Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Wisconsin police recruits must complete probation. Statewide requirements are set by the Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB), Wis. Stat. 165.85. Milwaukee has interpreted Wis. Stat. 62.50(3)(b) as authority to adopt additional requirements; no new recruit becomes a full officer before 16 months of “actual active service.” Ramskugler’s probation in Milwaukee began in October 2007. Days later, Ramskugler injured her knee during training. The Department assigned Ramskugler to clerical duties. In November, she was given 2.5 months of leave for knee surgery. Ramskugler returned to duty in a clerical capacity for several months. She obtained medical clearance for unrestricted duty, but had to wait for the next recruit class to begin. Before graduating in November 2008, Ramskugler re-injured her knee. She had completed the course. After more leave and a second surgery, Ramskugler returned to clerical duties in January 2009. Although Ramskugler was a “law enforcement officer,” as defined by the LESB, she was on probation in Milwaukee, which did not consider clerical duties “actual active service.” The district court rejected a suit and, while appeal was pending, Ramskugler accepted a settlement. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that the union lacked standing to bring suit on its own behalf. View "Milwaukee Police Assoc. v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the legal guardians and conservators of their adult son, sued the City and an investigator with the police department, alleging deprivation of the son's constitutional and statutory rights. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants and plaintiffs appealed. The court held that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the investigator where his behavior during the interrogation did not shock the conscience, the adequacy of the investigation did not shock the conscience, the investigation was not in retaliation, and the "charging decision" did not shock the conscience. The district court correctly granted summary judgment to the city where plaintiffs have not alleged a pattern of similar constitutional violations. In regards to plaintiffs' section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, claims, no reasonable jury could conclude that defendants failed to make reasonable accommodations for the son's disability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Folkerts v. City of Waverly, et al" on Justia Law

After Ian Burch's motor home was stopped by a highway patrol trooper, the trooper found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and $15,000 in cash in the vehicle. The State filed criminal charges against Burch. The district court found the trooper had unlawfully extended the scope and length of the stop and suppressed the evidence found in the vehicle. The charges against Burch were later dismissed. The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) subsequently issued a tax assessment notice indicating Burch owed $17,761 in taxes and penalties on the drugs found in his motor home. The Court of Tax Appeals (COTA) granted summary judgment to KDOR on its assessment of taxes and civil penalties against Burch under the Kansas Drug Tax Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that COTA erred in granting summary judgment to KDOR because it failed to consider and apply the exclusionary rule to the drugs upon which the taxes were assessed. Remanded to COTA for consideration of the exclusionary rule. View "In re Tax Appeal of Burch" on Justia Law

Smith was disbarred by the Tenth Circuit in 1996, followed by reciprocal disbarments by the Fifth Circuit, the U.S. District of Colorado and Northern District of Texas, and the Colorado Supreme Court. In 2007, the Tenth Circuit granted reinstatement, provided that Smith met conditions. The conditions were satisfied, and Smith was reinstated. The other courts then readmitted him to their bars, except the Colorado Supreme Court. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado then reversed itself and denied reinstatement, because Smith remained disbarred by the Colorado Supreme Court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. Smith filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking compensation and equitable relief, alleging violations substantive and procedural due process and of equal protection, and judicial takings of his private property right to practice law and make a living. The Claims Court dismissed, reasoning that absent a money-mandating statute providing for compensation for such government action, it had no jurisdiction and that because the revocation actions became final no later than 1999, suit under the Tucker Act was barred by the six-year limitations period, 28 U.S.C. 2501.. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

Mann operated a home day care center. While she was gone, her husband, a licensed day care provider, and Thompson, a newly-hired assistant, remained at the center. The children were left alone in the basement for about 10 minutes. One child hit another with a tray. A complaint was made to DCFS, which determined that Thompson was working without a background search or a medical evaluation. DCFS determined that Mann had failed to provide proper supervision, shut down the center, and prohibited Mann and her husband from providing child care pending full investigation. DCFS entered Mann’s name into the Illinois database concerning child abuse and neglect. DCFS concluded that the violation was “substantiated,” and after supervisory review, recommended license revocation. After another level of review, a corrective plan was recommend rather than revocation. Mann entered into a plan and had the report expunged and her name removed from the database. Mann sued DCFS employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Mann was not unconstitutionally deprived of a protected liberty interest relating to imposition of the protective plan or deprived of due process when she was prohibited from running her facility during the investigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Mann v. Vogel" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned an arbitration award arising out of a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitration award in this case reinstated Port of Seattle (Port) employee Mark Cann with a 20-day unpaid suspension after he was terminated for hanging a noose in the workplace for nonracial reasons. The reviewing trial court found this punishment so lenient that it violated the public policy against racial harassment in the workplace and imposed a six-month unpaid suspension instead. The arbitrator found that Cann intended the noose as a joke toward an older white co-worker. The arbitrator determined that Cann's impression of a noose was "not racial" and that in this situation, Cann was "more clueless than racist." The arbitrator also noted that the white employee targeted by the "joke" was not offended, and an African-American employee who observed the noose was angry but did not feel harassed. In light of these facts, the arbitrator determined that a 20-day unpaid suspension was the appropriate discipline. Given that Cann's 20-working-day unpaid suspension amounts to a month without pay, and given that so many working families live month to month, the Supreme Court found that to be a substantial penalty. "As we are bound by the arbitrator's findings of fact, we cannot find that a 20-day suspension was insufficient to deter such conduct in the future. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision to vacate the arbitrator's award. We also take this opportunity to clarify that a trial court that properly vacates an arbitration award does not have authority to impose its own remedy. Instead, trial courts facing such a situation should remand for further proceedings." View "Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 286 v. Port of Seattle" on Justia Law

Starship, a purveyor of various novelty items including sexually explicit materials, appealed the judgment of the district court dismissing under Rule 12(b)(6) its federal constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants and refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over its state constitutional claims. Starship's claims stemmed from the County's decision to uphold the Business Director's denial of its application for a business license to operate a retail bookstore. The court found no error in the district court's dismissal of Starship's 1983 claims because they were barred by res judicata and the district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Starship's state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Starship Enterprises of Atlanta v. Coweta County, GA, et al" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' commitments were effected by means of an executive-branch effort aimed at preventing the release of some "sexually violent predators." The court agreed with the district court that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support plaintiffs' procedural due process claims and therefore defeated the motion for summary judgment. The court also concluded that at the time of the Initiative, the constitutional principal that, absent some emergency or other exigent circumstance, an individual could not be involuntarily committed to a psychiatric institution without notice and a predeprivation hearing was firmly established. Because the law pertaining to the involuntary civil commitment of prisoners was firmly established, the district court properly determined that defendants should not enjoy qualified immunity. View "Bailey v. Pataki" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma certified questions of Oklahoma Law to the Supreme Court: (1) does the Okla. Const. art. 2, section 30 provide a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act?; (2) if such a right exists, is the cause of action recognized retrospectively? and (3) are the standards of municipal liability coterminous with a Federal section 1983 action or does the common law theory of respondeat superior apply to such action? The questions in this case arose from an altercation at the Cherokee County Detention Center (a facility operated by the Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority) whereby plaintiff Daniel Bosh was attacked while he was standing at the booking desk of the Detention Center with his hands secured in restraints behind his back. Video surveillance of the events captured images of one of the jailers, defendant Gordon Chronister, Jr., approaching the plaintiff and grabbing him behind his back. Plaintiff was seriously injured as a result of the altercation. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in state court against the Authority, the assistant jail administrator and the jailers who initiated the attack. He asserted federal Civil Rights claims against the individuals and state law claims against the Authority. The Authority removed the case to the United States District Court then filed a motion to dismiss the state tort claims based on exemptions from liability provided by Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (the OGTCA). Upon review, the Supreme Court answered the questions: (1) the Okla. Const. art 2, section 30 provides a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act; (2) the action is recognized retrospectively; and (3) the common law theory of respondeat superior applies to municipal liability under such an action. View "Bosh v. Cherokee County Bldg. Authority." on Justia Law

In an original proceeding, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether an indigent alleged juvenile offender was entitled as of right to a second competency evaluation at the State's expense. Upon receiving an competency evaluation report, the trial court made a preliminary finding that "W.P." was competent to proceed. However, citing ongoing concerns about her client's mental health, W.P.'s public defender objected, requesting a hearing and filing a motion for a second competency evaluation at the State's expense. At the motion hearing, the public defender stated that because the juvenile code was silent, the statutory authority relied upon referred to the adult code which entitled the second evaluation at the State's expense. Concluding that the Children's Code was "specifically silent on that issue," the district court determined that the adult provisions did not apply and denied the request for a second evaluation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the public defender's request for a second evaluation. View "In re People in the Interest of W.P." on Justia Law