Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A property developer settled claims with the U.S. Department of Justice for alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and sought to assert a state-law claim for contribution against other companies involved in developing the properties. The developer, Epcon Communities Franchising, L.L.C., alleged that the franchisees, including Wilcox Development Group, L.L.C., failed to comply with the FHA in their construction and design of certain properties.The trial court dismissed the case, not on the grounds argued by Wilcox, but on the theory that if a state-law cause of action for contribution existed, it was preempted by federal law. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, and Epcon appealed the preemption issue to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in deciding the case on the basis of federal preemption. The court emphasized principles of judicial restraint, noting that no party had argued for federal preemption and that courts should avoid deciding constitutional questions unless necessary. The court also highlighted that the preemption issue was hypothetical and should not have been addressed without first determining whether a state-law contribution claim was available.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether the facts alleged present a claim for relief under Ohio law. The court did not address the preemption issue, as it was not properly presented by the parties and was unnecessary to resolve at this stage. View "Epcon Communities Franchising, L.L.C. v. Wilcox Dev. Group, L.L.C." on Justia Law

L.C. Slaughter and Isiac Jackson were removed from their positions as commissioners of the Canton Municipal Utilities Commission by the City of Canton Board of Aldermen. They appealed their removal to the Madison County Circuit Court, arguing that their removal was illegal and violated their due process rights. The circuit court agreed, finding the removal void as a matter of law, and reinstated them to their positions. The Board appealed this decision.The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that the Board's removal of Slaughter and Jackson without notice and an opportunity to be heard was improper. The Court issued its mandate on April 6, 2023, affirming their reinstatement. Subsequently, on April 27, 2023, Slaughter and Jackson filed a petition for back pay in the same circuit court case, seeking compensation for the period they were removed.The circuit court denied the petition for back pay, citing lack of jurisdiction, as the issue of back pay was not raised before the mandate was issued. Slaughter and Jackson appealed this denial. The Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and held that the circuit court lost jurisdiction once the appeal was filed and did not regain it after the Supreme Court's mandate, which did not remand any issues for further consideration. Consequently, the circuit court's denial of the petition for back pay was affirmed. View "Slaughter v. City of Canton, Mississippi" on Justia Law

In February 2020, a police officer in Wauwatosa, Wisconsin, shot and killed a Black teenager, Alvin Cole. Following the incident, community members organized protests against police violence and racism. Anticipating unrest after the district attorney decided not to charge the officer, the mayor imposed a curfew. Plaintiffs, affected by the curfew and police conduct, filed constitutional and state law claims against the City of Wauwatosa and individual defendants.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed most claims, allowing only First Amendment and Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) claims to proceed. The court later granted summary judgment for the defendants on the First Amendment claims, leaving only the DPPA claims for trial. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants on the DPPA claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the curfew was a permissible time, place, and manner restriction under the First Amendment. The court found that the curfew was content-neutral, served a significant government interest in public safety, was narrowly tailored, and left open ample alternative channels for communication. The court also upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against individual defendants, agreeing that the claims were inadequately pleaded and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying further amendments. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s response to a jury question regarding the definition of “personal information” under the DPPA. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Knowlton v. City of Wauwatosa" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a police officer for the Town of Salem, was involved in an off-duty incident over ten years ago where he drove at 62 mph in a 30 mph zone, refused to pull over for another officer, and avoided spike strips before stopping and laughing off the incident as a joke. An internal investigation found he violated the department's code of conduct for "Conduct Unbecoming an Employee." He accepted responsibility, waived hearings, and took a one-day unpaid suspension in a negotiated agreement with the Salem Police Department (SPD).Years later, following an audit, the New Hampshire Department of Justice (DOJ) requested the internal investigation report and added the plaintiff's name to the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES). The plaintiff requested removal, citing a court order that his personnel file did not contain Brady/Giglio material. The DOJ denied the request, and the plaintiff filed a complaint in superior court seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the plaintiff's conduct was "potentially exculpatory evidence" under RSA 105:13-d, and that he had received adequate due process.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiff's conduct was not "potentially exculpatory evidence" as it was not relevant to his general credibility and was stale. The court noted that the conduct was over ten years old, the plaintiff had accepted responsibility, and his criminal charges were nolle prossed and annulled. The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the plaintiff's removal from the EES was warranted. View "Doe v. Salem Police Department" on Justia Law

Steve Winder became suicidal after discovering Facebook messages between his wife and her ex-husband. His wife, Latrisha, who was out of state, called her mother, Lou Anne, and the Young County Sheriff’s Department for a welfare check after Steve sent pictures of himself holding a gun to his head. Deputy Joshua Gallardo arrived at the scene, and after hearing Steve shout from within, opened the front door. Lou Anne indicated that Steve was armed. Deputy Gallardo then fatally shot Steve after ordering him to put the gun down.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the case at the 12(b)(6) stage. The court found that Steve’s suicidality and possession of a gun created exigent circumstances excusing the need for a warrant. It also ruled that an objectively reasonable officer in Deputy Gallardo’s position would not need to wait for Steve to point the gun at him before using deadly force, thus defeating the excessive force claim. Additionally, the court found no underlying constitutional violation to support claims for supervisory or Monell liability and ruled that Title II of the ADA does not support claims where police officers face exigent circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and that Deputy Gallardo’s use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances. The court also found no basis for supervisory or Monell liability due to the absence of an underlying constitutional violation. Lastly, the court ruled that the ADA claims were foreclosed by the exigent circumstances and that there was no evidence that Steve was discriminated against by reason of his disability. View "Winder v. Gallardo" on Justia Law

The Tuscaloosa City Council passed an ordinance limiting the maximum occupancy of certain restaurants, affecting a sports bar owned by CMB Holdings Group. The ordinance required establishments with restaurant liquor licenses to maintain occupancy limits based on their configuration as restaurants, not as bars or entertainment venues. This change reduced the sports bar's maximum occupancy from 519 to 287, negatively impacting its revenue. CMB Holdings Group sued the City of Tuscaloosa, the mayor, city council members, and the fire marshal, alleging racial discrimination and other claims.The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court dismissed most of CMB's claims, including those for money damages against the City and personal-capacity claims against the mayor and councilors due to legislative immunity. The court also dismissed claims for procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and others, leaving only claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Alabama Constitution's Contracts Clause. CMB requested the court to alter or amend its judgment or certify it as final for appeal purposes. The court denied the request to alter or amend but granted the Rule 54(b) certification, allowing CMB to appeal the dismissed claims.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the Rule 54(b) certification was improper. The court found that the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims were closely intertwined, particularly regarding whether the ordinance affected vested rights or mere privileges and whether it served a legitimate public interest. The court concluded that separate adjudication could lead to inconsistent results and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. View "CMB Holdings Groupv. City of Tuscaloosa" on Justia Law

On the night of July 18, 2019, in Charlestown, Indiana, bystanders called 911 to report a fight between RJ Slaymaker and his wife, Amylyn Slaymaker. Two police officers responded, separated the couple, and learned from Amylyn that RJ was drunk, had hit her, had guns, and was threatening to kill her and himself. RJ denied the allegations. The officers called an ambulance for RJ to seek mental health help at a hospital but did not place him under a 24-hour mental health hold. RJ left the hospital shortly after arriving, returned home, and killed Amylyn before committing suicide.The administrator of Amylyn’s estate sued Officer Roederer and the estate of Officer Johnson, claiming they created a danger by misleading Amylyn into believing RJ would be held for 24 hours, thus making her believe it was safe to return home. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding they were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment regarding Officer Roederer, finding no evidence of his personal involvement in making assurances to Amylyn. However, the court reversed the judgment regarding Officer Johnson, finding that a jury could reasonably infer that he misled Amylyn about RJ’s detention, creating a danger she would not have otherwise faced. The court held that Officer Johnson’s actions could be seen as a violation of clearly established law under the state-created danger doctrine, as established in Monfils v. Taylor. The case against Officer Johnson’s estate was remanded for further proceedings. View "Rakes v. Roederer" on Justia Law

A senior trooper with the Louisiana State Police (LSP), August McKay, committed suicide at his home after learning he was being reassigned and that a search warrant was to be executed on his residence. His widow, Brandy McKay, sued several LSP officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state law, alleging their actions contributed to his death. The district court denied qualified immunity to two officers, Sergeant Rohn Bordelon and Trooper David LaCroix, leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana initially dismissed Brandy’s Eighth Amendment claim but allowed her to amend her complaint. She then limited her claims to the Fourteenth Amendment and state laws. The district court found that Brandy had sufficiently stated § 1983 claims against Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix, concluding they had subjective knowledge of August’s suicide risk and responded with deliberate indifference. The court dismissed the claims against other defendants and allowed the state law claims against Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix to proceed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no constitutional duty to protect August from self-harm, as he was not in state custody or otherwise restrained. The court emphasized that the officers did not attempt to arrest or confine August, and Brandy’s complaint focused on their failure to restrain him. Without a constitutional duty, there could be no violation, and thus, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court’s decision regarding qualified immunity and dismissed the appeal concerning the state law claims without prejudice, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "McKay v. LaCroix" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Holman, who challenged a debt-relief program under the American Rescue Plan Act that provided benefits to "socially disadvantaged" farmers and ranchers based on racial categories. Holman, a farmer, argued that he was excluded from the program solely due to his race and sought a preliminary injunction to halt the program. The district court granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the program did not meet the strict scrutiny standard required for racial classifications under the Fifth Amendment. However, before a final judgment was reached, Congress repealed the program, leading Holman to seek attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied Holman's request for fees, ruling that he was not a "prevailing party" under the EAJA because the preliminary injunction did not provide him with lasting relief. The court also noted that the injunction was temporary and revocable, and thus did not materially alter the legal relationship between the parties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court did not definitively rule on whether Holman was a "prevailing party" but found that the Government's position during the litigation was "substantially justified" under the EAJA. The court noted that the Government had presented substantial evidence to defend the program's constitutionality, including historical discrimination against minority farmers by the USDA. The court concluded that a reasonable person could find the Government's position justified, thereby precluding Holman's entitlement to attorney's fees and expenses. View "Holman v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Absolute Essence LLC sought to enter the medical marijuana market in Arkansas but was unable to secure a license. The company invested over a million dollars in the application process, including finding a location and addressing zoning issues. The Arkansas Medical Marijuana Commission outsourced the review process to Public Consulting Group, Inc., which scored 197 applications in two weeks. Absolute Essence received a low score and alleged that the scoring process was manipulated, with conflicts of interest among the scorers favoring larger, established players and resulting in racial disparities in license awards.The case was initially filed in state court, alleging tortious interference, fraud, racial discrimination, and civil conspiracy. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, which dismissed the case for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court found that Absolute Essence's tortious interference claim failed because it did not establish a precise business expectancy with a specific third party. The fraud claim was dismissed due to a lack of justifiable reliance, as the company’s actions predated the involvement of the outside scorers. The race-discrimination claims were dismissed for failing to allege intentional discrimination, as the complaint only suggested a disparate impact without sufficient factual support. Finally, the civil conspiracy claim was dismissed because it could not stand without an underlying tort.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Absolute Essence did not plead enough facts to support any of its claims. View "Absolute Essence LLC v. Public Consulting Group LLC" on Justia Law