Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief and dismissal of state and federal claims in an action brought by Slidewaters LLC, challenging the State of Washington's imposition of COVID-19 restrictions prohibiting the waterpark from operating during 2020 and imposing capacity limits in 2021.The panel concluded that defendants have the authority under Washington law to impose the restrictions and that doing so does not violate Slidewaters' asserted rights under the U.S. Constitution. In this case, the governor had the lawful authority under Revised Code of Washington 43.06.010(12) to issue Proclamation 20-05, because the pandemic was both a public disorder and a disaster affecting life and health in Washington. Furthermore, the State Department of Labor and Industries, in promulgating an emergency rule as part of the state's efforts to curb the pandemic, Washington Administrative Code 296-800-14035, acted within its scope of authority. The panel explained that government regulation does not constitute a violation of constitutional substantive due process rights simply because the businesses or persons to whom the regulation is applied do not agree with the regulation or its application; defendants provided a rational basis for the proclamations and related rules; and the substantive due process rights of Slidewaters, its owners, and its employees are not violated by defendants' actions. Therefore, Slidewaters' application for injunctive relief was properly denied and its claims were properly dismissed. The panel also concluded that the district court did not err in consolidating Slidewaters' motion for preliminary injunction with a hearing on the merits or in reaching Slidewaters' state law claims. View "Slidewaters LLC v. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries" on Justia Law

Charitable organizations soliciting funds in California generally must register with the Attorney General and renew their registrations annually by filing copies of their IRS Form 990, on which tax-exempt organizations provide the names and addresses of their major donors. Two tax-exempt charities that solicit contributions in California renewed their registrations and filed redacted Form 990s to preserve their donors’ anonymity. The Attorney General threatened the charities with the suspension of their registrations and fines. The charities alleged that the compelled disclosure requirement violated their First Amendment rights and the rights of their donors. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the Attorney General.The Supreme Court reversed. California’s disclosure requirement is facially invalid because it burdens donors’ First Amendment rights and is not narrowly tailored to an important government interest. Compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as other forms of governmental action. Exacting scrutiny requires that a government-mandated disclosure regime be narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted interest, even if it is not the least restrictive means of achieving that end.A dramatic mismatch exists between the Attorney General's asserted interest and the disclosure regime. While California’s interests in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing are important, the enormous amount of sensitive information collected through the disclosures does not form an integral part of California’s fraud detection efforts. California does not rely on those disclosures to initiate investigations. There is no evidence that alternative means of obtaining the information, such as a subpoena or audit letter, are inefficient and ineffective by comparison. Mere administrative convenience does not “reflect the seriousness of the actual burden” that the disclosure requirement imposes on donors’ association rights. It does not make a difference if there is no public disclosure, if some donors do not mind having their identities revealed, or if the relevant donor information is already disclosed to the IRS. View "Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Five former employees of national security agencies who, during their employment, had clearances for access to classified and sensitive information, filed suit against the CIA, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. They facially challenged the agencies’ requirements that current and former employees give the agencies prepublication review of certain materials that they intend to publish to allow the agencies to redact information that is classified or otherwise sensitive to national security. They alleged that the agencies’ regimes “fail to provide former government employees with fair notice of what they must submit,” “invest executive officers with sweeping discretion to suppress speech[,] and fail to include procedural safeguards designed to avoid the dangers of a censorship system.”The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, holding that the prepublication review regimes were “reasonable” measures to protect sensitive information and did not violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. The regimes were not unduly vague under the Fifth Amendment; they adequately informed authors of the types of materials they must submit and established for agency reviewers the kinds of information that can be redacted. View "Edgar v. Haines" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reversing an order revoking Respondent's driving privileges for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances and/or drugs with a blood alcohol content of .15 or higher, holding that the circuit court erred.In reversing the order revoking Respondent's driving privileges the OAH determined that the officer's failure to comply with Respondent's demands for a blood test violated Respondent's rights to due process under W. Va. Code 17C-5-9. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in proceedings involving the revocation of a driver's license for DUI where a driver demands a blood test but the test is never given, a chemical analysis of the blood that is withdrawn is never completed, or the blood test results are lost, the trier of fact must consider three factors; and (2) this case must be remanded to the OAH for a new hearing that is to be conducted consistent with this opinion. View "Frazier v. Talbert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that social workers, and their approving supervisors, in the Department of Children and Families who attest to facts in sworn affidavits as part of care and protection proceedings commenced by the Department in the juvenile court pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 119, 24 are entitled to absolute immunity in these circumstances.Plaintiff brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a social worker with the Department, alleging that the social worker intentionally misrepresented facts in a sworn affidavit filed in support of a care and protection petition in the juvenile court. Plaintiff further alleged that the social worker's area supervisor (together, with the social worker, Defendants) was liable because she had approved the social worker's actions. Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that they were entitled to absolute immunity. A superior court judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendants were entitled to absolute immunity under the circumstances of this case. View "C.M. v. Commissioner of Department of Children & Families" on Justia Law

The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 allocated $29 billion for grants to help restaurant owners. The Small Business Administration (SBA) processed applications and distributed funds on a first-come, first-served basis. During the first 21 days, it gave grants only to priority applicants--restaurants at least 51% owned and controlled by women, veterans, or the “socially and economically disadvantaged,” defined by reference to the Small Business Act, which refers to those who have been “subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice” or “cultural bias” based solely on immutable characteristics, 15 U.S.C. 637(a)(5). A person is considered “economically disadvantaged” if he is socially disadvantaged and he faces “diminished capital and credit opportunities” compared to non-socially disadvantaged people who operate in the same industry. Under a pre-pandemic regulation, the SBA presumes certain applicants are socially disadvantaged including: “Black Americans,” “Hispanic Americans,” “Asian Pacific Americans,” “Native Americans,” and “Subcontinent Asian Americans.” After reviewing evidence, the SBA will consider an applicant a victim of “individual social disadvantage” based on specific findings.Vitolo (white) and his wife (Hispanic) own a restaurant and submitted an application. Vitolo sued, seeking a preliminary injunction to prohibit the government from disbursing grants based on race or sex. The Sixth Circuit ordered the government to fund the plaintiffs’ application, if approved, before all later-filed applications, without regard to processing time or the applicants’ race or sex. The government failed to provide an exceedingly persuasive justification that would allow the classification to stand. The government may continue the preference for veteran-owned restaurants. View "Vitolo v. Guzman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, All of Us or None–Riverside Chapter (All of Us or None), Jane Roe, and Phyllis McNeal, filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, Superior Court of California, County of Riverside (Riverside Superior Court), and its Executive Officer and Clerk, W. Samuel Hamrick, Jr. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants improperly maintained the Riverside Superior Court’s records in criminal cases in various ways. Plaintiffs alleged that these practices invaded their right to privacy as embodied in the California Constitution (fifth cause of action). Plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to declaratory relief (sixth cause of action) and writ of mandate (seventh cause of action) to remedy these violations. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s demurrer and summary judgment rulings. The Court of Appeal agreed with Plaintiffs the trial court erred in its ruling on the first, third, and fifth causes of action; as a result, the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ remedial causes of action for declaratory relief (sixth cause of action) and injunctive relief (seventh cause of action) were also reversed. The matter was thus remanded for further proceedings. View "All of Us or None etc. v. Hamrick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming the City of Cleveland's taxation of Hazel Willacy's stock-option income that she realized in 2016, holding that Willacy's propositions of law lacked merit.Willacy earned the disputed stock options in 2007 from her former employer while she was working in Cleveland. In 2009, Willacy retired and moved to Florida without having exercised any of the options. In 2014 and 2015, Willacy exercised the majority of the options and immediately resold the shares. In 2016, Willacy exercised the remaining options. Her former employer withheld her municipal-income-tax obligation and paid it to Cleveland. Willacy sought a refund on the grounds that she did not live or work in Cleveland. The refund was denied, and the BTA affirmed the denial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Cleveland's taxation of Willacy's 2016 compensation was required under municipal law and did not violate her due process rights under either the United States or Ohio constitutions. View "Willacy v. Cleveland Board of Income Tax Review" on Justia Law

The First Circuit resolved a portion of Appellant's appeal in this opinion addressing the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town of Brookline, Massachusetts, the Brookline Board of Selectmen, the Town's counsel and Human Resources director, and select members of the Board, holding that the summary judgment is affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings.Plaintiff, black man, brought this suit alleging that during his employment as a firefighter, he had been discriminated against and retaliated against for reporting discriminatory conduct. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the summary judgment granted in favor of Defendants, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Plaintiff's retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Town, the Board, and certain members of the Board, in their personal and official capacities. The Court then remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Alston v. Town of Brookline, Mass." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred by dismissing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) the Foundation's complaint against the executive director of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (the Board), alleging a violation of the disclosure provision in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). The Foundation sought disclosure of broad categories of documents related to the identification of North Carolina voter registrants whom the Board had identified as potentially failing to satisfy the statutory citizenship requirement.The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded, concluding that the district court erred in holding that the Foundation failed to state a claim under the NVRA's disclosure provision simply because the request implicated potential criminal conduct of registrants. The court explained that the disclosure provision does not contain such a blanket exemption and requires a more exacting and tailored analysis than what occurred in this case. Because discovery was not conducted, the court cannot discern on this record whether the Foundation may be entitled to disclosure of some of the documents requested. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court for further consideration of the documents subject to four restrictions excluding from disclosure: (1) information precluded from disclosure by the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994; (2) information obtained from confidential federal databases under the United States Department of Homeland Security's Systemic Alien Verification for Entitlements system (the SAVE system) that is otherwise protected from disclosure by statute or by the Board's agreement with the Department regarding confidentiality; (3) any requested voter registration applications, or the names affiliated with those applications, that are subject to protection as part of any prior or current criminal investigation; and (4) the identities and personal information of individuals who potentially committed criminal offenses, including those who later were determined to be United States citizens, which must be redacted from any documents ultimately released as sensitive information vulnerable to abuse. View "Public Interest Legal Foundation v. North Carolina State Board of Elections" on Justia Law