Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Jessica Cohon sought funding through New Mexicoâs Medicaid program. She qualified for the âMi Via Waiverâ program, and submitted budget requests which were partly granted, partly denied. After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, she filed suit, alleging that the administration of the Mi Via Waiver program discriminated against severely disabled persons like herself. The State moved to dismiss Plaintiffâs complaint, arguing that not only was it the wrong entity being sued, but that Plaintiff had no statutory basis to support her suit. The district court dismissed Plaintiffâs claims based on federal law, but remanded her state-law claims to the administrative agency for further proceedings. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her federal law claims to the Tenth Circuit. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found Plaintiffâs federal claims âinsufficient in substance,â and affirmed the judgment of the district court that dismissed her claims.

Plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in their official capacities under 28 U.S.C. 2201, alleging that the so-called "parsonage exemption" violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also sued the Executive Office of the California Franchise Tax Board in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that California's parsonage exemption violated the Establishment Clause of both the United States and California Constitutions. Six days after plaintiffs filed their complaint, a minister of the gospel in the Sacramento area, who regularly claimed both the federal and state parsonage exemptions, moved to intervene as a defendant. At issue was whether an individual who claimed certain federal and state tax exemptions could intervene in an unrelated action challenging the constitutionality of those exemptions. The court held that the minister was not entitled to intervene as of right where the federal defendants adequately represented the minister's interest. The court also clarified that the independent jurisdictional grounds requirement did not apply to proposed intervenors in federal-question cases when the proposed intervenor was not raising new claims. Therefore, the court also held that the minister was not required to make any further showing that his intervention was supported by independent jurisdictional grounds where the district court's denial of permissive intervention was not an appropriate exercise in discretion because the district court did not apply the correct legal rule. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded that portion of the district court's order so that the district court could reassess the request for permissive intervention.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, Nassau County, New York and/or MTA Long Island Bus ("MTA"), asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., where the gravamen of the lawsuits was that defendants implemented substantial reductions in paratransit services without allowing for the public participation of users of the services required by the ADA regulations and failed to make reasonable modifications to existing services so as to ameliorate the effect of the service reductions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' cases on the grounds that the regulations did not apply to the service cuts in question and that the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") reasonable modifications requirement did not apply to paratransit services. The court held that 49 C.F.R. 37.137(c) of the ADA could not be enforced in a private right of action based on 49 C.F.R. 12143 where the failure to permit public participation did not constitute discrimination under section 12143. The court also read section 12134 to mean that the DOJ's reasonable modifications regulations did not apply to public entities providing paratransit services outside the ADA service area. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' cases.

The United States sued the New York City Board of Education and related parties ("City Defendants") claiming a violation of Title VII's prohibition of disparate impact selection measures. The parties entered into a settlement in 1999 despite objections from incumbent employees who were denied leave to intervene in the suit. The incumbent employees' lawsuits raised the issue of whether the City Defendants' voluntary implementation of the settlement agreement violated section 703(a) of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In addition to the central holding, the court addressed several other issues. The court held that because the district court in its Title VII analysis reached results inconsistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, its judgment must be vacated and remanded with two exceptions. First, the court affirmed the district court's grant of class certification and second, paragraph 4 of the district court's declaratory judgment had not been appealed and therefore must stand.

Former captains from the Illinois Department of Corrections sued state and union officials, alleging that the defendants unlawfully punished them for seeking to organize with a rival union. The district court entered summary for the defendants, including a decision that the governor was protected by immunity. The governor's line-item veto of funding for captains' positions was legislative in nature and, therefore, protected by immunity and the plaintiffs failed to tie the governor to any allegedly-retaliatory actions before or after the veto. The decision to eliminate the middle management position at issue was a policy decision, unlike hiring or firing a particular individual, regardless of the subsequent creation of a new, similar position. The captains did not show how deposing the governor or more extensive deposition of the deputy chief of staff would lead to relevant evidence on the immunity issue. That two unions were competing to represent the captains did not establish a conspiracy between one of the unions and the administration with respect to determining the seniority of captains who took positions as corrections officers after their positions were eliminated.

The Equal Rights Center ("ERC") sued Post Properties, Inc. ("Post") alleging that Post designed, constructed, and operated its apartment complexes in a manner that violated the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631, and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12181-12189. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to Post on the ground that the ERC lacked standing to bring suit where it failed to demonstrate an injury in fact. The court held that the ERC failed to demonstrate that its injury was actual or imminent at the time of the filed suit and held that the district court erroneously concluded that the ERC could not establish standing because it chose to redirect its resources to investigate Post's allegedly discriminatory practice. Therefore, the court focused on whether the organizational plaintiff undertook expenditures in response to, and to counteract, the effects of a defendant's alleged discrimination rather than in anticipation of litigation and determined that the ERC failed to demonstrate that it suffered an injury in fact that was actual or imminent at the time it filed the suit.

The Puerto Rico Examining Board of Accountants required a CPA to submit to involuntary practice review and denied a requested postponement. The CPA failed to appear at a hearing. The Board did not respond to a request to reschedule, but suspended his license. Following a request for reconsideration, the Board sent notice that did not comply with statutory requirements, held a hearing, and declined to lift the suspension. The CPA completed the practice review after the deadline; the Board again declined to lift the suspension. The Board sent another non-compliant notice, held another hearing, and revoked the CPA's license. A Puerto Rico court ordered reinstatement. The federal district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the individual Board defendants perform functions similar to judges and are protected by immunity. They act under a statute that provides for due process and their actions are reviewable in Puerto Rico courts. Although they made serious procedural errors, the Board members had jurisdiction to take the actions at issue.

After the plaintiff publicly criticized town council policies, the council denied him reappointment to an unpaid advisory commission concerned with recreational facilities. The district court rejected his 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights suit on summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed. The court assumed that the council's decision was based on the plaintiff's exercise of First Amendment rights and held that the plaintiff's former position and his comments related to policy. Analogizing to firings based on political party affiliation, the court held that the balance weighs in favor of the town's need to accomplish its policy objectives through loyal, cooperative individuals whom the public will perceive as sharing the administration's goals.

The plaintiff and her four-year-old daughter, Muslim U.S. citizens, were returning from Canada in 2006 when a Customs and Border Protection computer mistakenly identified them as armed and dangerous. She was handcuffed and questioned for several hours; her car was searched and damaged. The district court dismissed plaintiff's suit to obtain unredacted Treasury Enforcement Communications System and Automated Targeting System (ATS) documents from DHS and for failure to maintain accurate records under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a. The Sixth Circuit vacated in part and remanded. Noting a split in the circuits, the court held that an agency may exempt a system of records from civil remedies provisions of the Act only if the underlying substantive duties fall within the Act's general exemption provision. Claims concerning improper disclosure and records of First Amendment activity do not fall within the general exemption, but DHS properly exempted the records from other provisions of the Act. The court further noted that the effort to exempt the all of the records may have been ambiguous and procedurally inadequate. A challenge to exemption of documents from the ATS was properly rejected for failure to claim "adverse effect" as a result of alleged procedural deficiencies.

The governor terminated two public employees. The district court ordered reinstatement. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. After examining the law of the U.S. Virgin Islands, the court determined that the employees were "career service," not exempt employees, but were not "regular" employees and, therefore, did not have a protected property interest in their jobs.