Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, tenants living in substandard conditions in a "Section 8" housing project, filed suit seeking to compel HUD to provide relocation assistance vouchers. The Fifth Circuit held that, because 24 C.F.R. 886.323(e) mandates that HUD provide relocation assistance, its alleged decision not to provide relocation vouchers to plaintiffs is not a decision committed to agency discretion by law and is therefore reviewable. Furthermore, the agency's inaction here constitutes a final agency action because it prevents or unreasonably delays the tenants from receiving the relief to which they are entitled by law. Therefore, the district court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs' Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Fair Housing Act (FHA) claims and erred in dismissing those claims.However, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted on their Fifth Amendment equal protection claim. In this case, plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim of intentional race discrimination. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hawkins v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development" on Justia Law

Providers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Medicaid Act, alleging that the Department violated constitutional and statutory law in retroactively recalculating their Medicaid reimbursement rates for the three-month period of January through March 2016.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the Providers' procedural due process claim, concluding that, at this early stage in the litigation, the allegations are sufficient to allege a violation of procedural due process. First, the court explained that the Providers retain a legitimate entitlement to a rate determined according to that formula, and any action to alter the rate must be conducted with due process. In this case, according to the amended complaint, the auditors failed to provide any notice of the alleged deficiencies prior to the final decision, and the Providers had no opportunity to submit additional documentation or other evidence following that decision. The court stated that the burden on the Department in providing such notice is no impediment, given that the procedures are already in the Code. The court explained that the Department need only follow those procedures rather than routinely bypass them. Therefore, in the absence of that basic and fundamental protection against unfair or mistaken findings, the court concluded that the Providers have sufficiently alleged a violation of due process. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Rock River Health Care, LLC v. Eagleson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the medical parole scheme set forth in the Medical Parole Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, 119A, authorizing the Commissioner of Correction to grant medical parole to terminally ill or permanently incapacitated prisoners, while delegating to the parole board oversight of a medical parolee's compliance with the conditions of parole imposed, does not offend due process.Plaintiff, an inmate, filed a petition for medical parole after being diagnosed with terminal cancer. Plaintiff was subsequently released on medical parole but later arrested for violating the terms of his release. Plaintiff's parole was later revoked, and the Commissioner denied Plaintiff's second petition for medical parole. Plaintiff then sought release from custody, and a single justice denied the request. The Supreme Judicial Court answered reported questions regarding the Medical Parole Act by holding that the statutory and regulatory scheme concerning the revocation of medical parole does not violate a parolee's right to due process. View "Emma v. Massachusetts Parole Board" on Justia Law

A member of Sons of Confederate Veterans applied to participate in the Old Soldiers Day Parade, a pro-American veterans parade funded and organized by the Alpharetta, Georgia, and was informed that the organization could participate if it agreed not to fly the Confederate battle flag.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the district court held that the Parade constituted government speech and entered summary judgment against the Sons. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Governments “are not obliged under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to permit the presence of a rebellious army’s battle flag in the pro-veterans parades that they fund and organize.” In 2015, in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, the Supreme Court clarified that, “[w]hen [the] government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.” View "Leake v. Drinkard" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from Alfred Brown’s lawsuit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. secs. 701–796l, against his former employer, the Defense Health Agency. In April 2010, the Agency hired Brown as a healthcare fraud specialist (HCFS) assigned to the Program Integrity Office (PIO) in Aurora, Colorado. Shortly after joining the Agency, Brown told his supervisors that he had been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder and other panic and anxiety disorders related to his military service. When Brown’s symptoms worsened in September 2011, he was hospitalized and received in-patient treatment for one week. The Agency approved Brown’s request for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The district court granted summary judgment for the Agency, determining that there were no triable issues on Brown’s claims that the Agency failed to accommodate his mental-health disabilities and discriminated against him based on those disabilities. Brown appealed, challenging the district court’s rulings that: (1) his requests for telework, weekend work, and a supervisor reassignment were not reasonable accommodations; and (2) he failed to establish material elements of his various discrimination claims. The Tenth Circuit found no reversible error: (1) granting Brown’s telework and weekend-work requests would have eliminated essential functions of his job, making those requests unreasonable as a matter of law; (2) Brown did not allege the limited circumstances in which the Agency would need to consider reassigning him despite the fact that he performed the essential functions of his position with other accommodations; (3) the Court declined Brown’s invitation to expand those limited circumstances to include reassignments that allow an employee to live a “normal life;” and (4) Brown did not allege a prima facie case of retaliation, disparate treatment, or constructive discharge. Summary judgment for the Agency was affirmed. View "Brown v. Austin, et al." on Justia Law

About 50 businesses that offer live adult entertainment (nude or nearly nude dancing) sought loans under the second round of the Paycheck Protection Program enacted to address the economic disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Congress excluded plaintiffs and other categories of businesses from the second round of the Program, 15 U.S.C. 636(a)(37)(A)(iv)(III)(aa), incorporating 13 C.F.R. 120.110. Plaintiffs asserted that their exclusion violated their rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.The district court issued a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the Small Business Administration (SBA) from denying the plaintiffs eligibility for the loan program based on the statutory exclusion. The Seventh Circuit granted the government’s stay of the preliminary injunction and expedited briefing on the merits of the appeal. The SBA satisfied the demanding standard for a stay of an injunction pending appeal, having shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits. Congress is not trying to regulate or suppress plaintiffs’ adult entertainment. It has simply chosen not to subsidize it. Such selective, categorical exclusions from a government subsidy do not offend the First Amendment. Plaintiffs were not singled out for this exclusion, even among businesses primarily engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment. Congress also excluded businesses “primarily engaged in political or lobbying activities.” View "Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc. v. United States Small Business Administration" on Justia Law

Enrollees in the North Carolina State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees (NCSHP) sued, alleging that NCSHP discriminates against its transgender enrollees by categorically denying coverage for gender dysphoria treatments like counseling, hormone therapy, and surgical care, in violation of section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which prohibits “any health program or activity” that receives federal funds from discriminating against individuals on any ground prohibited by various federal statutes, including Title IX, 42 U.S.C. 18116(a).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of NCSHP’s motion to dismiss, asserting that it was entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. NCSHP waived its immunity against this claim by accepting federal financial assistance. Under the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act (CRREA), “[a] State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of . . . any other Federal Statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance,” 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7. View "Kadel v. North Carolina State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees" on Justia Law

Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs (FLFNB), a nonprofit unincorporated association, advocates the message “that food is a human right, not a privilege.” FLFNB’s efforts include its weekly food sharing events in Fort Lauderdale’s downtown Stranahan Park, a location where the homeless tend to congregate. FLFNB does not serve food as a charity, but to communicate its message that "society can end hunger and poverty if we redirect our collective resources from the military and war.’ The Eleventh Circuit previously held FLFNB’s food-sharing to be expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and remanded the issue of whether the city’s regulations violated the First Amendment. Fort Lauderdale Park Rules require city permission for social service food-sharing events in all Fort Lauderdale parks,The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the city. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The Rule commits the regulation of FLFNB’s protected expression to the standardless discretion of city permitting officials. It provides no guidance nor explanation of when, how, or why the city will agree. As applied to FLFNB’s protected expression, it violates the First Amendment. It is neither narrowly drawn to further a substantial government interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, nor, as applied, does it amount to a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation on expression in a public forum. View "Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale" on Justia Law

In 1999, Agpawa pleaded guilty to federal felony mail fraud. In 2002, he completed his sentence. Agpawa ran for mayor of the City of Markham in 2017. There were no preelection challenges to Agpawa’s nominating petitions, but Cook County State’s Attorney Foxx sent Agpawa a letter stating that he was ineligible to serve as mayor because of his felony conviction. Agpawa won the election. Foxx filed a complaint, alleging that Agpawa had been convicted of an “infamous crime” and was prohibited from holding municipal office unless he received a presidential pardon under the Election Code. 10 ILCS 5/29-15. The appellate court affirmed judgment for Foxx.Agpawa sought relief from then-Governor Rauner, who issued a document that purported to be a “RESTORATION OF RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP ROGER AGPAWA.” Agpawa took the oath of office as Markham's mayor. The court vacated its earlier order. No appeal was taken. In 2020, Agpawa sought reelection. Opponents objected. The Markham Municipal Officers Electoral Board ruled in favor of Agpawa. The appellate court reversed. A subsequent amendment to the Election Code specifically refers to a restoration of rights by the governor.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the Board ruling. While the governor has no constitutional authority to pardon a federal conviction, the governor has statutory authority to mitigate the collateral electoral consequences of such a conviction by issuing a restoration of rights. Governor Rauner’s untitled document restored Agpawa’s Illinois rights of citizenship, including the right to hold municipal office. The court rejected arguments that the Illinois legislature had no authority to alter the effect of a federal conviction and that the statutory amendment violated the special legislation clause, was “void for vagueness,” should not be applied retroactively, and violated first amendment rights, the equal protection clause, and separation of powers principles. View "Walker v. Agpawa" on Justia Law

Maricopa Domestic Water Improvement District supplies water to about 300 households, including the public housing tenants of a Pinal County complex. Property owners like Pinal County are responsible for paying any past tenant’s delinquent water accounts. Pinal County acknowledged that responsibility but consistently refused to pay, contending it was immune to that policy based on its status as a public municipality. In response, the District imposed a new policy that increased to $180 the refundable security deposit required of new public housing customers before the District would provide water services. New non-public housing customers were subject to a $55 deposit.The Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the policy under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3604 and 3617, which bars discriminatory housing policies and practices, including those that cause a disparate impact according to certain protected characteristics or traits—race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. Although the District’s public housing customers are disproportionately African American, Native American, and single mothers, the District established by undisputed evidence that the policy served in a significant way its legitimate business interests; the plaintiffs failed to establish a triable issue of fact that there existed an equally effective, but less discriminatory, alternative. There was insufficient evidence that discriminatory animus was a motivating factor behind the District’s decision to implement its policy. View "Southwest Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Maricopa Domestic Water Improvement District" on Justia Law