Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants, Father and Son, were arrested for driving while intoxicated during separate traffic stops. Preliminary breath tests showed Appellants' blood-alcohol contest to be over the legal limit. Father agreed to take a breathalyzer test but refused to provide sufficient breath to perform the test, and Son refused to take the breathalyzer test. The director of revenue revoked Appellants' driving privileges for one year. Appellants filed petitions for review, which the circuit court denied. Appellants appealed, asserting (1) the trial court violated their due process rights by admitting the director's records into evidence without providing them the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the director's witnesses who created the records; and (2) Mo. Rev. Stat. 302.312, which authorizes the admission of the director's records in evidence in court and administrative proceedings, is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the provision of section 302.312 authorizing the admission of the director's records by the trial court did not deny Appellants their constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-examination, as Appellants had the right to subpoena witnesses to appear at the trials on their petitions for review. View "Doughty v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2011, BEST fired Aslin, a securities broker, to remain compliant with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority “Taping Rule,” which requires securities firms to adopt monitoring measures when too many of their brokers have recently worked for “Disciplined Firms.” Instead of adopting such measures, the employer may terminate brokers. FINRA, a private corporation, is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a “national securities association.” The Maloney Act provides for establishment of private self-regulatory organizations to oversee securities markets, 15 U.S.C. 78o. The SEC must approve FINRA’s rules and may abrogate, add to, and delete FINRA rules. Aslin filed suit alleging that FINRA violated his due process rights by including him on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms without providing him the opportunity to challenge the designation. The district court dismissed, concluding that Aslin failed to state a claim because he was not deprived of a protected property or liberty interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Since Aslin sought only injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent application of the rule to him, the controversy ended in 2012, after which Aslin was no longer included on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms and the case was moot. View "Aslin v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004 Taylor, an employee of the IRS, began applying for promotions and transfers, and was rejected until she received a promotion in 2006. In 2004, after being denied a promotion, Taylor filed her first discrimination complaint and was assigned to work in a unit supervised by Shields. While working in this unit, Taylor alleges that Shields took several retaliatory actions against Taylor, including written reprimands, a three-day suspension without pay, and providing negative references for Taylor to prospective employers. Based on these alleged actions, Taylor filed additional complaints for retaliation. In 2005, the IRS and Taylor entered into a settlement agreement. Taylor subsequently alleged noncompliance by the IRS. In 2006 and 2008, the agency issued decisions concluding that although the IRS had breached the agreement, it was currently in compliance. Taylor did not appeal either decision, but filed a complaint alleging retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a) and breach-of-settlement-agreement. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the breach claim, holding that Congress has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to such claims, but reversed with respect to retaliation.View "Taylor v. Geithner" on Justia Law

When Restaurant was denied a requested liquor license by the Town of Bingham, Restaurant appealed to the Department of Public Safety. After a hearing, a Department hearing officer also denied the license. On appeal, Restaurant asserted various independent claims alleging constitutional and statutory violations by the Department and Town. The appellate court found in favor of Defendants on Restaurant's independent claims but, on the merits, remanded the matter to the Department after concluding that an appeal of a municipality's denial of a liquor license could only be decided by the Commissioner of Public Safety and not a hearing officer. On remand, the Commissioner of the Department denied the license application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the deficiencies in the Department's notice to Restaurant of the hearing on Restaurant's requested liquor license constituted harmless error in the circumstances presented by this case; (2) The Department had sufficient grounds on which to deny Restaurant's liquor license; and (3) the court did not err in entering a judgment against Restaurant on its 42 U.S.C.S. 1983 claims. View "Antler's Inn & Rest., LLC v. Dep't of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee Elizabeth E. was a student in the Jefferson County, Colorado school system with substantial behavioral and emotional issues for which she required special education under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA"). In November 2008, Elizabeth's parents, Roxanne B. and David E. enrolled her at Innercept, LLC, a residential treatment center in Idaho, and sought reimbursement from Plaintiff-Appellant Jefferson County School District R-1 (the "District"). An Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) concluded Parents were entitled to reimbursement for the placement under the Act. That decision was affirmed by a state Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), whose decision was, in turn, affirmed by the Colorado federal district court. The District appealed, arguing Innercept was not a reimbursable placement under the IDEA and that Parents' conduct precluded reimbursement. Finding that Innercept was indeed a reimbursable placement, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "Jefferson County School v. Elizabeth E." on Justia Law

Plaintiff (ex-wife) and her parents sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant is a psychiatrist who was court-appointed to make recommendations in connection with plaintiff’s custody dispute with her ex-husband, following the 1998 entry of a marriage dissolution judgment. Plaintiff initially requested the evaluation, but was unhappy with the results. Defendant reported that plaintiff and her parents were delusional and that the children should be removed from their mother’s custody and have no further contact with her. A change of custody was granted. The Department of Children and Family Services later made a finding of abuse and neglect against the plaintiff. Plaintiff accused defendant of making false statements and a false evaluation. The trial court dismissed on the basis of res judicata; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, based on a separate civil rights class action that plaintiff had filed earlier in federal court against defendant and others for their role in custody proceedings. That action was dismissed for the immunity of such evaluators, and that dismissal was affirmed on appeal.View "Cooney v. Rossiter" on Justia Law

Humphries applied to Milwaukee County to renew her child care provider certificate. Muniz reviewed her application, sent a standard inquiry to a state agency as part of the background check, learned that Humphries had a substantiated finding of child abuse from 1988, and, after conferring with his supervisor, Muniz denied Humphries’s application. Humphries claims that she was not aware of the finding; she had been certified as a child care provider in the past. The abuse finding was later overturned and Humphries was certified. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment to Muniz and his supervisor on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a due process claim. Muniz and his supervisor had no involvement in the investigation or determination of the 1988 finding of substantiated abuse and did not violate Humphries’s constitutional rights when they relied on that finding to deny her child care provider renewal application.View "Humphries v. Milwaukee Cnty." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a tenured teacher who worked for Defendant, the Memphis City Schools Board of Education. After Plaintiff requested and was granted a substantial amount of sick leave but failed to return from that sick leave, Defendant dismissed Plaintiff without providing her with written charges or an opportunity for a hearing. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that her dismissal violated the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act and her constitutional due process rights. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and awarded Plaintiff's reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages for the actual harm she suffered, and attorney's fees. The court of appeals vacated the grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) although a tenured teacher's failure to return from sick leave may constitute cause for termination, there is no statute authorizing a board of education to deem it a constructive resignation or a forfeiture of tenure; and (2) accordingly, Defendant violated Plaintiff's rights under the Tenure Act and her constitutional due process rights. View "Thompson v. Memphis City Schs. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Appellants both had their driver's licenses suspended, and both requested a contested case hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) to challenge the suspension. Appellants made several arguments regarding the validity of Laramie Enrolled Ordinance 1592, which makes it a misdemeanor to refuse to submit to a chemical test and enhances the penalties for driving under the influence if a chemical test reveals a certain elevated blood alcohol level. In each case, the OAH determined it did not have the authority to consider the validity of the ordinance and upheld the suspension of Appellants' driver's licenses. The district court upheld the OAH's decision and dismissed Appellants' request for a declaration that the ordinance was unenforceable and unconstitutional on the basis that Appellants failed to raise a justiciable controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the OAH appropriately found that the ordinance did not change the nature of the advisements law enforcement officers were required to provide an individual pursuant to the state's implied consent statutes; (2) the OAH also properly upheld Appellants' driver's license suspensions; and (3) the district court did not err when it dismissed Appellants' petition for declaratory relief. View "Sandoval v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this interlocutory appeal was the scope of the special relationship doctrine and whether it would apply to the facts alleged to expose two human services employees to potential individual liability for the death of a seven-year-old child in foster care. After their son Chandler died while in the care of Jon Phillips and Sarah Berry, Chandler's biological parents, Christina Grafner and Joshua Norris, and Melissa R. Schwartz, personal representative and administrator of Chandler’s estate, filed suit against two county human services departments and two employees alleging, among other things, a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for violation of Chandler's substantive due process rights. The two employees, Defendants-Appellants Margaret Booker and Mary Peagler, appealed denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs sufficiently pled facts, when taken as true, showed Booker and Peagler plausibly violated Chandler's substantive due process right to be reasonably safe while in foster care, which right was clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "Schwartz, et al v. Booker, et al" on Justia Law