Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Laura Conroy filed this Title VII lawsuit against her employer, the United States Forest Service, after it (among other things) filled an open position with a male employee, instead of her. The district court excluded the testimony of Petitioner's two experts and granted summary judgment to the Forest Service. Petitioner did not have a college degree. She applied for the INFRA Program Manager position in the administrative series. She was found to be qualified, and her name, along with that of one other qualified applicant, was passed on to Larry Larson, the head of the group where the new position would be located. Mr. Larson, however, decided to readvertise the position. He would later explain that his reason for doing so was to broaden the pool of applicants. A revised announcement was issued modifying the job requirement noted above, replacing the words "[c]omprehensive knowledge and skills in" with simply "[k]nowledge of." The new advertisement drew interest from a greater number of applicants, and four were certified as sufficiently qualified for the position. Petitioner was certified under the administrative announcement, and three others were certified under the professional announcement. Among the latter three candidates was Daniel Hager, who had not applied when the position was originally advertised. Petitioner filed a grievance when she did not receive the position. Mr. Hager left the INFRA Program Manager position, and the position was readvertised. The position was advertised solely in the professional series. Although Petitioner applied again, she was deemed not qualified, and management ultimately selected Andrea Gehrke. Petitioner filed a second formal grievance, alleging that the decision to advertise the position solely in the professional series was made in order to retaliate against her for filing the first grievance. After exhausting administrative remedies, Petitioner filed suit in federal district court pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. She asserted various individual and class claims arising out of the agency's hiring decisions. The district court ultimately ruled in the agency's favor. Upon review, finding no abuse of the district court's discretion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Petitioner's claims. View "Conroy v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cheryl Debano-Griffin sued Lake County and the Lake County Board of Commissioners alleging, in part, that she had been terminated from her position as the director of Lake County’s 911 department in violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) after she raised concerns about a potentially improper transfer of county funds from the county’s ambulance account and regarding the ambulance service provided to the county. Defendants moved to dismiss. The court denied the motion, and the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting summary judgment to defendants. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of an additional argument that had been raised by defendants. On remand, the Court of Appeals, held that plaintiff had failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the causation element of her claim and again reversed the trial court’s order denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that reasonable minds could differ regarding the board’s true motivation for eliminating her position and raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation. Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment. View "Debano-Griffin v. Lake County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were several dismissed or demoted employees of the State Insurance Fund Corporation, a public corporation that administered Puerto Rico's workers' compensation program. Before the adverse employment actions took effect, Plaintiffs requested informal administrative hearings before the Corporation. Plaintiffs then filed administrative appeals before the Corporation's board of appeals. The board had not acted on the appeals when Plaintiffs sued the Corporation and several of its officers in the U.S. district court, alleging political discrimination and due process violations stemming from adverse employment actions. The district court abstained under Younger v. Harris and dismissed Plaintiffs' claims, finding that Plaintiffs voluntarily engaged the wheels of an administrative procedure before filing an action in federal court. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in abstaining based on Younger, and dismissal was not the remedy in any event; and (2) a stay of the federal proceedings was appropriate in this case pending the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales Segarra v. State Ins. Fund Corp. View "Casiano-Montanez v. State Ins. Fund Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff received housing assistance through the Massachusetts rental voucher program. Plaintiff rented an apartment in Chelsea and received her voucher through the Chelsea Housing Authority. In 2009, Plaintiff received notice from the Authority that it was terminating her voucher because she did not report changes in family composition and in the family's income within thirty days of the change as required by the conditions of her voucher. After a hearing, the Authority's grievance panel upheld the termination. The Board of Commissioners affirmed, as did the superior court and appeals court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was unlawful for the Authority to proceed to the grievance panel hearing without first offering Plaintiff the opportunity to engage in settlement negotiations; (2) the regulations Plaintiff was found to have violated were impermissibly vague; and (3) the grievance panel's factual findings were insufficient. Remanded. View "Rivas v. Chelsea Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued a police officer for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officer used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officer shot plaintiff seven times while plaintiff was in his car. The officer and the city police department subsequently appealed the district court's denial of the officer's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The court concluded that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity where no reasonable police officer would have used deadly force against plaintiff and where clearly established law gave the officer fair notice that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Further, state agent immunity did not apply to the assault and battery claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morton v. Kirkwood" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the closure of the Franklin Shelter, an overnight facility for homeless men in downtown Washington D.C. On appeal, plaintiffs alleged that the closure violated federal and D.C. antidiscrimination statutes. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal on res judicata grounds because plaintiffs could have raised these claims in two prior Superior Court cases. View "Sheptock v. Fenty" on Justia Law

Good News appealed from the district court's determination on remand from the Ninth Circuit that the Town's ordinance restricting the size, duration, and location of temporary directional signs did not discriminate between different forms of noncommercial speech in an unconstitutional manner. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the court held that the ordinance was not a content-based regulation and was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. Accepting the court's opinion in Reed as law of the case, the court concluded that the Sign Code was constitutional because the different treatment of types of noncommercial temporary signs were not content-based as that term was defined in Reed, and the restrictions were tailored to serve significant government interests. Good News' other challenges did not merit relief. Further, the court determined that the amendments to the Sign Code made by the Town during the pendency of the appeal did not moot this case and that Good News could file a new action in the district court should it wish to challenge the new provisions of the Sign Code. View "Reed, et al v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retired military police officer, sued the city and its former police chief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff claimed that the police chief used excessive force when he, without identifying himself as a police officer and dressed in street clothes, charged at plaintiff. The court held that, because there was enough evidence of a Fourth Amendment seizure, the court need not decide whether a reasonable jury could find the police chief's conduct shocked the conscience in violation of the Fourth Amendment; a reasonable jury could find that the police chief was an overzealous police officer who used excessive force and unreasonably caused plaintiff severe injuries; and the police chief was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that plaintiff could not establish that the police chief was - as a matter of Missouri law - a final policymaker for the city. Because no reasonable jury could find the city liable under section 1983, the district court correctly granted the city's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, et al" on Justia Law

A disciplinary action was imposed upon Appellant, an inmate of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC). Appellant filed a petition for judicial review and declaratory judgment seeking to challenge the dismissal of his grievance concerning the disciplinary action, the application of an administrative directive by prison officials, and policies he asserted were in violation of contractual obligations of the ADC concerning his conduct in regard to hobby crafts while incarcerated. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly determined that Appellant's petition did not set forth facts to show deprivation of a liberty interest and, as a result, Appellant failed to sustain a claim under the Arkansas Administrative Review Act to support a judicial review of the ADC's decision. View "Renfro v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Allstate Sweeping, LLC (Allstate) is owned and operated by two white women: Martha Krueger and Barbara Hollis. In January 2006 it began performing pressure-washing services at Denver International Airport (DIA) under a contract with the City and County of Denver (Denver). Although the contract term was through July 2008, it was terminated by Denver July, 2007. Defendant Calvin Black, a contract-compliance technician at DIA, was assigned to monitor Allstate’s contract. Black is an African-American male. Allstate claimed that it was subjected to gender- and race-based discrimination and to retaliation for its complaints of discrimination. It filed suit in the federal district court in Colorado against Denver and four DIA employees, including Black, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 2000d (Title VI), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants except Black, holding that there were genuine issues of fact regarding whether Black was motivated by racial and gender bias and whether Black created a hostile work environment in such a way as to make plaintiff’s contract "unprofitable and its owners miserable." It did not address Allstate’s retaliation claim. Black appealed the denial of his motion for summary judgment, contending that he was entitled to qualified immunity and that the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the denial under the collateral-order doctrine. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s determinations because such sufficiency determinations are not reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. The Court did, however, have jurisdiction to review the legal sufficiency of the claim that Black made Allstate’s owners "miserable" and to review the sufficiency of the evidence of the retaliation claim (which the district court did not consider). The Court reversed the denial of summary judgment on those claims. View "Allstate Sweeping, LLC v. Black" on Justia Law