within two years of its accrual, rejecting Woods’s contention that the 20-year limitations period applicable in Illinois to personal injury claims based on childhood sexual abuse applied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The limitations period applicable to all Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois is two years, as provided in 735 ILCS 5/13-202, and this includes claims involving allegations of failure to protect from childhood sexual abuse. View "Woods v. IL Dep't of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against the Chief of Police and the City under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim. Plaintiff, a police officer for the City, led a no-confidence vote of the police officers' union against the Chief. The Chief subsequently delayed signing an application for a certification that would have entitled plaintiff to a five percent salary increase. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding that plaintiff failed to meet his burden under Garcetti v. Ceballos, to show that he undertook his act as a private citizen and not pursuant to his official duties. The court disagreed and held that plaintiff had established a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation. Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Chief and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City because plaintiff did not adduce sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on his Monnell claim. View "Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Egyptian-American, filed a workplace discrimination suit against the Mohegan Council, Boy Scouts of America alleging that he was denied career advancement opportunities on account of his religion of Islam and his national origin. After a jury trial, the district court ruled in favor of Plaintiff. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Mohegan Council's motion for judgment as a matter of law, where (1) the district court correctly found that Mohegan Council was an "employer" with the requisite fifteen or more employees under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) Plaintiff's complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination was timely filed; and (3) sufficient evidence supported a finding of discrimination. View "Aly v. Mohegan Council, Boys Scouts of Am." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting, inter alia, that Maryland's good-and-substantial-reason requirement for obtaining a handgun permit contravened the Second Amendment. The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of section 5-306(a)(5)(ii) of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code, to the extent that it conditions eligibility for a permit to carry, wear, or transport a handgun in public on having "good and substantial reason" to do so. Because the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement could not pass constitutional muster, the court reversed the judgment. Under the applicable intermediate scrutiny standard, the State had demonstrated that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement was reasonably adapted to Maryland's significant interests in protecting public safety and preventing crime. The court also rejected plaintiffs' facial challenge. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Woollard v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a registered professional nurse, was terminated from her employment when her employer concluded that Petitioner had unlawfully obtained prescription narcotics for personal use or distribution to others. In 2008, Petitioner's employer filed a complaint against Petitioner in that regard with the Board of Examiners for Registered Professional Nurses. Petitioner was subsequently hired at another medical center, and her employment was terminated. In 2009, Petitioner's second employer filed a complaint with the Board, suggesting that Petitioner had unlawfully obtained prescription narcotics for personal use or distribution to others. In 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of prohibition asking the Supreme Court to direct the Board to dismiss the 2008 and 2009 complaints, alleging that the Board's continuances of the administrative hearings scheduled to resolve the two complaints were contrary to law, had deprived Petitioner of substantial resources, and had improperly delayed the entry of a final administrative decision. The Supreme Court granted the writ and dismissed the two complaints, holding that the Board effectively denied Petitioner an opportunity to be heard in opposition to the allegations against her. View "State ex rel. Fillinger v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

Appellant Mary Hill, the owner of an assisted living home, sought damages from Appellees Linda Giani (an independent care coordinator), the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) and Staci Collier (a state licensing specialist) for alleged economic harm caused by a Report of Harm filed by Giani, which resulted in the removal of one of Hill's residents and a subsequent investigation conducted by Collier. The superior court granted summary judgment: to DHSS and Collier on Hill's state law tort claims on the basis of immunity; to Collier on Hill's 42 U.S.C. 1983 due process claim because Hill failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Collier's actions deprived her of a constitutional right; and to Giani on the basis of immunity and common law privilege. Hill appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the court's grants of summary judgment to DHSS and Collier based on statutory immunity and to Collier on Hill's 1983 claim. Because the Court found that Hill raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Giani acted in good faith when she filed her Report of Harm, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to Giani and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hill v. Giani" on Justia Law