Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Dwayne Durham was charged and jailed in southwest Virginia for more than three months before the prosecutor realized that this was a case of mistaken identity and rectified the error. As a result, Plaintiff filed suit against, inter alia, Officer David L. Horner, alleging a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, plus a state law claim for malicious prosecution. The district court awarded summary judgment to Horner on the basis of qualified immunity, and Plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff contended that Horner was not entitled to qualified immunity because he relied on and utilized unverified information to set "forth a chain of events that would lead to the indictment and arrest of the wrong individual." Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding Plaintiff was unable to establish that his seizure was "pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause," and he could not show the essential constitutional violation underlying a 1983 claim. Because there was, as a matter of law, probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest and detention, his state law malicious prosecution claim failed too.

Per Hovem (Per), a former student of Klein Independent School District (KISD), along with his parents, filed a claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for reimbursement of private school expenses incurred because KISD allegedly failed to provide Per with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) while Per was a KISD student. The special hearing officer and the district court found in favor of the Hovems. The Fifth Circuit Court reversed, holding (1) the provision of FAPE to a student qualified for special education must be judged by the overall educational benefits received, and not solely by the remediation of the student's disability; and (2) because this student's individualized education program enabled him to excel, with accommodations for his disability, in a mainstream high school curriculum, KISD complied procedurally and substantively with IDEA.

Plaintiff found a $20 parking citation on his windshield and initiated a class action, claiming that the inclusion of personal information, such as his driver's license number, address, and weight, violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721, which generally makes it unlawful to disclose personal information contained in a motor vehicle record. The district court dismissed and the Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed, holding that the DPPA’s general rule of non-disclosure of personal information held in motor vehicle records and its overarching purpose of privacy protection must inform a proper understanding of the other provisions of the statute. Any disclosure must comply with those legitimate uses of information identified in the statutory exceptions. The Village’s placement of protected personal information in view of the public constituted a disclosure regulated by the statute, regardless of whether plaintiff can establish that anyone actually viewed it.

Mischelle Richter appealed (1) the district court's order dismissing her retaliation claims under Title VII and the Missouri Human Rights Act for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and (2) the dismissal of her wrongful discharge claim under Missouri law for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the district court's dismissal of the retaliation claims, holding that Richter did not properly exhaust her retaliation claims; but (2) reversed and remanded on the state-law wrongful discharge claim, holding that Richter alleged sufficient facts to state a wrongful discharge claim under Missouri law.

After a private citizen placed a creche on a sixty-foot-wide median at Christmas time. Macomb County ordered the creche removed. The Thomas More Law Center applied for a formal permit to display the creche. The County denied the permit, stating that it violated the Establishment Cause of the First Amendment. The citizen filed suit, claiming the denial of the permit violated his free-speech rights, the Establishment Clause, and his equal-protection rights. During litigation, the County changed its explanation for denying the citizen's permit, claiming that safety was the reason for its decision. The district court granted summary judgment for the County. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the citizen's Establishment Clause claim but reversed on all other grounds, holding that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the County on the citizen's free-speech and equal-protection claims.

Plaintiff, a former employee of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) who suffered from multiple sclerosis and systemic lupus, filed an administrative complaint based on alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The complaint was adjudicated by an ALJ, who denied relief in part. Plaintiff then filed an optional administrative appeal with the EEOC. Plaintiff withdrew her appeal without waiting 180 days as specified in 29 C.F.R. 1614.407(d) and filed suit in district court based on the same claims she asserted in her administrative complaint. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, holding that under Rivera v. USPS, it lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiff had not waited 180 days after filing her administrative appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that based on Bankston v. White and on post-Rivera regulation, Bullock had exhausted her administrative remedies. Remanded.

Kayla Eaton's lawsuit against her former employer and supervisor for sexual assault was dismissed for failure to prosecute. She claimed that her ability to prosecute the case was thwarted by a licensed polygraph examiner, Leroy Prior, who determined that she did not tell the truth in responding to questions about the alleged assault. Ms. Eaton and her father Robert Eaton filed this action against Prior, claiming negligent administration of the polygraph examination, and against the Vermont State Police and Lt. Matthew Belmay, alleging that they improperly disclosed the examination results and conspired to cover up Prior's misconduct. The trial court entered judgment for defendants on the ground that the suit was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for "injuries to the person," under 12 V.S.A. 512(4), and the Eatons appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly concluded the statute of limitations applied to this case, however, the court mistakenly failed to consider the applicability of 12 V.S.A. 511's general six-year limitation period to the claims for economic harm resulting from dismissal of the underlying lawsuit and other alleged economic costs.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The State of Alaska dismissed an employee for allegedly submitting a falsified timesheet and claiming full pay for a week when she was not working. The employee argued her dismissal violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because a biased supervisor was involved with the termination decision, because the State's investigation was conducted unfairly, and because she was treated differently from similarly situated employees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision that there was insufficient evidence to show a breach of the implied covenant on any of these grounds. The Court also affirmed the superior court's ruling that the employee's unfair labor practice claim was untimely and therefore waived.

"Jeffrey E." appealed his 30-day involuntary commitment order, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the superior court's conclusion that he was gravely disabled. In June 2011 Jeffrey was 20 years old, had recently lost his job due to behavioral difficulties, was in the process of divorcing, and was staying with family members. Jeffrey's family members became concerned about his behavior and brought him to a hospital. Jeffrey's family reported Jeffrey had not been eating, drinking, sleeping, or performing any self-care for several days- " he had more or less remained seated in a catatonic state," to the point of urinating on himself. Jeffrey's family also reported Jeffrey had made comments about others being able to read his mind, had responded aggressively to challenges, and had a family history of mental illness. Because Jeffrey was uncommunicative, hospital staff could not determine if he was actively psychotic. Although unable to articulate how he would behave differently, Jeffrey wanted to go home and "denied thoughts or plans of self harm or harm to others." Hospital staff concluded Jeffrey "may be experiencing symptoms of psychosis but it is difficult to assess" and that "[h]e could benefit from further assessment and stabilization . . . as it is possible he is experiencing psychosis." The superior court granted an ex parte order requiring Jeffrey's transport to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) for examination. A few days later API staff filed a petition for an involuntary 30-day commitment, and the court held a hearing on this petition. Because the superior court did not err in concluding that the respondent was gravely disabled under the required clear and convincing evidence standard, the Supreme Court affirmed the 30-day commitment order.

Petitioner Tina Marie Somerlott appealed a district court's dismissal of her claims against Cherokee Nation Distributors, Inc and CND, LLC ("CND") for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Petitioner brought federal employment discrimination claims against CND, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. After allowing discovery by both parties, the district court concluded CND was immune from suit under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and, therefore, dismissed Petitioner's complaint in its entirety. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the court's reasoning and affirmed its decision.