Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

These consolidated appeals concern the aftermath of the shooting of Kristin Marie Maxwell-Bruce by her husband, Lowell Bruce. The Maxwells brought suit against several parties. These interlocutory appeals concern two sets of claims. First, the Maxwells alleged various constitutional violations by the Sheriff's officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Second, the Maxwells sought tort damages under California law against the Viejas defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). The court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity to the Sheriff's officers on the ground of qualified immunity to the Sheriff's officers with regards to the Maxwell's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims. The court reversed the district court's granting of the Viejas defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to tribal sovereign immunity, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maxwell, et al v. County of San Diego, et al" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case was whether the Americans with Disabilities Act created two separate-but-overlapping causes of action for employment discrimination. Plaintiff-Appellant Judy Elwell worked for Defendant-Appellee University of Oklahoma for years in an administrative role. She began to suffer from a degenerative spinal disc condition which did not prevent her from performing the essential functions of her job. Nevertheless, she sought certain accommodations from her employer. She alleged that the University refused to grant those accommodations and ultimately fired her, allegedly because of her disability. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, holding that Title II did not provide a cause of action for discrimination, and that Oklahoma did not waive its immunity from suit under the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (OADA). The Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[i]n this case, those traditional tools of statutory construction - including a close examination of the text together with a careful review of the larger statutory structure . . . persuade us that Congress has spoken and spoken clearly to the question of employment discrimination claims and placed them exclusively in Title I. . . . Because Title II does not contain an independent cause of action for employment discrimination and because Ms. Elwell [could not] carry her burden of showing a waiver of sovereign immunity that might permit her to proceed with an OADA claim, the judgment of the district court [was] affirmed." View "Elwell v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Okla." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed a court of appeals' opinion in "Churchill v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder," whereby the underlying civil action involved claims brought by Professor Ward Churchill pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 after his tenured employment was terminated by the Board of Regents of the University of Colorado. Churchill alleged that the Regents violated his constitutionally protected free speech rights by initiating an investigation into his academic integrity and by terminating his tenured employment in retaliation for his publication of a controversial essay. Churchill sought both compensatory and equitable relief. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Churchill's termination claim on grounds that the Regents' quasi-judicial actions were entitled to absolute immunity. It also affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Churchill's claim for equitable remedies because it concluded that such remedies were not available in a Section 1983 action against quasi-judicial officials. Lastly, based on its determination that allegedly retaliatory employment investigations are not actionable under Section 1983, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the University on Churchill's bad faith investigation claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds: (1) the Court held that the Regents' decision to terminate Churchill's employment was a quasi-judicial action functionally comparable to a judicial process, and that the Regents were entitled to absolute immunity concerning their decision; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Churchill was not entitled to the equitable remedies of reinstatement and front pay; and (3) Churchill’s bad faith investigation claim was barred by qualified immunity because the Regents' investigation into Churchill's academic record does not implicate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right or law. View "Churchill v. University of Colorado at Boulder" on Justia Law

Semper worked as a probation officer for the District Court of the Virgin Islands until he was removed from his position on August 6, 2010. The reason given for his termination was that he was negligent in supervision of a convicted defendant who was killed while on release pending sentencing. . Semper filed a complaint in the Claims Court against the United States, the Chief Judge, and the court’s Chief Probation Officer. The Claims Court dismissed, holding that it lacked jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed, first holding that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. 7501-7543, applied to Semper, regardless of which governmental branch employed him. He was classified as a member of the “excepted service,” not the “competitive service,” and was not among those excepted service employees whom the statute makes eligible for judicial or administrative review of adverse agency action. View "Semper v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, nine homeless individuals living in the "Skid Row" district of Los Angeles, charged that the City violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by seizing and immediately destroying their unabandoned personal possessions, temporarily left on public sidewalks while plaintiffs attended to necessary tasks such as eating, showering, and using restrooms. Finding a strong likelihood of success on the merits, the district court enjoined the City from confiscating and summarily destroying unabandoned property in Skid Row. On appeal, the City argued that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating plaintiffs' claims. The court concluded that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protected homeless persons from government seizure and summary destruction of their unabandoned, but momentarily unattended, personal property. Accordingly, the court denied the City's appeal. View "Lavan, et al. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the fair market value of acreage on which a gas processing facility was located. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting an expert's testimony that allegedly violated the value-to-the-taker rule, which prohibits measuring land's value by its unique value to a condemnor in determining a landowner's compensation. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the expert's testimony violated the rule because it impermissibly focused on the condemnor's interest in retaining the property and was therefore inadmissible. Remanded. View "Enbridge Pipelines L.P. v. Avinger Timber, LLC" on Justia Law

The City notified a building owner that her property was in disrepair and that, unless she repaired it, the City might demolish it. After the owner failed to remedy the problem, the City declared the property a public nuisance and condemned it. Rather than appeal the nuisance determination, the property owner asserted a takings claim after the demolition. The City field an immunity-based plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the administrative-level decision to demolish the owner's property did not preclude her from seeking a de novo review of that decision in a constitutional suit. The Supreme Court reversed in part and rendered judgment dismissing the owner's claims, holding that because the owner never appealed her nuisance determination, her takings claims were barred, and the trial court correctly dismissed them. View "City of Beaumont v. Como" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was removed from the Costa Mesa City Council meeting for an alleged violation of Costa Mesa Municipal Code 2-61, which made it a misdemeanor for members of the public who speak at City Council meetings to engage in "disorderly, insolent, or disruptive behavior." On appeal, plaintiff challenged, among other things, the district court's dismissal of his First Amendment facial challenge to the ordinance. Because section 2-61 failed to limit proscribed activity to only actual disturbances, the court reversed the district court's constitutionality ruling and found the statute facially invalid. However, the word "insolent" was easily removed from the ordinance without detriment to the purpose of section 2-61 and it need not be wholly invalidated since it was properly applied to plaintiff's disruptive behavior. The court affirmed the remainder of the district court's determinations. View "Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, et al." on Justia Law

Respondent, a professor at Prairie View A&M University, filed a complaint with the EEOC and the Texas Workforce Commission civil rights division (TWC), alleging race and nationality-based pay discrimination, about two years after her promotion to full professor. Respondent subsequently filed suit against the University in state court under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). The University filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting Respondent's complaint was untimely filed pursuant to the 180-day limitations period under the TCHRA. The trial court denied the University's plea. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the federal Ledbetter Act, which provides that the limitations period begins anew each time a claimant receives a paycheck containing a discriminatory amount, applies to claims brought under the TCHRA, and Respondent's claim was therefore timely because she received a paycheck containing an alleged discriminatory amount within 180 days of the date she filed her complain with the TWC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Ledbetter Act does not apply to a claim brought under the TCHRA; and (2) because Respondent failed to timely file her complaint with the TWC, her suit was jurisdictionally barred. View "Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha " on Justia Law

As tasked by the Legislature, the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) identified potential reservoir sites. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. purchased some of the wetlands on one of the sites identified by the TWDB as a potential reservoir location. When the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers denied its application for a mitigation banking permit because the State had identified the site as a potential reservoir, Hearts Bluff sued the State and the Corps for a taking for interfering with its asserted right to commercially develop the land as a mitigation bank. At issue was whether a takings claim against the State may be predicated on the denial of a permit by the federal government when the State had no authority to grant or deny the permit. The trial court denied the State's plea to the jurisdiction, which alleged that Hearts Bluff failed to plead a valid takings claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that absent demonstrating bad faith, Hearts Bluff did not establish the existence of jurisdiction in this case because it did not establish a viable takings claim. View "Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law