Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Alita, her son, and her stepfather died in a fire that engulfed their Philadelphia apartment. With the building already burning, Alita had called 911. A fire department operator instructed her to remain inside, promising help was on the way. Firefighters initially drove to the wrong location and, at the scene, never learned that the family was waiting. The firefighters extinguished the blaze without a search, leaving all three trapped in their home where they perished from smoke inhalation. Days passed before firefighters returned and discovered their bodies. Their estates sued the city and two fire department employees.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The state-created danger theory does not apply. The dispatcher did not act affirmatively to create the danger, but only failed to communicate the family’s location, and the operator’s behavior did not shock the conscience. The employees neglected to relay the information through error, omission, or oversight. There is no plausible allegation that the city was deliberately indifferent to anyone’s substantive due process rights. Rejecting a negligence argument based on the history of problems at the residence, and failure to fix the building’s fire hazards, the court reasoned that the city was immune from these claims because it had insufficient control over the building. View "Johnson v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Porter co-owned property with a partner. His wife, Debra, held an unrecorded $2.8 million mortgage on the property. Unbeknownst to Porter, his partner obtained a second mortgage on the property from Commerce. That mortgage went into default. The property was listed at a mortgage foreclosure sheriff’s sale. The Porters filed lawsuits before the sale. A Pennsylvania court awarded Debra damages for the title company’s failure to record her mortgage but declined to have it retroactively recorded and denied a motion to postpone the sale. A federal declaratory judgment action, claiming that Debra’s unrecorded mortgage had priority over Commerce’s mortgage, was still pending. Porter contacted the Sheriff’s Office before the sale and sought Commerce’s assurance that it would inform bidders about the pending lawsuit. Commerce’s attorney never arrived at the sale, so when the property came up for sale, Porter stood up to make the announcement. Sheriff’s Office attorney Chew and Deputy Stewart ordered him to stop speaking. They put Porter in a chokehold, placed him in handcuffs, and dragged him from the room. Porter and a deputy required medical attention. Porter was convicted of misdemeanor resisting arrest.On Porter's s Monell claim against Philadelphia based upon its unwritten policy of not allowing non-bidders to comment at a sheriff’s sales, the jury awarded him $750,000. The Third Circuit vacated the judgment. Chew’s unendorsed actions did not become municipal policy. There is no evidence that municipal decision-makers were aware of Chew’s inconsistent implementation of the no-comment policy or that Chew had previously used force to enforce it. Because the sheriff’s sale is a nonpublic forum, the Sheriff’s Office policy prohibiting comments is valid; it is viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the city’s right to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. View "Porter v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

On October 25, 2011, Appellant Nicole B.’s then-eight-year-old son N.B. was sexually assaulted by three of his male fourth-grade classmates in a bathroom at his public elementary school in the City of Philadelphia. According to Appellant, N.B. had endured two months of pervasive physical and verbal harassment at school leading up to the sexual assault. During that time, both Appellant and N.B. reported the harassment to his teacher and to school administrators, to no avail. In November 2011, Appellant withdrew N.B. from the elementary school after learning of the attack. Over two years later, in 2014, Appellant filed an administrative complaint with the Human Relations Commission against the Philadelphia School District (“District”) in her individual capacity and on N.B.’s behalf, asserting claims of discrimination on the basis of gender and race under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). The Human Relations Commission rejected Appellant’s complaint as untimely, because it was filed beyond the 180-day time limit. In this appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether principles of equitable tolling found in PHRA, or Pennsylvania’s Minority Tolling Statute (“Minority Tolling Statute”), applied to an otherwise untimely complaint. After review, the Supreme Court found the PHRA’s equitable tolling provision applied to a minor whose parent failed to satisfy the applicable statute of limitations for filing an administrative complaint prior to the minor reaching the age of majority. By this finding, the Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "Nicole B. v. Philadelphia Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction barring implementation of decisions to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations of Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, and El Salvador. The TPS program is a congressionally created humanitarian program administered by DHS that provides temporary relief to nationals of designated foreign countries that have been stricken by a natural disaster, armed conflict, or other "extraordinary and temporary conditions in the foreign state."The panel held that judicial review of plaintiffs' claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is barred by 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(5)(A). Under the TPS statute, the Secretary possesses full and unreviewable discretion as to whether to consider intervening events in making a TPS determination. In this case, plaintiffs' attempt to rely on the APA to invoke justiciability over what would otherwise be an unreviewable challenge to specific TPS determinations, constitutes an impermissible circumvention of section 1254a(b)(5)(A).The panel also held that plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success, or even serious questions, on the merits of their Equal Protection claim. The district court found that the DHS Secretaries were influenced by President Trump and/or the White House in their TPS decisionmaking, and that President Trump had expressed animus against non-white, non-European immigrants. However, without any evidence linking them, the panel concluded that these two factual findings alone cannot support a finding of discriminatory purpose for the TPS terminations. View "Ramos v. Wolf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff represents three certified classes which are defined to include, in relevant part, all current and future individuals who are subject to an immigration detainer issued by an ICE agent located in the Central District of California, excluding individuals with final orders of removal or who are subject to ongoing removal proceedings. The district court entered a judgment and two permanent injunctions in favor of plaintiff and the Probable Cause Subclass on Fourth Amendment claims. The State Authority Injunction enjoins the Government from issuing detainers from the Central District to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in states that lack state law permitting state and local LEAs to make civil immigration arrests based on civil immigration detainers. The Database Injunction enjoins the Government from issuing detainers to class members based solely on searches of electronic databases to make probable cause determinations of removability.The Ninth Circuit first held that plaintiff had Article III standing to seek prospective injunctive relief when he commenced suit; second, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the Probable Cause Subclass pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) with plaintiff as the class representative; third, the panel held that 8 U.S.C. 252(f)(1) does not bar injunctive relief for the claims in this case because the only provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) whose text even refers to immigration detainers is not among the provisions that section 1252(f)(1) encompasses; fourth, the panel reversed and vacated the State Authority Injunction because the presence or absence of probable cause determines whether the Government violates the Fourth Amendment when issuing a detainer, not state law restrictions; fifth, the panel reversed and vacated the Database Injunction because it is premised on legal error and lacks critical factual findings; and finally, the panel reversed summary judgment for the Government on plaintiffs' claim pursuant to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). View "Gonzalez v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law

In 2006, a McVey assisted living resident fell and suffered injuries that resulted in his death. An investigation led to a homicide charge against Geness, a permanently mentally disabled McVey resident. A judge deemed Geness incompetent to stand trial and ordered him transferred to a psychiatric hospital for assessment. Approximately 10 months after his arrest, Geness was transferred to a psychiatric facility where he was deemed incompetent with a “poor” prognosis for improvement. He remained imprisoned for years, while his case remained on the court’s monthly “call of the list.” About five years after Geness’s arrest, a second competency evaluation was conducted, at the prison. It was again determined that Geness was incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to improve. A judge released him for involuntary commitment to a Long Term Structured Residence. Geness’s case remained the monthly “call of the list.” In 2015, a judge entered a nolle prosequi order. After nine years in custody without a trial, Geness was released.Geness sued the county and city, former detective Cox, and McVey under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12131, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983. All defendants were dismissed except Cox. Following a remand, Geness added ADA “Title II” and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the Commonwealth and the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC). The Third Circuit remanded for dismissal of AOPC. While Congress abrogated sovereign immunity for Title II claims, Geness has not stated a Title II claim against AOPC, which had no power over the disposition of his case. There is no allegation regarding how AOPC’s alleged failure to contact the Supreme Court connects to Geness’s disability. View "Geness v. Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts" on Justia Law

During the coronavirus pandemic, Illinois Governor Pritzker issued executive orders designed to limit the virus’s opportunities to spread, similar to orders in other states. Executive Order 2020‐43 (EO43, June 26, 2020), imposing a 50-person cap on gatherings, states: This Executive Order does not limit the free exercise of religion. To protect the health and safety of faith leaders, staff, congregants, and visitors, religious organizations and houses of worship are encouraged to consult and follow the recommended practices and guidelines from the Illinois Department of Public Health.... the safest practices ... are to provide services online, in a drive‐in format, or outdoors (and consistent with social distancing requirements and guidance regarding wearing face coverings), and to limit indoor services to 10 people. Religious organizations are encouraged to take steps to ensure social distancing, the use of face coverings, and implementation of other public health measures. Emergency and governmental functions enjoy the same exemption.The Republican Party challenged the “favored” treatment of religion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief. Because the exercise of religion involves more than simple speech, the equivalency urged by the Republicans between political speech and religious exercise is a false one. If there were a problem with the religious exercise carve‐out, the state would be entitled to return to a regime in which even religious gatherings are subject to the mandatory cap. View "Illinois Republican Party v. J. B. Pritzker" on Justia Law

On January 18, 2019, the plaintiffs went with Covington Catholic High School classmates to Washington, D.C. to attend the March for Life. They later gathered near the Lincoln Memorial to await buses to return to Kentucky. Following interaction with other groups, Native American activist Phillips approached them, beating a drum and chanting. A video of this interaction was posted online and went viral. Some of the students were displaying the “Make America Great Again” campaign slogan; some were performing the “tomahawk” chop; one student is standing close to Phillips. The plaintiffs complained of online harassment in response to the video’s dissemination. Representative Debra Haaland, a Native American, on her official Congressional Twitter account, posted: “This Veteran [Phillips] put his life on the line for our country. The students’ display of blatant hate, disrespect, and intolerance is a signal of how common decency has decayed under this administration.” She later sent a tweet from her campaign Twitter account that linked to an interview with Phillips, in which he stated that the students were chanting “build that wall.” Senator Elizabeth Warren sent a tweet from her official Senate Twitter account, stating “Omaha elder and Vietnam War veteran Nathan Phillips endured hateful taunts with dignity and strength."The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit as barred by sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1). Members of Congress routinely broadcast their views on current events; the statements were made within the scope of their employment. The United States was properly substituted as the defendant and the court correctly dismissed Senator Warren and Representative Haaland from the suit. That the United States has not waived its immunity to libel suits is irrelevant. Plaintiffs may pursue their claims against the remaining defendants in state court. View "Does v. Haaland" on Justia Law

Herman regularly attends Los Angeles and Pasadena city meetings and has been removed more than 100 times. Herman At a public hearing on April 17, 2019, Herman said, “Fuck" Los Angeles Deputy City Attorney Fauble and gave Fauble’s address. At an April 29 meeting, Herman, in a threatening manner, again disclosed Fauble’s Pasadena address. Herman also submitted speaker cards; one had a swastika drawn on it, another had a drawing of a Ku Klux Klan hood with figures that were either an “SS” or lightning bolts above Fauble’s name. On May 1, Herman attended another meeting and stated, “I’m going back to Pasadena and fuck with you.”The city sought a workplace violence restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure 527.8, precluding Herman from harassing, threatening, contacting, or stalking Fauble or disclosing his address, and requiring Herman to stay at least 10 yards away from Fauble while attending meetings. At a hearing, Herman explained that he made the statements because he was upset about a change in the council rules and with his own homelessness. He denied intending to threaten Fauble. The court of appeal affirmed the entry of a restraining order, rejecting a First Amendment challenge. There was substantial evidence that Herman’s threatening conduct was reasonably likely to recur and that Herman’s statements would have placed a reasonable person in fear for his safety, regardless of Herman’s subjective intent. The credible threats of violence were not constitutionally protected. View "City of Los Angeles v. Herman" on Justia Law

In 1998-2010, Dimora served as one of three Cuyahoga County Commissioners. An FBI investigation revealed that Dimora had received over $250,000 in gifts from individuals with business before the County, including home renovations, trips to Las Vegas, and encounters with prostitutes. Dimora had used his position to help with the awarding of County contracts, hiring, the results of at least one County election, and civil litigation outcomes. Dimora’s “influence” ranged from casting formal votes as Commissioner to pressuring other officials.Dimora was charged with Hobbs Act offenses, bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, making false statements on tax returns, conspiracy to commit mail fraud and honest services mail fraud, conspiracy to commit bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and honest services wire fraud, RICO conspiracy, mail fraud, conspiracy to obstruct justice and obstructing a federal investigation. A jury convicted Dimora on 33 counts. The Sixth Circuit upheld the jury instructions defining “official acts” as having “fairly trace[d] the line between permissible gifts and impermissible bribes.” A ruling that state ethics reports were inadmissible hearsay was harmless in light of “overwhelming evidence.”In its 2016 “McDonnell” decision, the Supreme Court gave a narrow construction to a key element included within several of Dimora’s offenses. The term “official acts” does not include “setting up a meeting, calling another public official, or hosting an event.” Official acts are limited to “formal exercise[s] of governmental power.” Dimora petitioned to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sixth Circuit vacated a denial of relief. The court declined to decide whether the instructional error was harmless with respect to most of the counts or whether the “cumulative effect” of instructional and evidentiary errors entitles Dimora to relief. View "Dimora v. United States" on Justia Law