Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners and its members, the chief of police, and certain police officers, alleging constitutional violations under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, reasoning Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided the exclusive remedy for Appellant's claims and Appellant could not circumvent the Act's procedural requirements by solely pleading constitutional violations under section 1983. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that to the extent that Appellant's complaint asserted the violation of rights secured by the Constitution and committed by persons acting under color of state law, the district court erred in dismissing her section 1983 action for failure to comply with Title VII's procedural requirements.

Kevin Morrison, a resident of Maryland, was born in Jamaica and cannot read or write English. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting that Appellee Randstad terminated his employment pursuant to a requirement that its employees read and write English. Two years later, in an amended charge, Morrison asserted that the literacy policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because he has a learning disability. In investigating Morrison’s charges, the EEOC served an administrative subpoena on Randstad, which Randstad resisted, in part. When the EEOC sought judicial enforcement of its subpoena, the district court denied relief. "Once a charge has placed the Commission on notice that a particular employer is (or may be) violating Title VII or the ADA in a particular way, the Commission may access 'virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.'" The question was whether and to what extent these materials were "relevant" to the EEOC’s investigation of Morrison’s charges. The district court concluded that none of the requested materials were relevant. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s application of an unduly strict standard of relevance amounted to legal error, leading to an abuse of discretion. Applying the correct standard, with deference to the EEOC’s assessment of relevance, the Court concluded that all of the EEOC’s requested materials fell within the broad definition of relevance applicable to EEOC administrative subpoenas, and that the district court’s rejection of the EEOC’s alleged factual nexus "crossed the line" into an assessment of the merits of Morrison’s claim. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Cristobal Ramirez brought a Title VII employment discrimination case and represented himself in district court. He survived summary judgment (in part) and proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the presentation of his evidence, Defendant, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), orally moved for judgment as matter of law. The district court granted the motion on the sole ground that Plaintiff's claim was time-barred because he did not contact an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff, still appearing in the case pro se, appealed to the Eleventh Circuit where he was appointed counsel. Upon review, and with the benefit of counseled briefing and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court. Because the EEOC found that there was a satisfactory reason for Plaintiff's delay in making initial contact with the EEO Counselor, and because the DOT did not challenge that finding, but, instead, undertook investigation and conciliation, the DOT and the district court were bound by the EEOC’s finding.

Plaintiff-Appellant Elizabeth A. Bertsch appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Overstock.com, on her hostile work environment and retaliation claims, and appealed the denial of leave to amend to add a disparate-treatment claim, all under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-e17. Plaintiff claimed that working next to another employee "notorious" for viewing sexually explicit videos at work and making misogynistic comments made work a hostile work environment. Despite her "clean" record, she and the offending co-worker were reprimanded for contributing to the work environment and instructed to work more cooperatively. Cooperative efforts ultimately failed, and Plaintiff was eventually fired; the employer elected to terminate Plaintiff because the situation between Plaintiff and the co-worker "was not ever going to resolve itself." Overstock viewed Plaintiff as a "difficult, high-maintenance employee who left the company with no choice but to part ways." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies prior to bringing her disparate treatment claim before the Court. Accordingly, the Court held Plaintiff could not bring her Title VII action based on claims that were not part of the timely-filed EEOC charge for which she received a right-to-sue letter. Otherwise, the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the hostile work environment sexual harassment claim (and denial of leave to amend). The Court reversed the district court on Plaintiff's retaliation claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on behalf of Jessica Chrysler ("Employee"), appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee The Picture People ("Employer"). The district court granted summary judgment on the basis that Employee could not establish that she was qualified (with or without accommodation) to perform an essential function of her job as a "performer" in Employer's store. It also concluded that Employee's retaliation claim failed because she could not perform an essential function of the job, and that she offered no evidence that Employer's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit found no error and affirmed.

Plaintiff-Appellant Stephanie Smith appealed a Superior Court's award of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Delaware State University ("DSU") on her claims of wrongful termination under the Delaware Whistleblowers' Protection Act, of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and of common law defamation. Plaintiff raised three arguments on appeal: (1) that the Superior Court erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to present evidence that she was constructively discharged from DSU, sufficient to support a claim under the Act; (2) that the Superior Court erred in failing to consider whether a threat to worsen her working environment could give rise to a claim under the Act; (3) that the Superior Court erred by granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's defamation claim based on her failure to produce any evidence of damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court recognized that a constructive discharge could give rise to a Whistleblower Act claim, but concluded that the Superior Court properly granted summary judgment based on the facts alleged in this case. Because Plaintiff's defamation claim was governed by New York law, it was barred by New York's one-year statute of limitations. Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DSU.

Howard Back filed this suit alleging that Secretary of Heath and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius violated her duties under the Medicare Act and the Due Process Clause by failing to provide an administrative process for beneficiaries of hospice care to appeal a hospice provider's refusal to provide a drug prescribed by their attending physician. The district court granted the Secretary's motion for judgment on the pleadings because Back had not exhausted his administrative remedies. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's judgment and dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that although the government led Back to believe there was no appeal process, such a process did exist. Accordingly, no controversy existed and the appeal was moot.

At issue in his case was whether the circuit court correctly determined that certain exchanges of e-mails between members of a local school board did not constitute a "meeting" within the meaning of Va. Code 2.2-3701 and, thus, did not violate the notice and open meeting requirements of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) the court did not err in determining that the Board had not conducted an improper closed meeting in violation of the notice and open meeting requirements of the FOIA; and (2) the circuit court did not err in concluding that because the citizen requesting information under the FOIA had not substantially prevailed on the merits of the case, she was not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs.

This appeal presented the question of whether the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights (the Commission) must interview one or more witnesses identified by a complainant before dismissing a complaint for lack of substantial evidence to support a discrimination claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory duty to impartially investigate implied that the Commission must make a reasonable effort to interview at least some of the witnesses identified by a complainant where it appears that they may have relevant information. The Court also concluded that this duty was not satisfied under the facts of this case because the Commission did not interview any of the witnesses identified by the complainant even though they potentially had relevant information.

Appellee, the City of New Orleans, enacted an automated traffic enforcement system ordinance (the Ordinance), which permitted the City to use automated cameras to detect speeding violations and cars entering an intersection against a red light. The district court dismissed Appellants' constitutional challenge to the Ordinance, concluding that the Ordinance (1) was civil in nature, (2) afforded constitutionally adequate due process, and (3) did not violate the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the district court correctly found that the Ordinance (1) imposed a civil penalty rather than criminal penalties; (2) supplied constitutionally adequate process; and (3) did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.