Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The 1972 Shakman Decree enjoined the City of Chicago and county officials from governmental employment practices based in politics. A 1983 Decree enjoined those officials from conditioning hiring or promotions on any political considerations. After the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment’s prohibition against patronage-based firings extends to promotion, transfer, recall, or hiring decisions involving public employment for which party affiliation is not an appropriate requirement, the Clerk of Cook County entered a separate consent decree. In 1992 the Voters Organization joined the Shakman complaint. The court has dismissed some entities and officials, including Chicago and its Park District, as showing substantial compliance. In 2010 the Clerk and other defendants consented to a magistrate judge conducting further proceedings. A new magistrate and a new district judge were assigned in 2020.In 2019, plaintiffs moved for supplemental relief. The magistrate found that the Clerk violated the 1991 Decree, that the evidence strongly suggested that the Clerk’s policy of rotating employees was “instituted for the purpose" of evading the 1972 Decree, appointed a special master to oversee compliance within the Clerk’s Office, and refused the Clerk’s request to vacate the Decrees. The Seventh Circuit, noting that it lacked authority to review the appointment of the special master, affirmed the denial of the request to vacate. Sounding a “federalism concern,” the court noted the permitting a consent decree over an arm of state or local government to remain on a federal docket for decades is inconsistent with our federal structure. View "Shakman v. Clerk of Cook County" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of appellant's amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant challenged the denial of his passport applications and sought a declaration of U.S. citizenship under 8 U.S.C. 1503(a). Appellant also brought a statutory claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and a constitutional claim under the Fifth Amendment. Appellant conceded in district court that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider his first two claims (his section 1503(a) claim and his statutory APA claim), leaving only his constitutional claim, which the district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider.The court held that Congress intended section 1503(a) to be the exclusive remedy for a person within the United States to seek a declaration of U.S. nationality following an agency or department's denial of a privilege or right of citizenship upon the ground that the person is not a U.S. national. Therefore, the "any other statute" proviso of section 702 maintains the United States' sovereign immunity against petitioner's constitutional claim because the statute of limitations contained in section 1503(a) has run and thus expressly forbids the relief sought. View "Cambranis v. Blinken" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit's order denied appellants' emergency motion for injunctive relief, which sought to prohibit the enforcement of California's COVID-19 restrictions on private "gatherings" and various limitations on businesses as applied to appellants' in-home Bible studies, political activities, and business operations. The court concluded that appellants have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits for their free exercise, due process, or equal protection claims, nor have they demonstrated that injunctive relief is necessary for their free speech claims.In regard to the free exercise claim, the court concluded that, when compared to analogous secular in-home private gatherings, the State's restrictions on in-home private religious gatherings are neutral and generally applicable and thus subject to rational basis review. The court believed that the best interpretation of Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, and Gateway City Church v. Newson is that rational basis review should apply to the State's gatherings restrictions because in-home secular and religious gatherings are treated the same, and because appellants' underinclusivity argument fails as they have not provided any support for the conclusion that private gatherings are comparable to commercial activities in public venues in terms of threats to public health or the safety measures that reasonably may be implemented. Therefore, appellants have not shown that gatherings in private homes and public businesses "similarly threaten the government's interest," and they have not shown that strict scrutiny applies.The court also denied as unnecessary appellants' request for an injunction on their free speech and assembly claims. Based on the district court's ruling, the State's gatherings restrictions do not apply to Appellant Tandon's requested political activities, and given the State's failure to define rallies or distinguish Tandon's political activities from Appellant Gannons' political activities, the court concluded that, on the record before it, the State's restrictions do not apply to the Gannons' political activities.Finally, the court concluded that the business owner appellants have not established a likelihood of success on their claims. The court has never held that the right to pursue work is a fundamental right and the district court did not err by applying rational basis review to the due process claims. Likewise, business owners are not a suspect class, and the district court correctly applied rational basis review to their equal protection claims. View "Tandon v. Newsom" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, twenty-three individuals who allege they are in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), filed suit alleging that the TSDB program violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by failing to include more procedural safeguards.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and concluded that plaintiffs have not demonstrated infringements of constitutional liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. The court explained that history and precedent reveal that the government possesses latitude in regulating travel, guarding the nation's borders, and protecting the aspirations of the populace for tranquility and safety. In this case, the typical delay pleaded by plaintiffs, which is around an hour or less at an airport, does not rise up to the level of constitutional concern. The court reasoned that these delays are not dissimilar from what many travelers routinely face, whether in standard or enhanced screenings, particularly at busy airports. Even if the court accepted plaintiffs' assertions that these inconveniences have actually deterred them from flying, the court stated that individuals do not have a protected liberty interest to travel via a particular mode of transportation. Furthermore, plaintiffs do not possess a protected liberty interest in being free from screening and delays at the border.The court also concluded that inclusion in the TSDB does not infringe on plaintiffs' constitutionally protected interest in their reputations. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that inclusion in the TSDB stigmatizes them by associating them with terrorism. The court explained that plaintiffs have not shown adequate "public disclosure" by the government and the government does not publicly disclose TSDB status. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explained that stigma or "reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment," is not "liberty" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. The court further explained that the government's act of including names in the TSDB does not mandate that private entities deny people rights and privileges. In this case, plaintiffs have not adequately demonstrated denials of employment, permits, licenses, or firearms. The court explained that speculation coupled with a few isolated incidents inadequately tethered to TSDB status is not enough. Finally, the court doubted plaintiffs' claims as to the adequacy of existing processes where the government's interest is extraordinarily significant in this case, the weight of the private interests at stake is comparatively weak, and the court would not casually second-guess Congress's specific judgment as to how much procedure was needed in this context. View "Elhady v. Kable" on Justia Law

Shortly after COVID-19 struck the Wallace Pack Unit, plaintiffs filed suit seeking injunctive relief on behalf of three certified classes of inmate for violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to their health and safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment in light of the dangers of COVID-19 for a geriatric prison population, and that defendants violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by failing to accommodate for specific risks to wheelchair-bound and other mobility-impaired inmates.On April 16, 2020, the district court entered a preliminary injunction which was stayed by the Fifth Circuit on April 22 and then vacated on June 5. On September 29, 2020, the district court issued a permanent injunction, concluding that plaintiffs did not need to exhaust administrative remedies; defendants were deliberately indifferent; and defendants violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's permanent injunction and rendered judgment for defendants. The court concluded that the prison officials were not deliberately indifferent based on a lack of a systemic approach. After considering Policy B-14.52, its unwritten additions, and its administration, the court explained that the record does not support a finding of deliberate indifference in the way the officials considered and adopted a response to COVID-19. The court also concluded that the prison officials were not deliberately indifferent based on a failure to abide by basic public health guidance regarding testing, social distancing, mask use, handwashing, sanitation, and cleaning. Finally, the court concluded that the mobility-impaired inmates failed to establish their prima facie ADA claim, and consequently their Rehabilitation Act claim. View "Valentine v. Collier" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) promulgated a rule that classified bump stocks as machine guns, reversing its previous position. Bump stocks are devices designed to assist the shooter in “bump firing,” a technique that increases a semiautomatic firearm’s rate of fire. In a challenge to the rule, the district court held that the ATF’s interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference and that the classification of bump stocks as machine guns was “a permissible interpretation” of 26 U.S.C. 5845(b). The court denied a preliminary injunction.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Section 5845(b)'s definition of a machine gun applies to a machine-gun ban carrying criminal culpability and penalties; an agency’s interpretation of a criminal statute is not entitled to Chevron deference. Deference to an agency’s interpretation of a criminal statute directly conflicts with the rule of lenity, would violate the Constitution’s separation of powers, and would raise individual liberty and fair notice concerns. ATF’s rule is not the best interpretation of section 5845(b); “single function of the trigger” refers to the mechanical process of the trigger and a bump stock does not enable a semiautomatic firearm to fire more than one shot each time the trigger is pulled. View "Gun Owners of America, Inc. v. Garland" on Justia Law

The 1993 National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. 20501(b)(1), requires states to register voters for federal elections, including “by application in person” at designated state offices. Each state must designate all offices that provide public assistance, all offices that provide state-funded programs primarily engaged in providing services to persons with disabilities, and “other offices. ” Each designated agency must offer certain voter registration services and, in California, must assign an employee to be responsible for the agency’s compliance (Elec. Code, 2406.) California’s Secretary of State coordinates the state’s responsibilities under the Act.The plaintiffs sought additional designations. The Secretary committed to designating as voter registration agencies programs for students with disabilities at community colleges, certain county welfare departments, and the Office of Services to the Blind. The trial court held, and the court of appeal affirmed, that the Secretary had a mandatory duty to designate as voter registration agencies state offices that administer General Assistance or General Relief programs and California Student Aid Commission Financial Aid Programs, as well as all private entities under contract to provide services on behalf of a voter registration agency. The court found that no mandatory designation duty existed as to offices administering the California Department of Education Nutrition Programs, special education offices, and Area Agencies on Aging. View "Senior Disability Action v. Weber" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Court of Appeal in this case centered on whether Alicia Clark exhausted her administrative remedies under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) prior to filing suit against her former employer, Arthroscopic & Laser Surgery Center of San Diego, L.P. (ALSC). Clark filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) alleging ALSC committed various acts of employment discrimination against her. While Clark’s DFEH Complaint contained an inaccuracy as to ALSC’s legal name, it clearly and unequivocally reflected Clark’s intent to name ALSC as a respondent. Specifically, Clark’s DFEH Complaint named, as respondents, “Oasis Surgery Center LLC,” and “Oasis Surgery Center, LP,” which are variants of ALSC’s registered business name, “Oasis Surgery Center.” In addition, Clark’s DFEH Complaint referenced the names of her managers, supervisors, and coworkers. The same day that Clark filed her DFEH Complaint, the DFEH issued a right-to-sue notice and Clark filed this action against “Oasis Surgery Center LLC,” and “Oasis Surgery Center, LP.” One week after filing her DFEH Complaint and the initial complaint in this action, Clark filed an amended complaint in this action, properly naming ALSC as a defendant. Notwithstanding that Clark’s DFEH Complaint clearly identified her former employer as the intended respondent, the trial court granted ALSC’s motion for summary judgment as to all of Clark’s FEHA claims brought against it because Clark “named the wrong entity in her DFEH [C]omplaint, and . . . never corrected that omission.” Clark then filed a petition for writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal, requesting that it vacate the trial court’s order granting ALSC’s motion for summary judgment. After considering the text and purpose of the relevant statutory exhaustion requirement, administrative regulations, and applicable case law, the Court of Appeal concluded Clark exhausted her administrative remedies against ALSC. "This is particularly true in a case such as this, in which the plaintiff’s error could not possibly have hampered any administrative investigation or prejudiced the defendant in any judicial proceedings." Accordingly, Clark’s writ petition was granted and the trial court directed to vacate its order granting ALSC’s motion for summary judgment. View "Clark v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Department of General Services (DGS) solicited bids for a Shenango Township Youth Development Center, closed since 2013. HIRA, a consultant for Islamic educational groups, submitted the highest bid, $400,000, planning to establish a youth intervention center and Islamic boarding school. DGS and HIRA entered into a contract. Legislators sent a letter to Governor Wolf, claiming HIRA was not in a financial position to turn the property into an economic driver, that New Jersey had revoked HIRA’s corporate status, that HIRA reported low income, that HIRA had not returned their phone calls, and that contract paperwork remained incomplete. When Governor Wolf did not act, the Legislators spoke with the press and at a community meeting where some participants made comments about Muslims. Lawrence County opened a criminal investigation into the bidding process. The Legislators tried, unsuccessfully, to pass a law divesting DGS of authority to sell the property, then tried to persuade DGS to halt the sale. Shenango Township rezoned the property.The sale fell through. DGS solicited new bids. HIRA offered $500,000; another group offered $2,000,000. Legislators promised to ensure the new purchaser secured funding. HIRA sued the officials, including the Legislators in their individual capacities, citing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the Legislators’ motions to dismiss. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Whether HIRA alleged conduct outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activities or that violates clearly established law is a question of law over which it had jurisdiction. Some of the allegations concerned “quintessentially legislative activities” for purposes of absolute immunity. Other allegations fell “well short of showing that the rights [HIRA] seeks to vindicate here were clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity. View "HIRA Educational Services North America v. Augustine" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether the Washington legislature extended a privilege or immunity to religious and other nonprofit, secular employers and whether, in providing the privilege or immunity, the legislature affected a fundamental right without a reasonable basis for doing so. Lawmakers enacted Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) to protect citizens from discrimination in employment, and exempted religious nonprofits from the definition of “employer.” In enacting WLAD, the legislature created a statutory right for employees to be free from discrimination in the workplace while allowing employers to retain their constitutional right, as constrained by state and federal case law, to choose workers who reflect the employers’ beliefs when hiring ministers. Matthew Woods brought an employment discrimination action against Seattle’s Union Gospel Mission (SUGM). At trial, SUGM successfully moved for summary judgment pursuant to RCW 49.60.040(11)’s religious employer exemption. Woods appealed to the Washington Supreme Court, contesting the constitutionality of the statute. SUGM argued RCW 49.60.040(11)’s exemption applied to its hiring decisions because its employees were expected to minister to their clients. Under Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020), plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim must yield in a few limited circumstances, including where the employee in question was a minister. Whether ministerial responsibilities and functions discussed in Our Lady of Guadalupe were present in Woods’ case was not decided below. The Supreme Court determined RCW 49.60.040(11) was constitutional but could be constitutionally invalid as applied to Woods. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court to determine whether SUGM met the ministerial exception. View "Woods v. Seattle's Union Gospel Mission" on Justia Law