Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Provider Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a preliminary injunction against the OIG's decision to terminate the Medicaid provider agreements to Planned Parenthood affiliates throughout the state. The district court held that the Individual Plaintiffs possessed a private right of action under the "qualified-provider" provision of the Medicaid Act and issued a preliminary injunction.The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in evaluating the evidence de novo, rather than under the arbitrary and capricious standard, and in applying the reasoning in Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast v. Gee, 862 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2017), to its determination of a "qualified" provider in this context. Therefore, the district court erred legally and plaintiffs were unlikely to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim. Accordingly, the court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for the district court to limit its review to the agency record under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard. View "Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Family Planning and Preventative Health Services v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 1998, Do a government employee since 1990, was hired by HUD’s Information Systems Audit Division. She became Division Director. In 2006, Asuncion, then working as a Justice Department auditor, applied for a GS-11 position in Do’s Division. On her resume and Questionnaire, Asuncion claimed she had a college degree in accounting. A pre-employment investigation revealed that Asuncion did not have that degree. Asuncion explained that she had completed the required coursework but needed to take one additional course to raise her GPA. Asuncion claimed good-faith mistake and promised to secure her degree. After conferring with her supervisor, Do approved Asuncion’s hiring. Asuncion was eventually promoted. In 2009, Do posted two GS-14 auditor positions. Human resources flagged Asuncion “as a qualified candidate.” Do selected Asuncion, knowing that Asuncion still did not have an accounting degree. Do later was advised that Asuncion could continue as an auditor but must obtain her degree. Asuncion resigned in 2016. HUD demoted Do to Nonsupervisory Senior Auditor and suspended her for 14 days. The Federal Circuit reversed. Do’s due process rights were violated; the Board relied on a new ground to sustain the discipline. Do's notice alleged a single charge of “negligence of duty” in hiring and promoting Asuncion. The Board’s decision concluded that Do negligently failed to investigate whether Asuncion met alternative requirements. That alternative theory appears nowhere in the notice or in the deciding official’s decision. View "Do v. Department of Housing and Urban Development" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order affirming the findings and modifying a cease and desist order of the Lower Loup Natural Resources District (LLNRD) Board directing Appellant to suspend use of ground water wells, holding that LLNRD had authority to impose a suspension of ground water access for noncompliance with LLNRD’s annual reporting requirements.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err in determining that LLNRD had authority to impose a suspension of ground water access for noncompliance with reporting requirements; (2) Appellant’s due process rights were not violated in the proceedings before the Board; (3) Appellant was not denied the possibility of competent judicial review; (4) the suspension of Appellant’s ground water access was not a taking without just compensation; (5) the district court did not err in declining to supplement LLNRD’s record and receive exhibits 4 and 5; (6) Appellant was not entitled to attorney fees because he was not the prevailing party; and (7) the district court did not err in its modification of the duration of Appellant’s penalty. View "Prokop v. Lower Loup Natural Resources District" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against the State of Missouri and others, alleging that the state failed to meet its constitutional obligation to provide indigent defendants with meaningful representation. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the State and the governor's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity and legislative immunity.The court held that the Missouri Supreme Court would apply long-established principles to cases involving prospective equitable relief and hold that the state was immune; neither the statute nor the Missouri Constitution's general-enforcement provision make the governor an Ex parte Young defendant; to the extent plaintiffs claim that the governor's general enforcement authority and appointment authority were non-legislative acts that lead to a constitutional violation, the governor was subject to sovereign immunity for those acts because they did not satisfy Ex parte Young; and even if the governor's appropriation-reduction authority was not shielded by sovereign immunity through Ex parte Young, legislative immunity, a separate defense, foreclosed suit against the governor. View "Church v. Missouri" on Justia Law

As a cost-saving measure, Flint's municipal water supply was switched from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) to the Flint River and was processed by an outdated and previously mothballed water treatment plant, with the approval of Michigan regulators and an engineering firm, and distributed without adding chemicals to counter the river water’s known corrosivity. Within days, residents complained of foul smelling and tasting water. Within weeks, some residents’ hair began to fall out and their skin developed rashes. Within a year, there were positive tests for E. coli, a spike in deaths from Legionnaires’ disease, and reports of dangerously high blood-lead levels in Flint children. The river water was 19 times more corrosive than the Lake Huron water pumped supplied by DWSD; without corrosion-control treatment, lead leached out of the lead-based service lines. The district court dismissed many claims and defendants in a suit by residents. The remaining defendants appealed with respect to the remaining 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim--that defendants violated their right to bodily integrity as guaranteed by the Substantive Due Process Clause. The Sixth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs pled a plausible Due Process violation regarding some defendants, rejecting their qualified immunity claims. The court reversed as to other defendants; plaintiffs alleged mere negligence, not a constitutional violation, against them. The court rejected a claim that the city was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity based on Michigan's takeover of the city under the “Emergency Manager” law. View "Guertin v. Michigan" on Justia Law

Michigan’s Unemployment Insurance Agency's automated program, MiDAS, accessed claimant records from employers, state agencies, and the federal government. When MiDAS detected unreported income or “flagged” other information, it initiated an automated process to determine whether the individual had engaged in fraud. If an employee reported no income for any week during a quarter in which he earned income, MiDAS automatically found fraud. MiDAS did not inform the claimant about the basis for suspicion and did not allow fact-based adjudication but automatically sent claimants multiple-choice questionnaires. No human being took part in the fraud determination. MiDAS sent the questionnaires to claimants’ online accounts, many of which were dormant, and did not take additional steps (emails, mail, or phone) to notify claimants. When MiDAS determined that a claimant committed fraud, the individual’s right to benefits terminated immediately and severe monetary penalties were automatically assessed, even when claimants did not actually receive benefits. Most claimants did not know about the determination until the time for appeal had expired. The Agency did not answer calls and garnished claimants’ wages and intercepted their federal income tax returns without an opportunity to contest the fraud determinations. The Michigan Auditor General reviewed 22,000 MiDAS fraud determinations; 93% did not actually involve fraud.In an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the Individual Defendants qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Plaintiffs adequately alleged that Defendants violated their right to procedural due process by terminating their eligibility for benefits and seizing their tax refunds without any meaningful pre-deprivation process; the right to a pre-deprivation hearing was clearly established at the time. Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible equal protection claim; they failed to allege Defendants intentionally singled them out for discriminatory treatment. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights were not clearly established in this context. View "Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc." on Justia Law

An April 2016 Chicago Police Accountability Task Force report indicated that the Chicago Police Department’s “response to violence is not sufficiently imbued with Constitutional policing tactics.” In January 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice released a report concluding that the Chicago Police Department exhibits a pattern or practice of the unconstitutional use of force. In August 2017, the state sued the city, alleging that the Chicago Police Department’s use-of-force policies and practices violate the federal constitution and Illinois law. Two days later, the parties moved to stay the proceedings while they negotiated a consent decree. Almost immediately, the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 7, publicly opposed any consent decree, citing fears that the decree might impair its collective bargaining rights. For months, the Lodge monitored the ongoing negotiations and met informally with the state’s representatives. The Lodge nonetheless waited until June 2018, to file a motion to intervene in the suit. The district court denied the motion to intervene as untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Lodge knew from the beginning that a consent decree might impact its interests but delayed its motion for nearly a year; its allegations of prejudice are speculative. View "Illinois v. Chicago" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kyle Guillemette challenged a determination by the Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) that the notice requirements set forth in RSA 171-A:8, III (2014) and New Hampshire Administrative Rules, He-M 310.07 did not apply when Monadnock Worksource notified Monadnock Developmental Services of its intent to discontinue providing services to petitioner because that act did not constitute a “termination” of services within the meaning of the applicable rules. Petitioner received developmental disability services funded by the developmental disability Medicaid waiver program. MDS was the “area agency,” which coordinated and developed petitioner’s individual service plan. Worksource provides services to disabled individuals pursuant to a “Master Agreement” with MDS. Worksource began providing day services to the petitioner in August 2012. On March 31, 2017, Worksource notified MDS, in writing, that Worksource was terminating services to petitioner “as of midnight on April 30.” The letter to MDS stated that “[t]he Board of Directors and administration of . . . Worksource feel this action is in the best interest of [the petitioner] and of [Worksource].” Petitioner’s mother, who served as his guardian, was informed by MDS of Worksource’s decision on April 3. The mother asked for reconsideration, but the Board declined, writing that because the mother “repeatedly and recently expressed such deep dissatisfaction with our services to your son, the Board and I feel that you and [petitioner] would be better served by another agency . . . .” Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint with the Office of Client and Legal Services alleging that his services had been terminated improperly and requesting that they remain in place pending the outcome of the investigation of his complaint. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the AAU’s ruling was not erroneous, it affirmed. View "Petition of Kyle Guillemette" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Azar Webb’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim in the same lawsuit in which the court considered an appeal from a contested case under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and whether, as a result, the court lacked the authority to award Webb attorney fees.After the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) ended Webb’s Medicaid benefits and denied his petition for reinstatement, Webb filed a claim in the district court under the APA for unlawful termination of Medicaid eligibility, adding a claim of violation of his federal rights under section 1983. The district court reversed DHHS’ decision and ordered reinstatement of Webb’s coverage and reimbursement of medical expenses that should have been covered. The court further found in favor of Webb as to his 1983 claim and enjoined DHHS officials from denying Webb Medicaid eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that once the district court resolved Webb’s APA claim, the court had the authority to grant Webb relief under section 1983 and his request for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. View "Webb v. Nebraska Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

The Architect of the Capitol removed high school student David Pulphus’ painting from the exhibition of the 2016 winners of the Congressional Art Competition. The painting was initially described as “a colorful landscape of symbolic characters representing social injustice, the tragic events in Ferguson, Missouri, and the lingering elements of inequality in modern American society.” It was removed after protests by police unions and a FOX news personality, based on a newspaper story that described it as “depicting police officers as pigs with guns terrorizing a black neighborhood.” After unsuccessfully asking that the House Office Building Commission overrule the removal decision, Pulphus and Missouri Congressman Clay unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights. The D.C. Circuit dismissed an appeal as moot; the 2016 Congressional Art Competition is over and no other concrete, redressable injury is alleged that was caused by the Architect’s removal decision. View "Pulphus v. Ayers" on Justia Law