Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered an appeal by several Missouri public officials who were denied qualified immunity by a lower court regarding five claims arising from a murder prosecution. The murder case, involving Donald Nash who was eventually convicted for the murder of Judy Spencer, was reopened in 2007, 25 years after the crime occurred. The officials based their case on a theory that DNA evidence found under Spencer's fingernails belonged to Nash, which they asserted could not have remained present if Spencer had washed her hair after their last encounter.Nash was convicted and spent 11 years in prison until the Missouri Supreme Court set aside his conviction in 2020. The charges were dismissed after DNA testing on the shoelace used to strangle Spencer supported Nash’s noninvolvement. Nash and his wife filed a lawsuit against the officials, claiming violations of rights including unlawful arrest and detention, fabrication of evidence, failure to investigate, violations of rights of access to courts, and violation of the right to familial and marital associations.The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part the appeals on the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of unlawful arrest and detention, finding that the omission of certain exculpatory facts from the probable cause affidavit negated probable cause for Nash's arrest. However, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity for the claim alleging violation of the right to familial and marital associations, as this was not a clearly established constitutional right in 2008. The court dismissed the officials' appeal on the remaining claims due to lack of jurisdiction, as these involved genuine disputes of material fact to be resolved by a jury. View "Estate of Nash v. Folsom" on Justia Law

In a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, plaintiffs Jennifer Dupree and Detrich Battle challenged the dismissal of their Title V claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) on the basis of sovereign immunity. Dupree, who worked for the Georgia Department of Human Services, and Battle, an employee of the Georgia Department of Corrections, had requested accommodations at their respective workplaces due to their health conditions. After their requests were denied and their employment terminated, they filed claims under Title V, alleging retaliation.The court, however, found that sovereign immunity applies to Title V claims when brought in conjunction with Title I claims. This meant that the plaintiffs' claims could not proceed. Importantly, the court clarified that dismissals based on sovereign immunity, a jurisdictional issue, should be entered without prejudice. Not specifying this in the dismissal could lead to misunderstandings about the nature of the dismissal. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded the case for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to dismiss the case without prejudice. View "Dupree v. Owens" on Justia Law

This case before the Indiana Supreme Court involved the intersection of a successful Section 1983 federal action and Indiana’s public-employee indemnification statute. The plaintiff, Kailee Leonard, hit and killed a dog belonging to a state conservation officer, Scott Johnson. In response, Officer Johnson pursued misdemeanor charges against Leonard for leaving the scene of the accident. Leonard was subsequently charged but never arrested, and the charges were later dropped at Officer Johnson's request. Leonard then filed a federal lawsuit against Officer Johnson, claiming false arrest. The jury found in Leonard's favor, awarding her $10,000 in damages and $52,462 in attorney’s fees and costs. Unable to pay the full amount, Officer Johnson assigned his indemnification rights against the State to Leonard and her attorney. Leonard subsequently sued the State for a declaratory judgment that the State had a duty to indemnify Officer Johnson and pay the judgment. The trial court found in Leonard's favor, but the State appealed, arguing that Officer Johnson's actions constituted a criminal act.The Indiana Supreme Court held that Leonard had shown that Officer Johnson’s conduct was noncriminal, and the State did not rebut that showing. The Court clarified that a party seeking indemnification under the Indiana public-employee indemnification statute must initially show that the loss occurred because of a noncriminal act or omission. The burden then shifts to the State to rebut that showing by producing evidence establishing a prima facie case of criminal conduct. In this case, Leonard met her burden of producing evidence that Officer Johnson’s conduct was noncriminal, and the State failed to establish a prima facie case that he had committed the crime of false informing. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision ordering the State to indemnify Officer Johnson and pay the federal judgment. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the plaintiff, Donald Ray Logsdon, Jr., alleged that Deputy United States Marshals used excessive force when executing a state-court warrant for Logsdon's arrest. The plaintiff relied on a precedent, Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, which established a cause of action against federal agents for violations of the Bill of Rights. However, the district court dismissed Logsdon's case, holding that the Bivens claim was not applicable, and the plaintiff appealed.The Appeals Court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Logsdon had no claim under Bivens. The court found that there were two "special factors" that distinguished this case from Bivens and thus justified not recognizing a Bivens claim.Firstly, the court stated that agents of the United States Marshal Service (USMS) were a new category of defendant not considered by the Supreme Court in Bivens. The USMS is required by statute to partner with state and local law-enforcement authorities to create Fugitive Apprehension Task Forces. The court found that the potential chilling effect on such partnerships of recognizing Bivens liability for USMS officers was a special factor that suggested that Congress, not the courts, should create a remedy.Secondly, the court found that the availability of alternative remedies for misconduct by Deputy U.S. Marshals, including the internal USMS grievance procedure and the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) investigation procedure, was a special factor suggesting that the courts should not create a remedy. The court stated that the judiciary should not assess the adequacy of such remedies, indicating that this was the role of Congress or the Executive.The Appeals Court also rejected Logsdon's argument that the district court abused its discretion by granting the defendants' motion to reconsider its initial ruling that Logsdon had a Bivens claim. The court held that the district court had the discretion to reconsider any order short of a final decree. View "Logsdon v. United States Marshal Service" on Justia Law

In a case involving the Department of Child and Family Services of the County of Los Angeles and individual social workers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a mixed ruling. The case arose from the removal of two minor children from their parents' custody following an anonymous report that the parents were using medical marijuana to treat one child's severe autism. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment.The Circuit Court reversed the district court's summary judgment for the defendants on the parents' claim of judicial deception. The court concluded that the application submitted by the defendants in support of the warrant for removal contained misrepresentations and omissions and a reasonable trier of fact could find these misrepresentations material.The Circuit Court also reversed the district court's summary judgment for defendants on the parents' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and their Monell claim, which argued that the county had an unofficial policy of encouraging social workers to omit exculpatory information from warrant applications.However, the Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim concerning the social worker's interview of one child at her school, finding that the social worker was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found no error in the district court's handling of a jury question during trial.The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the claims of judicial deception, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the Monell claim.The case was remanded for further proceedings on these issues. View "SCANLON V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

A group of current and former inmates, or their representatives, filed a class action lawsuit against Kate Brown, the Governor of Oregon, and Patrick Allen, the Director of the Oregon Health Authority, claiming that the state's COVID-19 vaccine rollout plan, which prioritized corrections officers over inmates, violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim, asserting immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act. The district court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding that the defendants were immune from liability for the vaccine prioritization claim under the PREP Act. The court held that the statutory requirements for PREP Act immunity were met because the "administration" of a covered countermeasure includes prioritization of that countermeasure when its supply is limited. The court further concluded that the PREP Act's provisions extend immunity to persons who make policy-level decisions regarding the administration or use of covered countermeasures. The court also held that the PREP Act provides immunity from suit and liability for constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if those claims are federal constitutional claims. View "MANEY V. BROWN" on Justia Law

An inmate in Texas, Raul Gerardo Favela, Jr., alleged that prison officials had ignored warnings and failed to prevent him from being assaulted by another inmate. Favela sued several employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that their failure to protect him violated his constitutional rights. However, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, stating that Favela had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, finding that the summary judgment was inappropriate. Favela's declaration that he had filed and timely submitted grievances relating to his claims was found to be sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact, thereby meeting his burden to counter the defendant's prima facie case. The court concluded that the matter of the credibility of Favela's statement was a matter for trial, and not for summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Favela v. Collier" on Justia Law

In the state of Montana, William James Rupnow Jr., a licensed bail bondsman, was accused of criminal offenses after he tried to apprehend a client, Victorianne Dahl, who had violated her bail conditions. Dahl had consistently been late with payments and had violated other conditions of her release. Rupnow resorted to using pepper spray in his attempt to detain Dahl, leading to the State charging him with felony assault with a weapon and aggravated assault. Rupnow was ultimately acquitted on the aggravated assault charge, but the jury could not reach a verdict on the assault with a weapon charge. In response, Rupnow filed a lawsuit against the Montana State Auditor and Commissioner of Insurance, Mike Winsor, Jennifer Hudson, and XYZ government subdivision, alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and violation of his rights under the Montana Constitution. The defendants requested the case be dismissed based on prosecutorial immunity, a motion which the District Court granted. Rupnow appealed the decision, arguing that as a bail bondsman, he had the authority to arrest Dahl without a warrant.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss Rupnow's case. The Court found that Montana's statutory scheme for pre-trial release, or bail, did not provide bail bondsmen with an unfettered right to remit a bail bond client to jail without an outstanding warrant. The Court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to grant bail bondsmen arrest authority that far exceeded that of law enforcement officers. Therefore, Rupnow did not have the authority to arrest Dahl without a warrant, meaning there was probable cause to charge Rupnow with the crimes he was accused of. The Court concluded that Rupnow's claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process failed as a matter of law. View "Rupnow v. State Auditor" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the plaintiffs, two police officers injured in a shooting, filed a suit against Chester Arms, LLC (the seller of the firearm used in the shooting), and the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) (which conducted the background check for the sale of the firearm). The suit accused Chester Arms of negligent entrustment and DOS of negligent entrustment and negligence per se. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants on the basis of immunity under state law. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.The court of appeals found that the state law barring lawsuits against firearms manufacturers and sellers for damages resulting from the criminal or unlawful use of their products by a third party was constitutional and not preempted by federal law. The court found that the law was designed to safeguard citizens' fundamental right to bear arms by limiting suits against the firearms industry, thereby protecting its solvency and ensuring law-abiding citizens have access to firearms. The court also found that the law did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional right to equal protection or right to a remedy.Regarding the suit against DOS, the court found that DOS had not been negligent in its background check as the shooter was not disqualified from owning a firearm at the relevant time under federal law. Therefore, the court concluded that any alleged error in the trial court's immunity analysis was harmless as DOS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hardy v. Chester Arms, LLC" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Curtis Stewart, an inmate in the Missouri correctional system, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against various Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) officials, including MDOC Director Anne Precythe. Stewart alleged that he was subjected to excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment due to a policy of handcuffing and shackling prisoners to a steel bench for hours. Precythe filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that she was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied Precythe’s motion with respect to qualified immunity.The appeal court reversed the district court's decision. It held that Stewart failed to plausibly allege that Precythe authorized a policy that permitted jailers to use excessive force where it was unnecessary or unprovoked. The court also found that the complaint did not plausibly allege that Precythe acquiesced in any such practice of unprovoked or unwarranted excessive force because it failed to allege a pattern of such conduct.The court further noted that Stewart’s allegations against Precythe regarding the restraint policy did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court held that the allegations represented the kind of punishment necessary “to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” There were no allegations that Precythe’s conduct in adopting and promulgating the policy was “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Therefore, the court concluded that Precythe was entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Precythe and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Stewart v. Precythe" on Justia Law