Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs-Appellants, eight operators and a supervisor at the City of Albuquerque's 311 Citizen Contact Center (CCC), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees City of Albuquerque, Ed Adams, and Esther Tenenbaum, on claims arising from their termination. The City's Merit System governed Plaintiffs' employment; section 3-1-6 of the Merit System Ordinance (MSO) divides employees into classified and unclassified service, and defines unclassified employees as "employees at will." When the City created the 311 CCC, it designated all positions as unclassified. Upon joining the 311 CCC, each Plaintiff signed a form that listed their Employment or Position Status as "Unclassified." Between 2005 and 2009, Plaintiffs were terminated from the 311 CCC. Some Plaintiffs were subject to Progressive Disciplinary Action, while others faced Immediate Termination. In April 2009, Plaintiffs filed suit in New Mexico state court for (1) breach of employment contract, (2) denial of due process and equal protection, (3) wrongful termination, (4) violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and (5) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In a lengthy opinion, the district court found that summary judgment was appropriate because Plaintiffs, as unclassified employees, were employed at will, and (1) had no protected property interest in continued employment; (2) had not raised a genuine issue of material fact whether they had an implied employment contract; and (3) had not raised a genuine issue of material fact whether they were terminated in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. With respect to the FMLA claim, the court found that whether treated as a claim for retaliation or interference, Plaintiffs had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the City's reason for termination was pretextual or that the City had interfered with Plaintiffs' right to FMLA leave. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district court's grant of summary judgment was improper because the court weighed the evidence and failed to construe the facts in Plaintiffs' favor when determining that they were at will employees and thus rightly terminated. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs' arguments lacked merit and affirmed the district court decision. View "Gonzales v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the court concerned whether monetary damages are available to a prisoner for violations of the terms of a judicial decree approving the "Cleary Final Settlement Agreement." In 2004 appellee Corrections Corporation of America contracted with the State to house Alaska inmates at Corrections Corporation's Red Rock Correctional Center in Arizona. Byran Perotti was an Alaska inmate at Red Rock. He filed a complaint against Corrections Corporation alleging that Corrections Corporation violated provisions of its contract with the State, as well as various State Department of Corrections policies. He asserted standing as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the State and Corrections Corporation. He based his argument on his status as a Cleary class member and the provisions of the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement, which settled the class action involving various inmate claims against the State of Alaska, Department of Corrections (DOC). Perotti's complaint sought liquidated damages under the DOC-Corrections Corporation contract, as well as compensatory damages, nominal damages, and punitive damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement did not contemplate the award of monetary damages to enforce its provisions. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court's decision granting Corrections Corporation's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Perotti's claims. View "Perotti v. Corrections Corporation of America" on Justia Law

In the four cases giving rise to these eleven consolidated appeals, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Director of the California Department of Health Care Services (DHCS), appealed the district court's grant of preliminary injunctions to plaintiffs, various providers and beneficiaries of California's Medicaid program (Medi-Cal). At issue was the implementation of Medi-Cal reimbursement rate reductions. The court held that Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe did not control the outcome in these cases because it did not consider the key issue here - the Secretary's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A); the Secretary's approval of California's requested reimbursement rates were entitled to Chevron deference; and the Secretary's approval complied with the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court further held that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits on their Supremacy Clause claims against the Director because the Secretary had reasonably determined that the State's reimbursement rates complied with section 30(A). The court finally held that none of the plaintiffs had a viable takings claim because Medicaid, as a voluntary program, did not create property rights. View "Managed Pharmacy Care, et al v. Sebelius, et al" on Justia Law

The Board of Licensure in Medicine revoked Petitioner's medical license. The superior court dismissed Petitioner's complaint seeking judicial review, concluding (1) it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board's decision because the district court had exclusive jurisdiction to review nonconsensual license-revocation orders pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 10, 8003(5); and (2) Petitioner's 42 U.S.C.S. 1983 claim should be dismissed because the Board members had authority to revoke her license and were immune from suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court properly dismissed Petitioner's petition for review of the Board order revoking her license because the district court had exclusive jurisdiction in such matters; and (2) because the Board acted within its authority in revoking Petitioner's license and, on appeal, Petitioner did not otherwise assert a denial of her constitutional rights, Petitioner's section 1983 claim was properly dismissed. View "Michalowski v. Bd. of Licensure in Med." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs initiated this proceeding against defendants, challenging the use of advanced imaging technology (AIT) scanners and invasive pat-downs at airport screening checkpoints in the United States. On appeal, plaintiffs maintained that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the TSA's standard operating procedures for checkpoint screenings did not constitute an "order" under 49 U.S.C. 46110. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued, that section 46110's conferral of exclusive jurisdiction in a court of appeals deprived them of due process and contravened the separation of powers rooted in the Constitution. The court held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291; on the merits, the district court did not err in ruling that the Checkpoint Screen SOP constituted an order of the TSA Administrator under section 46110; and plaintiffs' remaining contentions lacked merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blitz v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

This case concerned an employment discrimination dispute between Portland State University (PSU) and Portland State University Chapter of the American Association of University Professors (the Association). Those entities entered into a collective bargaining agreement that included a dispute resolution process for alleged violations of the agreement. That dispute resolution process included a "Resort to Other Procedures" (ROP) provision that permitted PSU to decline or discontinue a grievance proceeding if an Association member brought a claim regarding the same matter in an agency or court outside of PSU. PSU invoked that provision to halt a grievance proceeding after an Association member filed discrimination complaints with two outside agencies. The Association subsequently filed a complaint with the Oregon Employment Relations Board (ERB), alleging in part that PSU had engaged in an unfair labor practice by discontinuing the contractual grievance proceeding. ERB concluded that PSU's invocation of the ROP clause constituted unlawful discrimination. It therefore declined to enforce the ROP clause and ordered PSU to submit to the grievance process. On PSU's appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that ERB erred by applying the wrong legal standard in ordering PSU to submit to the grievance process, and it therefore reversed and remanded the case for ERB's reconsideration. The Association sought review of that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals's decision, concluding that ERB correctly held that the ROP clause at issue in this case imposed a form of employer retaliation for protected conduct that reasonably would impede or deter an employee from pursuing his or her statutory rights. "The resulting harm is neither theoretical nor trivial, but qualifies as a substantive difference in treatment. The ROP provision is therefore facially discriminatory . . . Accordingly, ERB properly declined to enforce that illegal contract provision. " View "Portland St. Univ. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Portland St. Univ." on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a circuit court judgment affirming the classification of real property for tax purposes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that the Arkansas Constitution and the Assessment Coordination Rules and Regulations allowed the land at issue to be classified as residential and not timber land; (2) ad hoc requirements were not imposed only on Appellants by Appellee Pope County Board of Equalization (BOE); (3) Appellants failed to demonstrate that they were similarly situated to any other taxpayer or landowner within the city limits, and therefore, Appellants' equal-protection claim that the circuit court erred in denying Appellants' petition without considering similarly situated property owners with similar property classified as timber and pasture within city limits was without merit; and (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a site visit by BOE's expert witness between the first day of trial and the second day of trial. View "McWilliams v. Pope County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Applicant Marilyn Clifford appealed the denial of long-term home-care benefits under the Medicaid-funded Choices for Care program, arguing that a second home on an adjacent piece of property should have been excluded from the financial-eligibility calculation. Given the language of the regulation, the legislative history that led to its promulgation, and the policy considerations attending the Medicaid program, the Supreme Court concluded that the Secretary correctly interpreted the home-exclusion rule when he reinstated the determination of the Department of Children and Families denying the benefits. Thus, the Court found no compelling indication of error in the Secretary’s determination and affirmed. View "In re Marilyn Clifford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the City and several city officials in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988, challenging a city ordinance prohibiting outdoor smoking on certain public property. The court held that the right to smoke was not a fundamental right and the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's due process claim. The court also held that because plaintiff did not plead facts plausibly indicating that smokers constituted a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the district court did not err in dismissing his equal protection claim. Because the city's health-based justification was sufficient, the court held that plaintiff's claim that the law failed rational basis review was properly dismissed. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining constitutional claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Gallagher v. City of Clayton, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Rural Water District No. 2 Creek County, Oklahoma, a rural water provider covered by 7 U.S.C. 1926(b), and Defendant Glenpool Utility Services Authority, a public trust created to provide water service, and its beneficiary, Defendant City of Glenpool, entered into a Settlement Agreement under which Plaintiff agreed not to file a civil action pursuant to section 1926(b) during the term of the agreement unless Defendants defaulted on their contractual obligations. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the civil action underlying this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging Defendants violated section 1926(b). The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The issue on appeal to the Tenth Circuit centered on whether Plaintiff’s agreement not to file a civil action against Defendants, absent default, deprived the Court of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where a state court had not yet determined whether Defendants defaulted. Upon review, the Court held that such agreement did not deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction, and it reversed and remanded. View "Rural Wtr Dist No 2 Creek Cnty v. City of Glenpool, et al" on Justia Law