Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants Family Protection Services Board, its secretary/treasurer, and several of its members all appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Men & Women Against Discrimination (MAWAD). The Board is a public body created by the West Virginia Domestic Violence Act (WVDVA). Among other things, the Board is charged with establishing and enforcing standards for the licensure of all domestic violence shelters and family protection programs in the state. The Board also provides funds for shelters and programs once they become licensed. In 2008, MAWAD filed a complaint alleging that the Board implemented the WVDVA in a discriminatory manner. MAWAD sought to enjoin the Board from disbursing funds to shelters and programs until the alleged discriminatory practices were addressed. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of MAWAD, rendering three legislative rules promulgated by the Board as "null and void." Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found MAWAD lacked standing to bring suit against the Board. The Court dismissed the case.

Appellant, director of a child development center on the Elmendorf Air Force Base, sued appellees alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16, and a claim of unlawful removal from employment pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7702. Appellant appealed from the district court's denial of summary judgment affirming a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), which in turn upheld a decision by the United States Air Force ("Agency"), to terminate her employment after she requested 120 days leave without pay pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 5 U.S.C. 6382(a)(1)(D), and failed to provide the minimum information required by section 6383(b) of the FMLA. The court held that the MSPB's finding was supported by substantial evidence where appellant's WH-380 form and the two doctors' notes she submitted did not provide the minimum information required by section 6383(b). The court further held that, because appellant refused to submit the minimal mandated medical certification, she could not show any harm arising from the Agency's request for more documentation that was required by the FMLA. The court further held that the administrative law judge properly rejected appellant's argument that the Agency failed to give her adequate time to provide medical certification. The court finally held that substantial evidence supported the MSPB's finding and therefore, the Agency acted within its discretion in removing her from her position.

After a drug search, plaintiff, a 12-year veteran of the police force, notified his supervisor that he had $600 that had been found in the house. He followed instructions and returned the money to its owner. He was suspended without pay. The officer was acquitted of criminal charges before the suspension hearing, which occurred six months after his request. After the hearing, he was terminated from the department. The Investigation, Processing and Appeals Commission and Puerto Rico Court of Appeals affirmed. The federal district court ultimately dismissed all claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court properly applied collateral estoppel; plaintiff had a full opportunity to litigate the issues at the administrative and state court levels and a "public policy" exception does not apply. Plaintiff's due process rights were not violated by the 14-day delay between his acquittal and the administrative hearing.

In 1994 the federal government filed suit to remedy conditions in Puerto Rican juvenile detention facilities. The court approved a settlement in 1997. A 2007 order terminated some conditions and modified and retained others. The parties continued sparring over failure to achieve specified staff levels; a 2009 order required hiring of 50 staff members per month until the goal was reached. Six months later, the federal government moved for a finding of civil contempt. The district court took no action on either the contempt motion or Puerto Rico's request to modify or terminate the 2009 order before 180 days had passed, and the prospective relief provisions were stayed (18 U.S.C. 3626(a)). The court subsequently denied the motion for contempt. The Third Circuit dismissed, reasoning that there is nothing to enforce because the 2009 order was stayed as a result of the motion to modify or terminate. The two motions involve the same argument: whether Puerto Rico is financially able to comply with the 2009 order. The court urged the district court to decide Puerto Rico's motion promptly.

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and various business and civil rights organizations (collectively, "Chamber") filed a federal preenforcement suit against those charged with administering the Legal Arizona Workers Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23-211, 212, 212.01, which provided that the licenses of state employers that knowingly or intentionally employed unauthorized aliens could be, and in certain circumstances, must be, suspended or revoked. The law also required that all Arizona employers use E-Verify, an internet-based system employers could use to check the work authorization status of employees. At issue was whether federal immigration law preempted those provisions of Arizona law. The Court held that Arizona's licensing law fell within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the states and therefore, was not expressly preempted where the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(2), prohibited states from imposing civil or criminal sanctions on those who employed unauthorized aliens but preserved state authority to impose sanctions through licensing and similar laws. The court also held that Arizona's requirement that employers use E-Verify did not conflict with the federal scheme and in no way obstructed achieving the aims of the federal program.

The Sheriffs of Jackson and Washington Counties withheld concealed handgun licenses from persons who met all of the statutory conditions for the issuance of such licenses, but admitted to being regular users of medical marijuana. When the sheriffsâ actions were challenged in court, the sheriffs responded that the stateâs handgun licensing scheme does not take medical marijuana use into consideration. The reason why the sheriffs denied the handgun licenses was because the state law is preempted by the federal prohibition on the possession of firearms by persons who are âunlawful users of controlled substances.â Both the trial and appellate courts rejected the preemption argument, and held that the concealed handgun licenses were wrongfully withheld. The sheriffs appealed. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Gun Control Act did not preempt the stateâs concealed handgun licensing statute, and accordingly, the Court ordered the sheriffs issue or renew the requested licenses.

A social worker employed by the Department was the primary case worker for plaintiffâs son, who was removed from his motherâs custody by the Department. After boy was adjudicated neglected by the juvenile court, custody was granted to his maternal great aunt and uncle. Plaintiff, who wished to take custody, claimed that the social worker misrepresented his desire and ability to parent and impeded his ability to participate in custody proceedings. The district court denied the social worker's motion for summary judgment on claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the social worker is absolutely immune from suit for her participation in juvenile court proceedings, regardless of whether she conducted an inadequate investigation or knowingly made false statements. Because the social worker's conduct neither caused any deprivation of the plaintiff's interest in family integrity, nor interfered with the process, qualified immunity barred remaining claims. The juvenile court was responsible for the "deprivation" and the plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to be heard.

The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS) determined that Darline Liddell-Toney was required to participate in a self-sufficiency program in order to receive benefits under the Welfare Reform Act, despite her documented disability. The district court affirmed the DHSSâ determination. Ms. Liddell-Toney appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the DHSS provided sufficient evidence to prove she was not entitled to an exemption from participating in the program. The Supreme Court found that the evidence clearly indicated that Ms. Liddell-Toney was prevented from working for a substantial period due to her disability. The Court held that the district court erred when it affirmed DHSSâs determination that Ms. Liddell-Toney did not qualify for an exemption from participating in the self-sufficiency program. The Court reversed the judgment of the district court, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 1995 the city gave an examination for positions in its fire department and rated applicants on a scale between highly qualified and not qualified, based on scores. "Qualified" applicants were told that they were unlikely to be hired. From 1996 through 2001, the city hired random batches from the well-qualified pool. In 1997 a person in the qualified pool filed a charge of discrimination, claiming disparate impact on African-American applicants (42 U.S.C. 2000(e)). After receiving right-to-sue letters from the EEOC, applicants filed a class action in 1998. After a trial, the court rejected a business necessity defense and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On remand, after the Supreme Court held that most of the claims were timely, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The city conceded that the cut-off score in the ranking system had a disparate impact, so each "batch" hiring had a similar impact. While hiring according to a list, perhaps hiring highest scorers first, might have served a business necessity, the random selection of batches amounted to repeated "use" of a tool that created disparate impact.

In the early 1990s, Colorado state prisoners initiated a class action lawsuit alleging that state officials were committing ongoing violations of disabled prisonersâ rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In 2003, the parties entered into a consent decree setting forth the actions the government officials would take to bring the prison system into compliance with these laws. Claimant Larry Gordon filed an individual claim for damages under the plan devised by the inmates and officials. Mr. Gordonâs claim was denied, and he filed an appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Because the class action suit covered the issue Mr. Gordon raised in his appeal, his case was remanded to a panel that was working on the logistics of enforcing the plan. The parties could not resolve their disagreements concerning enforcement of the plan, and took their disagreement to the district court. The court ruled that its orders on appeal from the panelâs decisions would be final and not appealable to the Tenth Circuit. Mr. Gordonâs claim for damages would eventually be denied by the district court, and he appealed despite the courtâs earlier ruling. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether it could actually review appeals from denied claims of damages that stemmed from the consent decree and plan. The officials wanted the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, Court held that even if the language of the agreement provided that the lower courtâs review would be final, an appeal could be made to the Tenth Circuit since the Courtâs jurisdiction is invoked by statute. The Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decision to dismiss the officialsâ motion, and Mr. Gordonâs claim for damages.