Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Michael Chenoweth was arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Thereafter, Commissioner Joe Miller of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles issued an order revoking Chenoweth's privilege to drive a motor vehicle. The circuit court reversed and vacated the revocation of Chenoweth's driver's license based on its finding that the trooper improperly stopped Chenoweth's vehicle without an articulable reasonable suspicion. In so doing, the circuit court applied the exclusionary rule to an administrative driver's license revocation proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no illegal stop, and thus it was not necessary to reach the issue of whether the circuit court properly applied the exclusionary rule in this case.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants on various claims arising from plaintiff's unsuccessful application for appointment as director of the City's Department of Human Rights and Equal Economic Opportunity, as well as denial of his motion to compel various depositions. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's due process claims because he had no protected property interest in the position; because plaintiff had not presented evidence that he was treated differently from similarly situated candidates or that he was the victim of intentional or purposeful discrimination, plaintiff's equal protection claim failed as a matter of law; the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's conspiracy claim because plaintiff's assertion did not demonstrate a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus; and the court affirmed the district court's remaining rulings.

Defendant, a city police officer, appealed from the denial of qualified immunity in plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging First Amendment retaliation. The district court held that it was clearly established in December 2008 that a supervisor could not retaliate against a public employee for his or her subpoenaed deposition testimony offered as a citizen in the context of a civil rights lawsuit. The court agreed and affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

After the September 11, 2011 attacks, the government detained plaintiff, an American citizen, as an enemy combatant. Plaintiff alleged that he was held incommunicado in military detention, subjected to coercive interrogation techniques and detained under harsh conditions of confinement, all in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiff and his mother sued John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) from 2001 to 2003, alleging that they suffered from plaintiff's unlawful detention. The court held that, under recent Supreme Court law, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the court was compelled to conclude that, regardless of the legality of plaintiff's detention and the wisdom of Yoo's judgments, at the time he acted the law was not "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he [wa]s doing violated[d]" plaintiff's rights. Therefore, the court held that Yoo must be granted qualified immunity and accordingly reversed the decision of the district court.

Plaintiffs Russell and Mary Ann Rueger and John Moyers appealed a trial courts grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Natural Resources Board and the District #9 Environmental Commission of Vermont. The matter arose from an Access to Public Records Act request. The court concluded that certain records held by Defendants reflected deliberations of an agency acting in a quasi-judicial role, and those were exempt from disclosure. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that the court erred in interpreting the Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the documents in question fell within the plain language of the Act, and were indeed exempt. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of claims he brought against Board Members, in their individual capacities, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff alleged that the Board Members deprived him of his constitutional rights when, in an ex parte emergency proceeding, they summarily suspended his authority to prescribe medication. The court held that the Board Members were absolutely immune from plaintiff's claims for money damages where they were functionally comparable to judges and their summary suspension authority was comparable to a judicial act. The court also held that Younger abstention barred plaintiff's claims for equitable relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Robert Newton alleged Major John R. Teter and Lieutenant Colonel Wayne E. Lee of the Utah Air National Guard violated his due process rights when they suspended and subsequently withdrew his Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS) certificate, and when they suspended his employment as an Air Traffic Control Supervisor at Hill Air Force Base in Utah. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on Plaintiff's due process claim regarding the suspension of his employment. It denied summary judgment on Plaintiff's due process claim regarding the withdrawal of his ATCS certificate, holding this claim was not barred by qualified immunity or by intramilitary immunity under the "Feres" doctrine. In this interlocutory appeal, Defendants challenged the denial of qualified immunity and intramilitary immunity on Plaintiff's ATCS certificate claim. Plaintiff cross-appealed the grant of summary judgment on his employment claim. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff's ATCS certificate was not barred by the "Feres" doctrine, and that the Court had no jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity to defendants. The Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's cross-appeal.

Appellant Michael Miller was placed under arrest for the offense of driving while intoxicated. Appellant's driver's license was suspended for six months and his commercial driver's license was disqualified for one year. At an administrative hearing, a hearing officer upheld the suspension of Appellant's driving privileges. Appellant appealed, asserting that his administrative hearing was flawed. The circuit court found (1) the administrative hearing did not violate Appellant's due process right, and therefore, Ark. Code Ann. 5-65-402, which governs the administrative suspension of driver's licenses, was not unconstitutional as applied to Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 5-64-402 was no unconstitutional as applied to Appellant in this case.

Proposition 200, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-166(F)(the registration provision), required prospective voters in Arizona to provide proof of U.S. citizenship in order to register to vote and required registered voters to show identification to cast a ballot at the polls, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-579(A)(the poll place provision). At issue on appeal was whether Proposition 200 violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973, was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment or Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, or was void as inconsistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq. The court upheld Proposition 200's requirement that voters show identification at the polling place, but concluded that the NVRA superseded Proposition 200's registration provision as that provision was applied to applicants using the National Mail Voter Registration Form to register to vote in federal elections.

Plaintiff brought suit against the Board, arguing that the fee charged at the conclusion of his public intoxication and public inhabitation case violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment because it discouraged public defenders from exonerating their clients. Louisiana's funding mechanism for indigent defense required indigent defendants who were found guilty, or plead nolo contendere, to pay a $35 fee at the conclusion of their cases, but it did not require defendants who were exonerated to pay the fee. The district court ruled that abstention was required under the Younger doctrine and, alternatively, that plaintiff did not state a claim for relief under the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment. Because the court held that the district court did not err in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's lawsuit, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.