Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Susan Jeffery appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant City of Nashua on her wrongful discharge and breach of contract claims. Plaintiff worked for the City since 1977 in the payroll department. She became the City's risk manager in 1998. n 2004, Plaintiff became concerned that her direct supervisor, Maureen Lemieux, did not understand the budgetary process because "she wanted to level fund the health line items" in the City’s 2005 fiscal year budget. Plaintiff raised her concerns with Lemieux "dozens of times," but Lemieux responded that "she was comfortable with her numbers." In April 2005, the City discovered that the health insurance line item was underfunded. Consequently, the Board of Aldermen convened an ad hoc health care budget committee to investigate the circumstances leading up to the shortfall. Plaintiff alleged that between her two interviews with the committee, she was summoned to a meeting with the mayor, at which he asked her whether she, as department manager, should be held responsible for the budget shortfall. Plaintiff refused to accept responsibility, explaining that she had tried to prevent the error by raising her concerns with Lemieux and others. Further, Plaintiff alleged that on a separate occasion, the mayor suggested that they "all share the blame," but she refused his suggestion. Subsequently, Plaintiff started receiving poor performance evaluations and later received disciplinary actions. She would later be demoted. Shortly after her demotion, Plaintiff took a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act; while still on leave, Plaintiff resigned her position, stating she wished to retire early. Three years after her resignation, Plaintiff sued the City alleging constructive discharge and breach of contract. Finding that Plaintiff's suit fell outside the statute of limitations, and that Plaintiff had no enforceable employment contract with the City, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment granted in favor of the City.

Plaintiff-Appellant Judy Jaramillo appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Adams County School District 14 on her 42 U.S.C. 1981 claim for race discrimination. Plaintiff was employed as principal of Hanson PreK-8 school. More than 70% of the students attending Hanson are Hispanic, and Plaintiff was the only Hispanic principal in the District. In 2008, the District contemplated policy changes, including implementing an English Language Learners policy, which stresses English immersion (rather than teaching subjects in Spanish as well as English), and operating Hanson on the same academic year as other schools in the District. These proposals were controversial in the Hispanic community and apparently with some of the teachers at Hanson. Dr. Sue Chandler, interim superintendent of the District, received a copy of an e-mail about a planned teachers’ meeting before the public study session which contained false and inaccurate information. Dr. Chandler met with Plaintiff to ask for the name of the person who had misinformed her as to the specifics of the policy. Plaintiff refused to give the name. They met again later in the afternoon and Dr. Chandler questioned Plaintiff about her lack of support for the administration’s policy, and requested that Plaintiff provide Dr. Chandler with the name of the person who informed Plaintiff about the Board’s upcoming study session. Dr. Chandler informed Plaintiff that failing to provide the name would result in disciplinary action. Plaintiff refused to provide the name. Dr. Chandler placed Plaintiff on paid administrative leave; Plaintiff was subsequently notified by letter that Dr. Chandler recommended Plaintiff's termination. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment: "What the record does reveal in this case is disagreement about administrative policy choices --hardly infrequent in the education setting. But that does not constitute pretext [of discrimination]."

Plaintiffs Vermont Human Rights Commission (HRC) and Ursula Stanley, an employee of the State Agency of Transportation, appealed the Washington Civil Division's decision to grant the State's motion to dismiss her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ms. Stanley complained that, under the Vermont Parental and Family Leave Act (VPFLA), 21 V.S.A. 472(c), which requires continuation of certain "employment benefits" during family leave, she was entitled to accrue, but was denied, paid vacation and sick time during the course of an unpaid parental leave. The trial court held that under section 472(c) an employee does not continue earning paid leave during unpaid parental leave. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss, finding that sections 472(a) and (b) of the VPFLA point to why the accrual of paid time-off and sick time are not benefits that employers must provide during unpaid leave. Section 472(a) states that an employee is "entitled to take unpaid leave." However, the statute permits employees to use already "accrued paid leave," such as vacation or sick leave, during parental leave. As the trial court noted, if an employee could demand accrual of paid leave from an employer under the VPFLA while on family leave, it must follow that at least a portion of the parental leave would be rendered paid leave, "a result not just inconsistent with, but contrary to, the employer's VPFLA obligation to provide unpaid parental leave only."

Geoff Livingston and 134 other homeonwers or renters (collectively Plaintiffs) in a Fairfax County subdivision brought an inverse condemnation suit against the County and the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) after their homes were flooded during a severe storm. The circuit court dismissed the suit on demurrer, holding that a single occurrence of flooding could not support an inverse condemnation claim under Va. Const. art. I, 11. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint, if taken as true, established that their homes and personal property were damaged by VDOT's operation of, and failure to maintain, the relocation of a tributary stream, the circuit court erred in dismissing their inverse condemnation suit on VDOT's demurrer. Remanded.

Respondent Christopher Toler's driver's license was revoked by the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles after Respondent's vehicle was stopped at a vehicle equipment checkpoint and Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence. The circuit court reversed, concluding (1) Respondent was driving while under the influence of alcohol; but (2) the vehicle equipment checkpoint at which Respondent was stopped was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the judicially-created exclusionary rule is not applicable in a civil, administrative driver's license revocation or suspension proceeding; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in applying the exclusionary rule to exclude all evidence in this case. Remanded.

Plaintiffs brought a First Amendment and other constitutional challenges to regulations and associated guidelines that required permits for "commercial weddings" on public beaches in Hawaii. The court held that Hawaii's regulation of commercial weddings on unencumbered state beaches did not violate the First Amendment, except for a provision giving an official absolute discretion to revoke a permit at anytime and to modify it as the official deemed necessary or appropriate.

A suit seeking to represent a class of inmates at the “supermax” Tamms Correctional Center, alleging due process violations, was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While remand was pending, the Illinois Department of Corrections developed a “Ten-Point Plan,” revising procedures for transferring inmates to Tamms, with a detailed transfer-review process. Although it had not been implemented, IDOC submitted the Plan at trial. The court held that conditions at Tamms impose atypical and significant hardship, establishing a due-process liberty interest in avoiding transfer to Tamms, and that procedures for transfer decisions were unconstitutional. The court entered an injunction incorporating the Ten-Point Plan. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The scope and specificity of the injunction exceed what is required to remedy the due process violation, contrary to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), and to Supreme Court statements about remedial flexibility and deference to prison administrators in this type of litigation. Injunctive relief to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions must be “narrowly drawn,” extend “no further than necessary” to remedy the violation, and use the “least intrusive means” to correct the violation of the federal right. Making the Plan a constitutional baseline eliminated operational discretion and flexibility, exceeding what due process requires and violating the PLRA.

The Association filed suit, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and the Constitution, challenging the State Authorization, Compensation, and Misrepresentation Regulations the Department of Education initiated under the Higher Education Act (HEA), Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232-54. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court holding that the Compensation Regulations did not exceed the HEA's limits; the court mostly rejected the Association's claim that these regulations were not based on reasoned decisionmaking; the court remanded two aspects of the Compensation Regulations, however, that were lacking for want of adequate explanations. The court also held that the Misrepresentation Regulations exceeded the HEA's limits in three respects: by allowing the Secretary to take enforcement actions against schools sans procedural protections; by proscribing misrepresentations with respect to subjects that were not covered by the HEA, and by proscribing statements that were merely confusing. The court rejected the Association's other challenges to the Misrepresentation Regulations. Finally, with respect to the State Authorization Regulations, the court concluded that the Association had standing to challenge the school authorization regulation, but held that the regulation was valid. However, the court upheld the Association's challenge in the distance education regulation, because that regulation was not a logical outgrowth of the Department's proposed rules.

The Bald Knob Cross is a well-known Illinois tourist attraction, claiming to be the largest cross in the Western Hemisphere. It had fallen into disrepair. The non-profit group Friends of the Cross was formed to solicit donations. In 2008 Friends secured a $20,000 grant from the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity. Sherman, an atheist, filed suit, alleging violation of the Establishment Clause (42 U.S.C. 1983) and claiming standing as a taxpayer. A magistrate ruled that Sherman lacked standing and that his claim was moot. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. "Whatever may be lurking in the background of this appropriations legislation, the $20,000 grant to Friends was not the result of legislative action; rather, it can be traced at most to the initiative of a single legislator. The ultimate pool of $5 million was in the hands of an executive agency, which was formally responsible for the decision to hand out the $20,000 to Friends." Taxpayer standing is foreclosed under these circumstances.

Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, denies federal economic and other benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in Massachusetts and to surviving spouses from those couples, by defining "marriage" as "only a legal union between one man and one woman." "Spouse" refers "only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." DOMA absolves states from recognizing same-sex marriages solemnized in other states; prevents same-sex married couples from filing joint federal tax returns, affecting tax burdens; prevents a surviving same-sex spouse from collecting Social Security survivor benefits; leaves federal employees unable to share health insurance and other benefits with same-sex spouses. DOMA may result in loss of federal funding of programs such as Medicaid and veterans cemeteries if states recognize same-sex marriages in determining income or allowing burials. The district court declared Section 3 unconstitutional. The First Circuit affirmed, but stayed injunctive relief, anticipating certiorari review. The court applied "a closer than usual review" based on discrepant impact among married couples and on the importance of state interests in regulating marriage and tested the rationales for DOMA, considering Supreme Court precedent limiting which rationales can be counted and the force of certain rationales.