Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After concluding that police violated plaintiff's constitutional rights in seizing items from his residence, a Missouri state trial court suppressed the evidence. Missouri filed an interlocutory appeal of the suppression order in the Missouri Court of Appeals, which was dismissed. Plaintiff then brought this civil rights lawsuit against his ex-wife, his son, the City of Desloge, a city police officer, and unidentified defendants. Plaintiff alleged a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against all defendants for violations of plaintiff's civil rights, as well as section 1985 and state law claims for civil conspiracy against all defendants. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the dismissal of the city and the police, alleging various errors. The court rejected plaintiff's arguments under State v. Daniels, holding that plaintiff's collateral estoppel argument lacked merit. The court also held that plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated where the arrest warrant was properly admitted and even if the warrant was admitted in error, plaintiff suffered no prejudice. The court further held that plaintiff was unable to show any material prejudice resulting from the late filing of the police's motion to file their brief in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court finally held that plaintiff failed to establish that the police officer violated plaintiff's constitutional rights and could not maintain the action against the other officer or the city. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiffs, Cindy Fils and Nemours Maurice, raised claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that certain named police officers used excessive force to subdue plaintiffs at a club. The court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and the officers appealed. The court affirmed the district court with respect to Maurice's excessive force claims against Officer Bergert and Williams; reversed the district court with respect to Fils' excessive force claims against Officer Bergert and Burns; affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the remaining claims; and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs, visually or manually impaired Florida citizens who were registered to vote in Duval County, Florida and were represented by the American Association of People with Disabilities, filed a putative class action against defendants, alleging that defendants violated federal statutory and state constitutional provisions by failing to provide handicapped-accessible voting machines to visually or manually impaired Florida voters after the 2000 general election. The court vacated its prior opinion and in its revised opinion, held that the district court erroneously granted plaintiffs' requested declaratory judgment and injunction against purported violations of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The opinion, however, based that outcome exclusively on the ground that voting machines were not "facilities" under 28 C.F.R. 35.151(b).

Plaintiff Billy Merrifield brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against his former employer Defendant Board of Commissioners for Santa Fe. In his suit, he alleged he had been denied procedural due process with respect to the County's pre termination hearing process when he was fired from his position as a Youth Services Administrator. His complaint also alleged that he was fired in retaliation for retaining an attorney. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, and set aside a state administrative decision to award him back pay. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff failed to show that the County's pre termination process was constitutionally inadequate and that his association with an attorney lead to his termination.

Plaintiff sued defendant, the Secretary of the Navy, for sexual harassment and retaliation, in addition to state law claims. Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of the case based on the failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because she first made contact with an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor on February 10, 2004 - 68 days after the sexual harassment ended. The court also held that neither equitable tolling nor equitable estoppel saved her claim.

Plaintiff, Green County's chief juvenile-intake worker from 1997-2008, alleged that Green County (county) deprived her of a property interest in her job without due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, where the county Board of Supervisors removed the juvenile-intake position from the auspices of the circuit court and created a new juvenile-intake position within the Human Services Department. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The court concluded that the evidence indicated that the county reorganized to save costs and, had the county reorganized merely to terminate plaintiff's employment, its decision to rehire her for the new position would be inexplicable. The court also concluded that because nothing in the record suggested that saving money was a pretext for something else, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the county eliminated plaintiff's court-attached juvenile-intake position in conjunction with a legitimate governmental reorganization. Therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to due process and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) appealed from an order of the district court enjoining the enforcement of an NYCTA policy requiring third parties to obtain the consent of those contesting notices of violations before NYCTA's Transit Adjudication Bureau in order to observe such hearings. At issue was whether the public had a right to access these proceedings. The court held that the First Amendment guaranteed the public a presumptive right of access to the NYCTA's adjudicatory proceedings and that the NYCTA had not overcome that presumption.

Catherine Stone was employed as a nurse at a nursing facility when she physically restrained a patient in an attempt to force-feed the patient medication. The Department of Health and Senior Services placed Stone on the employee disqualification list for eighteen months after finding that Stone knowingly abused a patient. Stone sought review of the Department's decision, arguing that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the decision because expert testimony was required to prove that she knowingly abused a patient with dementia and mental disabilities, and (2) the Department deprived her of due process of law by allegedly failing to provide notice of her violations. The circuit court reversed the decision of the Department. The Department appealed, and after opinion by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court granted transfer. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the Department's lay witnesses' testimony was substantial and competent evidence that Stone knowingly abused a patient; (2) the Department provided her with notice of her violations, and therefore, Stone's due process rights were not violated; and (3) the decision of the Department was authorized by law and supported by substantial and competent evidence.

A jury found for the District of Columbia government and a detective of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)(collectively, the government), in this case alleging a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for the use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and common law claims for assault and battery. Appellant, as personal representative of her brother's estate, sued to recover damages for the shooting death of her brother by the detective, and she contended on appeal that she did not receive a fair trial. The principle issue concerned the district court's rulings on the inadmissibility of portions of an internal MPD report regarding an altercation between the detective and appellant's brother. A related issue involved a violation of the pretrial disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. The court found no abuse of discretion by the district court where the record revealed that it properly excluded those parts of the report likely to confuse the jury and unfairly prejudiced the government. The court also held that the government failed to comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(E) by not supplementing the medical expert's disclosure to reflect an interview with the detective on which the expert intended to rely at trial, but in view of appellant's cross-examination of the expert, after receiving the expert's interview notes, that the violation was harmless and so the district court's refusal to strike the expert's testimony was not reversible error. Accordingly, because appellant's other claims of error and her bias claim were unpersuasive, the court affirmed the judgment.

The District of Columbia filed this suit to recover its attorneys' fees from a lawyer who brought an administrative complaint against the District on behalf of a student with special educational needs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A). At issue was whether the District was a "prevailing party" under the IDEA in this suit. The court held that the facts in this case followed closely in the wake of the court's precedent in District of Columbia v. Straus where that court held that the district was not a "prevailing party" where its own change of position was what had mooted the dispute, causing the case to be dismissed. Therefore, the court held that the District, in this case, was not a "prevailing party" where the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) authorized an independent comprehensive psychological evaluation for the student, which mooted the only issue before the hearing officer. Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment ordering the lawyer to pay attorneys' fees was reversed.