Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
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The case involves the family of Joseph Perez, who died after law enforcement officers, under the direction of a paramedic, used their body weight to restrain him while he was prone to secure him to a backboard for hospital transport. The family sued the City and County of Fresno, individual law enforcement officers, and the paramedic, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the officers and paramedic were entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that at the time of Perez's death in 2017, the law did not clearly establish that the officers' actions would be unconstitutional. The court also found that the paramedic was entitled to qualified immunity because the law did not clearly establish that a paramedic acting in a medical capacity to restrain a person for medical transport could be held liable for a constitutional violation. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' Monell claims, finding insufficient evidence that the City and County were deliberately indifferent to their duty to properly train their officers.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the law did not clearly establish, nor was it otherwise obvious, that the officers' actions, directed by medical personnel, would violate Perez's constitutional rights. The court also held that the paramedic was acting in a medical capacity during the incident, and the law did not clearly establish that medical personnel are liable for constitutional torts for actions taken to provide medical care or medical transport. The court concluded that the plaintiffs produced insufficient evidence to support their municipal liability claim against the City and the County based on a failure-to-train theory. View "PEREZ V. CITY OF FRESNO" on Justia Law

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Eric Demond Lozano, a Texas state prisoner and Sunni Muslim, filed a lawsuit against three officials of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Establishment Clause. Lozano claimed that his ability to practice his religion was substantially burdened due to the conditions in the prison. His claims included the inability to shower privately before Jumah, a weekly prayer service, due to non-Muslim inmates being allowed to shower at the same time; insufficient space to pray in his cell due to hostile cellmates; and lack of access to religious programming and instruction, specifically Taleem and Quranic studies, due to the absence of Muslim volunteers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the TDCJ officials. The court found that Lozano failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on whether the absence of a Muslim-designated unit or dorm violated the Establishment Clause. The court also concluded that Lozano provided no evidence to support his allegation that the faith-based dorms required inmates to study Christian materials.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment on Lozano's RLUIPA claims regarding Jumah showers and adequate prayer space. The appellate court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact on whether Lozano's ability to practice his religion was substantially burdened. The court also vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on Lozano's RLUIPA claim regarding additional religious programming and his Establishment Clause claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lozano v. Collier" on Justia Law

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Michael Rivera, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, was in an open-air telephone cage when he overheard prison officials preparing to forcibly extract another inmate, Ryan Miller, from a nearby cell. Anticipating the use of pepper spray, Rivera informed the officials that exposure to the spray would trigger his asthma. Despite his pleas to be moved back to his cell, the officials refused, citing the lack of available personnel due to the ongoing preparations for Miller's extraction. After the pepper spray was deployed, Rivera suffered an asthma attack. He sued the prison officials for damages, alleging they had acted with deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm to him, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials. The court concluded that the law was not clearly established to the extent that the officials would have known that their actions violated the Eighth Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. The court noted that the officials were confronted with competing institutional concerns and that the cited case law did not clearly establish that the officials' decision to prioritize one prisoner's health and safety over another's violated the Eighth Amendment. View "Rivera v. Redfern" on Justia Law

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The estate and heirs of Dale O'Neal, a pre-trial detainee who was murdered by his cellmate in Clay County's jail, filed a lawsuit against several officers and the county under Section 1983. They alleged that the defendants failed to protect O'Neal, thereby violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The case centered around the actions of the intake officer, Annie Avant, who assigned O'Neal's murderer, Cameron Henderson, to the same cell as O'Neal. The parties disputed what information was conveyed to Avant about Henderson's violent behavior and whether the booking system would have revealed that Henderson was previously determined to be a threat.The district court agreed with the magistrate judge's decision to exclude a late-designated expert and the accompanying report, which the plaintiffs relied on to establish the County's liability. The court then granted summary judgment to all defendants, concluding that the plaintiffs could not create a fact question as to whether the individual defendants acted with deliberate indifference. The court also found that Avant had qualified immunity.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiffs argued that it was an abuse of discretion to exclude the expert and error to grant summary judgment to Avant. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. It found no abuse of discretion in excluding the late-designated expert, considering factors such as the explanation for the failure to identify the witness, the importance of the testimony, potential prejudice in allowing the testimony, and the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice. The court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Avant on the basis of qualified immunity, noting that the plaintiffs failed to point to any case supporting the proposition that the alleged constitutional violation was of clearly established law. View "Culberson v. Clay County" on Justia Law

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In the case, Sease Beard, a transgender inmate, alleges mistreatment and retaliation by prison officials. Beard, who identifies as a transgender woman, has been provided hormone-replacement therapy by the Missouri Department of Corrections since 2019. The issue in the case centers on whether the prison officials are shielded by qualified immunity.Beard was involved in multiple incidents with guards. In one particular incident, when a guard expressed disapproval of Beard's attire, Beard refused to change. Subsequently, several guards physically restrained Beard, used pepper spray, removed Beard's clothes, and carried Beard through the prison's hallways in view of other inmates. Following this incident, Beard filed a lawsuit against nearly everyone involved, claiming violations of state law and the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.The lower court, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, denied the officials' motion to dismiss the case, asserting their claim to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision in part and reversed in part. The court found that certain prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity for some of Beard's claims, including a Fourth Amendment claim regarding a strip search and First Amendment retaliation claims related to denial of a promotion, restriction of shower access, and confiscation of personal property. However, the court found that other officials were entitled to qualified immunity for claims related to the denial of mental health treatment and the supervisors' inaction. The case was sent back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Beard v. Falkenrath" on Justia Law

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The case involves the death of Andrew Dawson Bell, who committed suicide while detained at the Washington County Detention Center (WCDC) in Fayetteville, Arkansas. Bell's mother, Judy Lynn Smith-Dandridge, filed a lawsuit against several Fayetteville Police Department officers, WCDC employees, nurses, and Washington County itself, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to Bell's serious medical needs, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Arkansas Code Ann. § 16-123-105. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, and Smith-Dandridge appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.Bell had a history of mental illness and substance abuse. On the day he died, Bell had called the police several times, reporting hallucinations of people trying to break into his apartment. Officers responded but found no evidence of a break-in. They arrested Bell for terroristic threats, disorderly conduct, and carrying a weapon. When Bell was processed into WCDC, he informed the intake officers of his mental health history, including a history of suicidal ideation. Despite this, he was placed in the general population.The main issue on appeal was whether the police officers and WCDC personnel had knowledge of Bell's substantial risk of suicide and deliberately disregarded it. Smith-Dandridge argued that the officers’ interactions with Bell and their review of his arrest history established they had the requisite knowledge to establish deliberate indifference. However, the court found that while Bell's behavior put the officers on notice of signs of mental illness, it did not make it obvious to them that Bell had a substantial risk of suicide. Similarly, the court found that the WCDC personnel's inaction to prevent Bell's suicide did not constitute criminal recklessness.The court also dismissed Smith-Dandridge's claim that Washington County was deliberately indifferent in its failure to train jail staff. The court found that Smith-Dandridge failed to show that the alleged deficient training caused WCDC personnel to be deliberately indifferent to Bell's substantial risk of suicide. As such, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of all defendants. View "Smith-Dandridge v. Geanolous" on Justia Law

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In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Thurman King sued Officers Zachary Abbate and Jason Bradley, the City of Rockford, the Rockford Public Safety Department, and other municipal officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for incidents stemming from a 2019 traffic stop. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants but denied their motion for summary judgment on qualified and governmental immunity grounds for King’s federal and state tort claims against Abbate and Bradley. The court also denied their motion on King’s Monell claim against the City and Department. The defendants appealed this denial.The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the district court’s denial of qualified and governmental immunity to Abbate and Bradley. The court found that Abbate was entitled to qualified and governmental immunity for his takedown maneuver against King but not for the subsequent conduct on the ground. The court also dismissed the City and Department’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.The court found a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Abbate and Bradley had probable cause to believe that King committed any underlying crimes, which defeated the officers' claims for summary judgment on King’s false arrest claim. The court affirmed the district court's denial of governmental immunity to Abbate and Bradley for their conduct on the ground but reversed the denial of governmental immunity to Abbate for his takedown maneuver. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of governmental immunity to Abbate and Bradley for King’s false arrest claim. View "King v. City of Rockford, MI" on Justia Law

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The case at hand involves Candise Gore, who sued various individuals and governmental entities claiming she was wrongfully strip-searched at the Dorchester County Detention Center. Gore claimed against the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office, which operates the facility, for reckless infliction of emotional distress. The case was moved to the United States District Court due to the inclusion of federal law claims. The court had to decide whether the bar under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act of claims of "intentional infliction of emotional harm" applied to claims of reckless infliction of emotional distress.The court examined past South Carolina case law and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. It noted that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known as outrage, could be caused by extreme and outrageous conduct that intentionally or recklessly inflicts severe emotional distress. The court further indicated that several jurisdictions consider intentional infliction of emotional distress and reckless infliction of emotional distress as the same cause of action. Consequently, the court concluded that reckless infliction of emotional distress was a subset of intentional infliction of emotional distress and that there was no separate cause of action in South Carolina for the reckless infliction of emotional distress.However, to provide a complete response, the court also considered the definition of "loss" in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. The court concluded that since reckless infliction of emotional distress was a subset of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the bar to recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress also covered any conduct by a governmental entity that might be merely reckless but yet satisfied the elements of the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court therefore held that the bar to recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress applied to the subset of claims for the reckless infliction of emotional distress. View "Gore v. Dorchester County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

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In a case certified by the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, the Supreme Court of Wyoming was tasked with two questions regarding the duty of care owed by law enforcement officers to suspects while conducting an investigation.The first question asked whether a law enforcement officer acting within the scope of their duties owed a duty of care to the suspect(s) in a criminal investigation to conduct that investigation in a non-negligent manner. The court affirmed that law enforcement officers indeed owe such a duty, consistent with existing precedent.The second question asked whether, if a duty of care is owed, the law enforcement officer is entitled to assert qualified immunity under Wyoming law. The court affirmed that law enforcement officers are entitled to assert qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects officers who act in good faith and whose actions are reasonable under the circumstances, and it serves important policy purposes, such as protecting law enforcement from the risk of being liable for mistakes made in the performance of their duties.The specific facts of the case involved a law enforcement officer who had received a tip about a suspected marijuana growing operation and subsequently initiated an investigation. The suspect, Deborah Palm-Egle, later filed a civil action against the officer and other parties, alleging a variety of tort claims. View "Palm-Egle v. Briggs" on Justia Law

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In this case, the plaintiff, Kellie Farris, called 911 alleging that another woman had damaged her car. However, responding sheriff's deputies ended up arresting Farris instead. Farris alleged that during her arrest and subsequent transportation to jail, the deputies used excessive force. She also claimed that she was suicidal and that the deputies' actions were unreasonable given her state of mind.In response, the deputies argued that they had probable cause for Farris's arrest based on corroborated eyewitness testimony and physical evidence in Farris's car. They further contended that Farris's suicidal behavior justified the level of force used to restrain and control her.On reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the deputies had probable cause for Farris's arrest and that the force used was minimal and reasonably necessary given Farris's behavior. The court also rejected Farris's claim that the county had an unconstitutional policy of inadequately training its deputies, finding no evidence of deliberate indifference or a pattern of excessive force.The court noted that states may pass laws or prison policies that protect detainees' privacy or liberty more than the Constitution demands, but Farris failed to show how this was relevant to her Fourth Amendment claim.In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, ruling in favor of the deputies and the county on all counts. View "Farris v. Oakland County" on Justia Law