Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Victor S. Couzens, the senior pastor of Inspirational Bible Church (IBC), faced a significant decline in church membership and financial troubles following public accusations of an adulterous relationship. In response, church leaders organized a vote to remove him from his position. To enforce this decision, they hired off-duty police officers for the next Sunday service. When Couzens attempted to address the congregation, the officers threatened him with arrest, leading him to leave the church. Couzens subsequently sued the officers, their police chief, and the City of Forest Park, alleging a conspiracy to deny him his constitutional rights.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that while the officers' actions could be seen as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, their actions were not unreasonable. The court also determined that the free exercise claim failed because the police department's policy did not target religious conduct. Without constitutional violations from individual defendants, the court found no merit in the municipal liability and civil conspiracy claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the officers' actions were objectively reasonable given the circumstances and the evidence they had, including a letter indicating Couzens' removal as pastor. The court also found that Couzens failed to establish a violation of his First Amendment rights, as the officers' actions did not reflect state interference in church governance. Consequently, the court upheld the summary judgment on the constitutional, civil conspiracy, and municipal liability claims. View "Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio" on Justia Law

The case involves a long-standing litigation concerning the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office and the conditions at Orleans Parish Prison. Plaintiffs, including detainees and the United States, argued that the jail provided constitutionally inadequate housing and medical care. In 2013, a district court approved a consent decree to address these issues, which included a plan to construct a mental health annex, known as Phase III. Despite years of delays, the district court ordered the construction to proceed. No party appealed these orders at the time.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana oversaw the case initially. In 2016, the parties entered a stipulated order to develop a plan for appropriate housing for prisoners with mental health issues. The Compliance Director later proposed the construction of Phase III, which was agreed upon by the former Sheriff and the City. However, the City later sought to explore alternatives, leading to further court orders in 2019 to proceed with Phase III. The City’s subsequent motion to halt the project was denied, and this decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Anderson v. City of New Orleans.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is currently reviewing the case. The new Sheriff, Susan Hutson, moved to terminate all orders concerning Phase III, arguing that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibits the construction of a new jail facility. The district court denied this motion, and the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that it could review the denial of the motion but not the underlying orders, as the Sheriff’s motion was not a proper procedural mechanism under the PLRA to challenge the 2019 Orders and Stipulated Order. The appeal was dismissed, and the construction of Phase III continues. View "Anderson v. Hutson" on Justia Law

Victor Raul Tellez was charged with three counts of lewd or lascivious acts upon a child and faced a maximum prison term of 12 years. On the advice of his attorney, he accepted a plea deal, pleading guilty to one count and receiving a three-year prison sentence. Tellez was not informed that his conviction would make him eligible for civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). After completing his prison term, the District Attorney initiated SVPA proceedings for his involuntary commitment to a state hospital.Tellez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not being advised of the SVPA consequences. The superior court denied his petition, and the Court of Appeal also denied it, stating that prevailing norms did not require such advisement and that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice. Tellez then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.The California Supreme Court held that Tellez did not sufficiently demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to advise him of the SVPA consequences. The court noted that Tellez provided insufficient evidence that he would not have accepted the plea deal had he been informed of the SVPA consequences. Therefore, the court did not address whether his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. However, recognizing the significant liberty deprivation involved in SVPA commitments, the court exercised its supervisory powers to require trial courts to inform defendants of potential SVPA consequences when pleading guilty or no contest to a qualifying offense. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed on the ground that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice. View "In re Tellez" on Justia Law

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, Governor Roy Cooper of North Carolina issued an executive order limiting attendance at outdoor venues to twenty-five people. Robert Turner, who operated Ace Speedway in Alamance County, publicly opposed these restrictions and kept the racetrack open. This led to a series of events where Governor Cooper allegedly pressured local officials to enforce the order against Ace Speedway, culminating in the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) issuing an abatement order to shut down the racetrack as a health hazard.The Superior Court of Alamance County initially issued a preliminary injunction against Ace Speedway, prohibiting it from holding events until it complied with the abatement order. Ace Speedway and its operators counterclaimed, alleging constitutional violations, including the right to earn a living and selective enforcement. The trial court denied the State’s motion to dismiss these counterclaims, and the State appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, allowing the case to proceed.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that Ace Speedway sufficiently alleged colorable claims under the North Carolina Constitution. The allegations suggested that the State's actions were not for a proper governmental purpose but to retaliate against Turner for his public criticism, thus violating the right to earn a living. Additionally, the selective enforcement claim was deemed colorable because Ace Speedway alleged it was targeted while other similar venues were not, based on Turner’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. The Court concluded that these claims were sufficient to overcome the State’s sovereign immunity at this stage. View "Kinsley v. Ace Speedway Racing, Ltd" on Justia Law

Xiomara Santiago was hired as the Deputy Director for the Head Start Program in Utuado, Puerto Rico. Following a mayoral election, the new mayor, Jorge Pérez, terminated her employment. Santiago claimed her dismissal violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and was politically motivated, violating her First Amendment rights. She sought a preliminary injunction to be reinstated.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held hearings and ultimately denied Santiago's request for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that Santiago had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of either her due process or political discrimination claims. The magistrate judge's Report & Recommendation, which the district judge adopted, found that Santiago's initial hire was contrary to Puerto Rico law, meaning she did not have a property interest in her employment. Additionally, the court found insufficient evidence to support her claim of political discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that Santiago had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her claims. The court noted that Santiago's argument regarding the incorrect application of Puerto Rico law was waived because it was raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the court found no clear error in the district court's assessment that Santiago's political affiliation was not a substantial factor in her termination. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "Santiago v. Municipality of Utuado" on Justia Law

In 2016, John O. Kalu, an inmate at FCI Allenwood, alleged that he was sexually assaulted on three separate occasions by Lieutenant K. Middernatch. Kalu reported the first two incidents to Warden Spaulding, who responded that he would investigate but took no further action. Following his report, Kalu was placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) and later returned to the general population, where he was assaulted a third time. Kalu also claimed that he was subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement, including being forced to sleep on a cold metal bunk in freezing temperatures without adequate clothing.Kalu filed a pro se complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Warden Spaulding and Lt. Middernatch, seeking damages under Bivens for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed Kalu’s claims against Warden Spaulding for lack of personal involvement but allowed the sexual assault claim against Lt. Middernatch to proceed. Kalu later amended his complaint, but the District Court ultimately dismissed all claims, determining that they presented new Bivens contexts and that special factors counseled against extending Bivens remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that Kalu’s Eighth Amendment sexual assault and conditions-of-confinement claims presented new Bivens contexts. It found that special factors, including the availability of alternative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program, Congress’s omission of a standalone damages remedy in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), and separation of powers principles, counseled against extending Bivens liability. The court also agreed that Kalu’s complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim against Warden Spaulding for deliberate indifference or failure to protect. View "Kalu v. Spaulding" on Justia Law

In January 2019, Ashley Franklin, an inmate at the Franklin County Regional Jail, was transported to a hospital by Jail Sergeant Brandon Price due to illness. During the transport, Price sexually assaulted Franklin. Franklin filed a lawsuit against Price, Franklin County, and two other Jail employees, asserting constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state law claims. She alleged that Price and his superior, Captain Wes Culbertson, were deliberately indifferent to her safety and that Franklin County had inadequate policies and training to prevent such assaults.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted Franklin’s motion for summary judgment on her Eighth Amendment claim against Price but denied her other claims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the other defendants, finding no evidence that Culbertson or Franklin County were deliberately indifferent or that the County’s policies were inadequate. The court also found that the County’s previous incidents of misconduct did not establish a pattern of unconstitutional behavior. Franklin’s negligence claims against Culbertson and Jailer Rick Rogers were dismissed, with the court ruling that they were entitled to qualified immunity under Kentucky law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Franklin County was not liable under § 1983 because Franklin failed to show a direct causal link between the County’s policies and her assault. The court also found that Culbertson and Rogers were entitled to qualified immunity, as their actions were discretionary and performed in good faith. Franklin’s claims of gross negligence were deemed forfeited due to lack of development in her arguments. The court concluded that Franklin had not established that the County’s policies or training were constitutionally inadequate or that there was a pattern of similar constitutional violations. View "Franklin v. Franklin County" on Justia Law

In August 2020, Joe Willie Cannon, an inmate at Anamosa State Penitentiary (ASP), injured his right wrist while playing basketball. He sought medical attention from ASP staff, including nurses and a doctor, but experienced delays and inadequate treatment. Cannon alleged that the medical staff's failure to promptly diagnose and treat his wrist injury, which was later found to be a displaced fracture, constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, violating his Eighth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied summary judgment to four defendants—Dr. Michael Dehner and Nurses Amy Shipley, Courtney Friedman, and Barbara Devaney—who claimed qualified immunity. The court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Cannon's medical needs. The defendants appealed this interlocutory order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the district court failed to properly apply the principle that each defendant's knowledge and conduct must be individually assessed. The appellate court found that the nurses' actions, including their assessments and treatment plans, did not amount to deliberate indifference. Similarly, Dr. Dehner's decisions, including ordering an X-ray and referring Cannon to an orthopedic specialist, were based on his medical judgment and did not constitute deliberate indifference.The Eighth Circuit held that each appellant was entitled to qualified immunity because Cannon failed to prove that any of them acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Cannon v. Dehner" on Justia Law

In 1984, Richard Wershe, Jr., at fourteen, was recruited by the FBI as a drug informant. Over the next few years, he was involved in dangerous drug operations under the direction of federal and state officers. In 1987, Wershe was arrested and convicted of possessing a large quantity of cocaine, receiving a life sentence without parole, which was later amended to allow parole eligibility. While incarcerated, he cooperated with law enforcement in various investigations, including "Operation Backbone" and a grand jury against the "Best Friends" gang, based on promises of assistance with his parole. Despite his cooperation, Wershe was denied parole in 2003 and was only released in 2017, subsequently serving time in Florida for an unrelated charge until his release in 2020.Wershe filed two lawsuits: one in July 2021 against the City of Detroit and various federal and state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens, and another in October 2022 against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). He alleged constitutional violations and tort claims related to his time as a juvenile informant and subsequent parole denial. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed both lawsuits with prejudice, ruling that Wershe’s claims were time-barred and not subject to equitable tolling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that Wershe’s claims were indeed time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations and that he was not entitled to equitable tolling. The court found that Wershe had constructive knowledge of the filing deadlines, did not diligently pursue his claims, and that the defendants would be prejudiced by the delay. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court did not err in dismissing the complaints with prejudice or in its handling of materials outside the pleadings. View "Wershe v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

The case involves several special education students who alleged that their teacher physically and emotionally abused them. The students, who have various disabilities affecting their communication abilities, were assigned to the same classroom at Elm Street Elementary School in Coweta County, Georgia. The teacher, Catherine Sprague, was hired by the principal, Dr. Christi Hildebrand, despite lacking special education certification. Throughout the fall of 2019, the students exhibited signs of distress, and their parents noticed behavioral changes and physical signs of mistreatment. A paraprofessional, Nicole Marshall, reported multiple instances of abuse by Sprague to Hildebrand, who delayed reporting these allegations to law enforcement and the students' parents.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the students' complaint. The court ruled that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) following the Supreme Court's decision in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. The court also found that the students failed to state a constitutional violation against Hildebrand and the school district, and that Hildebrand was entitled to qualified immunity. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law negligence claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under Title II of the ADA, as Title II incorporates the remedies of the Rehabilitation Act, which the Supreme Court in Cummings ruled does not allow for emotional distress damages. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred by not considering whether the students might be entitled to other forms of relief under Title II, such as damages for physical harm or nominal damages. The appellate court also affirmed the dismissal of the section 1983 claims, ruling that the alleged abuse did not meet the "shock-the-conscience" standard required for a substantive due process violation. The case was remanded for further proceedings to consider other potential relief under Title II. View "A.W. v. Coweta County School District" on Justia Law