Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants enforced two local ordinances in violation of the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants. The court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for retrospective relief because those claims were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief because those claims have not been mooted by defendants' voluntary conduct; the court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment challenges; and the court held that jurisdiction existed as to plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims and remanded for a consideration of the merits in the first instance. View "Bell, et al v. City of Boise, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a pre-enforcement action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, the California Secretary of State. At issue were the California Elections Code sections 8066 and 8451, which mandated that circulators shall be voters in the district or political subdivision in which the candidate was to be voted on and shall serve only in that district or political subdivision. Plaintiffs alleged that the residency requirement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought to enjoin its enforcement. The court reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing, holding that plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient injury-in-fact to meet constitutional standing requirements. In light of plaintiffs' concrete plan and defendant's specific threat of enforcement, the court concluded that plaintiffs have met the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement. View "Libertarian Party Los Angeles, et al v. Bowen" on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska foreclosed on Jeffrey and Jeanne Stoops' property after the Stoops failed to pay municipal taxes. The Town then conveyed the property to Richard and Betty Nelson by municipal quitclaim deed. The Stoopses subsequently filed a complaint against Richard Nelson seeking to quiet title to the property and asking the court to declare the respective rights of the parties to the property. The superior court granted the Nelsons' motion for summary judgment. The Stoopses appealed, arguing (1) the Town failed to give the Stoopses proper notice of the pending foreclosure in violation of their due process rights, and (2) the Town failed to adhere strictly to the requirements of the statutorily outlined steps a municipality must take to foreclose on a municipal tax lien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Town complied with the requirements of the statutory scheme and gave the Stoopses sufficient notice, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Nelsons. View "Stoops v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, thirteenth North Carolina residents who lost access to in-home personal care services (PCS) due to a statutory change, brought suit challenging the new PCS program. The district court granted plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification. Defendants appealed, raising several points of error. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that a preliminary injunction was appropriate in this case. The court held, however, that the district court's order failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 because it lacked specificity and because the district court neglected to address the issue of security. Accordingly, the court remanded the case. View "Pashby v. Delia" on Justia Law

This case involved two provisions in Arizona's Senate Bill 1070, which makes it unlawful for a motor vehicle occupant to hire or attempt to hire a person for work at another location from a stopped care that impedes traffic, or for a person to be hired in such a manner. At issue was whether these provisions violated the First Amendment by restricting and penalizing commercial speech for day laborers and for those who hire them. The court held that the district court correctly determined that, though Arizona had a significant government interest in promoting traffic safety, the day labor provisions failed Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York's requirement that restrictions on commercial speech be no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and that the other requirements for a preliminary injunction were satisfied. Therefore, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the day labor provisions. View "Valle del Sol, et al v. State of Arizona, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant David Becker was pulled over by Defendant-Appellee Officer Jason Bateman in a parking lot in Heber City, Utah. A confrontation ensued which ended in Plaintiff being thrown to the ground and suffering a severe traumatic brain injury. Plaintiff brought suit against Officer Bateman, the Heber City Chief of Police in his official capacity, and Heber City under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Officer Bateman used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He also asserted a claim for loss of consortium. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding Officer Bateman did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Because the violation of constitutional rights Plaintiff asserted was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Officer Bateman. However, the district court erred in concluding there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether a constitutional violation occurred. The grant of summary judgment in favor of the City was therefore reversed. On remand, the district court must determine whether Plaintiff can withstand summary judgment as to the second element of his municipal liability claim. Similarly, the district court must determine whether Mrs. Becker could maintain a cause of action for loss of consortium against the City in light of the Court's ruling that a reasonable jury could conclude Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. View "Becker v. Bateman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a white male employed as captain of the City of Buffalo Police Department, sued the Department and its police chief claiming that their failure to promote him was impermissibly motivated by race. Plaintiff claimed racial discrimination after the results of a civil service examination were replaced by the results of an updated version. The court declined to address the 42 U.S.C. 1983, defamation, and equal protection claims because they were insufficiently argued; the court agreed with the district court that Ricci v. DeStefano did not indicate that defendants' actions were prohibited; plaintiff provided no other evidence of unlawful discrimination and his Title VII claim failed; and plaintiff's remaining claims were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dept." on Justia Law

The State appealed from the district court's order enjoining it from requiring plaintiff to submit to a suspicionless drug test pursuant to Section 414.0652 of the Florida Statutes, as a condition for receipt of government-provided monetary assistance for which he was otherwise qualified. Plaintiff applied for financial assistance benefits for himself and his son through Florida's Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction enjoining the State from enforcing the statute because the court concluded that the State had failed to establish a substantial special need to support its mandatory suspicionless drug testing of TANF recipients. View "Lebron v. Secretary, FL Dept. of Children and Families" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, manufacturers and distributors of smokeless tobacco products, filed suit challenging the validity of a New York City ordinance governing the sale of flavored tobacco products. Plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance, New York City Administrative Code 17-715, was preempted by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C. 387 et seq., and sought an injunction against enforcement. The district court awarded summary judgment to the City and plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that the ordinance was a regulation of sale and not a veiled attempt to regulate the manufacture of tobacco products. The ordinance represented an exercise of local police power that Congress specifically allowed in enacting the Act and was therefore not preempted. View "U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., et al. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Wisconsin police recruits must complete probation. Statewide requirements are set by the Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB), Wis. Stat. 165.85. Milwaukee has interpreted Wis. Stat. 62.50(3)(b) as authority to adopt additional requirements; no new recruit becomes a full officer before 16 months of “actual active service.” Ramskugler’s probation in Milwaukee began in October 2007. Days later, Ramskugler injured her knee during training. The Department assigned Ramskugler to clerical duties. In November, she was given 2.5 months of leave for knee surgery. Ramskugler returned to duty in a clerical capacity for several months. She obtained medical clearance for unrestricted duty, but had to wait for the next recruit class to begin. Before graduating in November 2008, Ramskugler re-injured her knee. She had completed the course. After more leave and a second surgery, Ramskugler returned to clerical duties in January 2009. Although Ramskugler was a “law enforcement officer,” as defined by the LESB, she was on probation in Milwaukee, which did not consider clerical duties “actual active service.” The district court rejected a suit and, while appeal was pending, Ramskugler accepted a settlement. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that the union lacked standing to bring suit on its own behalf. View "Milwaukee Police Assoc. v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs" on Justia Law