Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned who was legally authorized to select the drug or drugs to be used in executions in Georgia and how that choice may be made-- an issue which the Court felt impacted the management of prisons and inmates in Georgia: "this case could also affect the remaining myriad of management decisions made throughout Georgia’s prison system, and . . . when those decisions must be made directly by the Board of Corrections in its policymaking role versus when they may by left to the statutorily-granted management prerogatives of the Commissioner of Corrections and the Department of Corrections that he manages." Warren Lee Hill was convicted of murdering a fellow inmate in the Lee County Correctional Institute by beating the victim with a board embedded with nails. Hill received the death sentence, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Hill was unsuccessful in his state and federal habeas proceedings. The execution was originally scheduled for July 18, 2012, but it was rescheduled for July 23, 2012. The change in the specific execution date was announced by the Department of Corrections at approximately the same time that the Department of Corrections announced that it was changing from a three-drug execution procedure to a one-drug procedure. In response to the announcement of the new execution procedure, Hill filed a complaint against the Board of Corrections, the Department of Corrections, and the Commissioner of Corrections, alleging that the defendants failed to comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act in adopting Georgia’s new execution procedure, and he sought a declaratory judgment, an injunction, a stay of execution, and a writ of mandamus. The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Hill’s complaint on the ground that the Administrative Procedure Act did not apply to the new execution procedure, and the Supreme Court granted Hill’s application for discretionary appeal and his motion for a stay of his scheduled execution. But upon review of the applicable statutory authority, the Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal. View "Hill v. Owens" on Justia Law

A group of firefighters brought a class action lawsuit against the City of Atlanta alleging that the city breached its employment contracts with the firefighters as well as its statutory obligation to provide a fair and impartial promotional process by failing to prevent cheating on a fire lieutenant promotional exam. The trial court issued an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the city from making any permanent promotions based on the results of the challenged exam and providing that all appointments would be temporary pending a final decision on the merits of the case. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the trial court crafted a permanent injunction that contained mandatory instructions regarding how the city must re-test. Appellants, all of whom are firefighters who scored 90 or higher on the first exam, appealed the permanent injunction to challenge provisions of the injunction that treated them as "probable cheaters." Appellees (named plaintiffs in the class action), moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that appellants lacked standing to challenge the trial court’s judgment because they were not parties to the original action and because the judgment was not entered against them. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found appellants had standing to appeal the judgment in this case. Further, the Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in fashioning injunctive relief specific to appellants and erred in entering judgment against them. Accordingly, the Court vacated those portions of the permanent injunction that required the city to treat appellants differently from class members. View "Barham v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the conduct of police officers lead to their son's death, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that all three officers involved in the incident were entitled to qualified immunity and awarded summary judgment in their favor. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that two of the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, but that the district court erred in awarding summary judgment in favor of the officer who repeatedly activated his taser at plaintiffs' son. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Meyers, Sr. v. Baltimore County, Maryland" on Justia Law

In 2010, the General Assembly enacted the Missouri Secure and Fair Enforcement Mortgage Licensing Act (Missouri SAFE Act), which provides that the director of the Missouri Division of Finance shall not issue a mortgage loan originator license to an applicant who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony within seven years prior to the date of the application. When Plaintiff subsequently submitted an application for a mortgage loan originator license, the director denied the license pursuant to the Act because Plaintiff had pleaded guilty to a felony in 2006. The circuit court entered a declaratory judgment finding that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as applied to Plaintiff, the statute (1) was not an unconstitutional bill of attainder; (2) did not violate the Missouri Constitution's ban on retrospective laws; and (3) did not violate Plaintiff's right to procedural and substantive due process. View "Garozzo v. Mo. Dep't of Ins., Div. of Fin." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the former Mayor of the City of Russelville and the members of the Russellville City Council in federal district court, alleging age and race discrimination. Defendants subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal, seeking a reversal of the district court's denial of legislative immunity. The court concluded that defendants were entitled to legislative immunity where defendants not only eliminated plaintiff's position, but also instantaneously created a seemingly identical position. In the present case, control over the position at issue moved from the Mayor to the City Council, a quintessential legislative decision. View "Leaphart v. Williamson, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former sergeant with the Hartford Police Department, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants where plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that defendants wrongfully failed to promote him and defendants instigated several internal affairs investigations into his conduct on the basis of his race or national origin. With respect to plaintiff's discrimination claims, the court held that he failed to introduce factual evidence that defendants' nondiscriminatory reasons for the investigation and failure to promote him were pretextual or that plaintiff's race or national origin was a motivating favor. With respect to Chief Croughwell, although the court agreed with plaintiff that his statement to the press implicated a matter of public concern, the court affirmed the judgment on the district court's alternative ground that Chief Croughwell was protected from liability by qualified immunity. View "Garcia v. Hartford Police Dept." on Justia Law

This case involved the 18 U.S.C. 2703(d) orders pertaining to the Government's request for records of electronic communications relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. The underlying facts of the investigation related to the unauthorized release of classified documents to WikiLeaks.org, and the alleged involvement of a U.S. Army Private First Class. At issue was the public's right to access orders issued under section 2703(d) and related documents at the pre-grand jury phase of an ongoing criminal investigation. Because the court found that there was no First Amendment right to access such documents, and the common law right to access such documents was presently outweighed by countervailing interests, the court denied the request for relief. View "In re: 2703(d) Application" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review of the Baltimore City Council's approval of a planned unit development (PUD) with a Wal-Mart supercenter. Both Petitioners' residences were approximately 0.4 miles away from the PUD. The Mayor and City Council of the City, the owners of the property, and the developers of the PUD (Respondents) filed motions to dismiss, alleging that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the PUD. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions and dismissed Petitioners' petition for review. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that Petitioners did not qualify for prima facie aggrieved status and that they had failed to show any special aggrievement different from the general public. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the circuit court did not err in its judgment, as Petitioners failed to allege specific facts that they had been specially aggrieved in a manner different than the public generally. View "Ray v. Baltimore" on Justia Law

The Town appealed the district court's invalidation of its municipal sign ordinance as it applied to a resident. Dissatisfied with the Town's efforts to resolve a dispute with the resident, the resident painted the words, "Screwed by the Town of Cary" across a fifteen foot swath of the facade of his home. The court acknowledged that the Town's Sign Ordinance, and in particular its application to the resident, has aggravated some town residents who believed that it was excessively restrictive. But their recourse lies with the ballot, not the Constitution. Because the Sign Ordinance had distinguished content for a constitutionally permissible purpose, the court held that it did not violate the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Bowden v. Town of Cary" on Justia Law

CFIF and WVFL are 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(4) organizations that engage in election-related speech. These organizations and an individual brought suit alleging that West Virginia's campaign finance statutes were constitutionally impermissible. At issue was whether West Virginia's campaign-finance reporting and disclaimer requirements could survive constitutional scrutiny, West Virginia Code section 3-8-1 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's decisions to (1) strike "newspaper, magazine or other periodical" from West Virginia's "electioneering communication" definition; (2) upheld the "electioneering communication" definition's exemption for grassroots lobbying; (3) declined to consider the merits of the CFIF's challenge to the bona fide news account exemption because the organization lacked standing; and (4) prohibited prosecutions for violations that occurred while the earlier injunctions were in effect. However, the court reversed the district court's decision with respect to (1) its conclusion that subsection (C) of the "expressly advocating" definition was unconstitutional; (2) its choice to uphold the "electioneering communication" definition's section 501(c)(3) exemption; and (3) its application of an "earmarked funds" limiting construction to the reporting requirement for electioneering communications. Because WVFL did not file a notice of appeal in this case, the court could not consider its challenge to the district court's finding that the statutory scheme's twenty-four- and forty-eight-hour reporting requirements were constitutional. Consequently, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Center for Individual Freedom v. Tennant, et al." on Justia Law