Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Wasatch Equality and four snowboarders (collectively, Wasatch) sued to challenge a snowboard ban at Alta Ski Area in Utah. In its complaint, Wasatch alleged the ban unconstitutionally discriminated against snowboarders and denied them equal protection of the law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Recognizing that private action won’t sustain a civil rights complaint, Wasatch further alleged the ban constituted “state action” because Alta operated its ski resort on federal land via a permit issued by the United States Forest Service. The district court disagreed, and dismissed this case for failure to identify a state action. Because the Tenth Circuit agreed Wasatch hadn't plausibly established that the snowboard ban constituted state action, the Court affirmed. View "Wasatch Equality v. Alta Ski Lifts" on Justia Law

Farmington School District appealed a Board of Education (state board) decision reversing the decision of the Farmington School Board (local board) not to renew the employment contract of Demetria McKaig, a guidance counselor at Farmington High School. In November 2012, a student (Student A) and her boyfriend told McKaig and another guidance counselor that Student A was pregnant and that she wanted to terminate her pregnancy. Student A was fifteen years old at the time. McKaig suggested that Student A tell her mother about the pregnancy, but Student A refused. The principal expressed his view that the school should inform Student A’s mother about the pregnancy. McKaig disagreed, asserting that Student A had a right to keep the pregnancy confidential. McKaig spoke with Attorney Barbara Keshen of the New Hampshire Civil Liberties Union about Student A’s situation. Keshen’s opinion was that the judicial bypass law protected the confidentiality of Student A’s pregnancy and the fact that she was contemplating an abortion. McKaig relayed this opinion to Student A, and Student A made an appointment with a health center and another attorney to assist her with the judicial bypass proceedings. Meanwhile, the principal instructed the school nurse to meet with Student A to tell her that the school would inform her mother about her pregnancy. McKaig told the principal about her conversation with Keshen and urged him to contact Keshen to discuss Student A’s rights. The principal did not contact Keshen; however, Keshen contacted him. He told Keshen that the parental notification and judicial bypass laws did not prevent him from telling Student A’s mother about the pregnancy. Keshen instituted a petition for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the principal to prevent him from contacting Student A’s mother. McKaig was named as the petitioner “ON BEHALF OF [Student A]”; she was not named in her individual capacity. The TRO was ultimately granted. Months later, McKaig received a notice of nonrenewal from the superintendent; in the written statement of the reasons for non-renewal, the superintendent listed three reasons: insubordination, breach of student confidentiality, and neglect of duties. After the hearing, the local board upheld McKaig’s nonrenewal on those grounds. McKaig appealed to the state board, which found, pursuant that the local board’s decision was “clearly erroneous.” The state board reversed the local board’s decision to uphold McKaig’s nonrenewal, but it did not order McKaig’s reinstatement or any other remedy. McKaig cross-appealed the state board’s decision and argued that she was entitled to reinstatement with back pay and benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed the state board’s reversal of the local board’s decision, and ordered that McKaig be reinstated to her former job. The case was remanded to the state board for further proceedings to determine whether she was entitled to additional remedies. View "Appeal of Farmington School District" on Justia Law

Defendant California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) employed plaintiff Corey Baughn as a firefighter at its Mendocino Unit. In 2009, Cal Fire terminated him for sexually harassing a female subordinate employee. Baughn appealed his termination to the State Personnel Board. Before the Board considered the matter, the parties settled the dispute by written stipulation. Baughn agreed to withdraw his appeal; resign from Cal Fire; and not apply for, seek, or accept employment with Cal Fire again. In exchange, Cal Fire agreed to remove any reference to its disciplinary action from Baughn’s personnel file and to accept Baughn’s resignation. The Personnel Board approved the stipulation. Baughn then worked for the Ukiah Valley Fire District, first as a volunteer firefighter and then as a temporary employee. Ukiah Valley had an agreement with Cal Fire to assign Ukiah Valley personnel to a Cal Fire facility during the winter months. The unit chief of Cal Fire’s Mendocino Unit, Christopher Rowney, became aware that Baughn was working for Ukiah Valley. Rowney knew that as result of Baughn’s employment duties, Baughn would likely be present in Cal Fire facilities when the victim of Baughn’s earlier harassment would also be present. Concerned about this possibility, Rowney wrote a letter to Ukiah Valley’s fire chief ordering Baughn not to be present in any Cal Fire facility. Baughn sought permanent employment with Ukiah Valley. However, when Ukiah Valley’s governing board members learned of Rowney’s action, they pressured the chief to terminate Baughn, which the chief ultimately did. Baughn and his union, plaintiff CDF Firefighters (the Union), sued Cal Fire for breach of the written settlement stipulation between it and Baughn, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. Cal Fire filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint as to the Union, but not as to Baughn. It contended the complaint arose from speech by Rowney that was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. It also asserted the Union was not likely to succeed on the merits. The trial court denied the motion. Cal Fire appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that defendant failed to demonstrate plaintiffs’ action arose from conduct taken by defendant in furtherance of its right of speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. The Court reversed and remanded an award of attorney fees, finding that the trial court relied on an improper basis for awarding fees to plaintiff. View "Baughn v. Dept. of Forestry" on Justia Law

Garden City appealed from a final judgment finding it liable for violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 1981; 42 U.S.C. 1983; and the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs cross-appealed from the 2012 grant of summary judgment by the same district court in favor of Nassau County. The court held that plaintiffs have Article III standing and plaintiffs' claims are also not moot; the district court did not commit clear error in finding that Garden City’s decision to abandon R‐M zoning in favor of R‐T zoning was made with discriminatory intent, and that defendants failed to demonstrate they would have made the same decision absent discriminatory considerations; the court affirmed the judgment insofar as it found plaintiffs had established liability under 42 U.S.C. 3604(a) of the FHA based on a theory of disparate treatment; the court held that 24 C.F.R. 100.500(c) abrogated the court's prior precedent as to the burden‐shifting framework of proving a disparate impact claim; the court vacated the judgment insofar as it found liability under a disparate impact theory, and remanded for further proceedings; the court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims against Nassau County at the summary judgment stage because plaintiffs have not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the County had legal responsibility for Garden City’s adoption of R‐T zoning; the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims against Nassau County at the summary judgment stage; and the court remanded with respect to plaintiffs' claims under Section 804(a) and Title VI relating to Nassau County’s “steering” of affordable housing. View "MHANY Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Nassau" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including many with disabilities, had cases pending in state courts and were represented by an attorney who uses a wheelchair. They claimed that the St. Joseph County Courthouse and the Mishawaka County Services Building did not comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, particularly with respect to restrooms, elevators, witness stands, jury boxes, jury deliberation rooms, attorney podiums, spectator seating, entrance ramps, clerk counters, services for the blind, water fountains, and parking. While the case was pending, defendants remodeled the courthouse restrooms, which are now accessible. Defendants presented evidence that their facilities complied with the statutes. Plaintiffs offered little evidence in rebuttal. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The court dismissed the claims of non-disabled plaintiffs represented by a disabled lawyer and claims relating to jury facilities, saying that the ADA did not provide for “associational” standing. The court found no evidence that other plaintiffs had suffered past injuries that would support standing for damages, and that the prospect of future injury was too speculative to support an injunction. Some plaintiffs had died; some were no longer in litigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, without finding the facilities compliant and without expressing an opinion on possible future claims. View "Hummel v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

ATBS and its owner filed a First Amendment retaliation claim against the City of Jackson, alleging that the mayor, acting through city employees, ended support for a development project proposed by ATBS after Hewitt had made public statements claiming corruption in city government. The district court entered judgment as a matter of law (JML) to the city. The court concluded that the city council was the final policymaker with ultimate authority to approve (or reject) project funding. The mayor did not have final authority over individual funding decisions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Advanced Tech. Bldg. Solutions LLC. v. Jackson, Mississippi" on Justia Law

Texas merchants filed suit challenging Texas’ Anti-Surcharge Law, Tex. Fin. Code 339.001. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied a preliminary injunction. Merchants claim that the law penalizes them for characterizing pricing as a “surcharge”, while at the same time not prohibiting a “discount” for non-credit-card transactions; and is unconstitutionally vague. Reviewing the parties’ claims de novo, and in the light of the States’ broad authority to regulate economic conduct, the court held that Texas’ law regulates conduct, not speech, and, therefore, does not implicate the First Amendment. Instead, the law ensures only that merchants do not impose an additional charge above the regular price for customers paying with credit cards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rowell v. Pettijohn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Diana Schaffer appealed a district court order granting summary judgment on her 42 U.S.C. 1983 malicious prosecution claims in favor of Defendants-Appellants Ashley Hollingshead, B. Gail Cameron, and Salt Lake City Corp. (“the City”). Schaffer argued that Hollingshead and Cameron, two City parking enforcement officers, falsely reported to the police that Schaffer hit them with her truck after they issued her a parking ticket. The two elements of a Section 1983 claim were: (1) deprivation of a federally protected right by (2) an actor acting under color of state law. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the parking enforcement officers did not act under color of state law in reporting the parking incident to the police. View "Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corp." on Justia Law

In 1988, Department of Professional Regulation investigator visited Gekas, a Springfield, Illinois dentist, and expressed concern that Gekas had administered nitrous oxide to a child. He ordered Gekas to provide information on all prescriptions on a continuing basis. Gekas contacted Deputy Governor Riley for assistance. After a meeting, the Department imposed less onerous requirements. In 2002, a Department investigator raided Gekas’ offices, with the assistance of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency. After failed negotiations, the Department issued a cease and desist order against Gekas for the unlicensed practice of medicine and prescribing controlled substances while not a licensed physician and sought to have his license suspended, on grounds that Gekas had prescribed 4,600 doses of Hydrocodone and Vicoprofen to a patient. Gekas contacted his Senator. In 2008, the cease-and-desist was vacated and the complaint dismissed. Gekas submitted a FOIA request concerning the administrative complaint. The Department responded that no public documents were available. In 2009, Gekas filed suit; it was dismissed by stipulation in 2010. Meanwhile, a Chairman on the Illinois Board of Dentistry issued subpoenas against Gekas, stating that there was reasonable cause to believe that Gekas had violated the Illinois Dental Practice Act. Gekas filed suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding no evidence of retaliatory motive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gekas v. Vasiliades" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) adopted new procedures regarding the application process for surgical abortion facilities, including the requirement that individuals and other entities obtain a license from the Secretary of DHMH before establishing or operating such a facility. In 2013, Petitioner, pursuant to the Public Information Act, requested the records of all applications submitted for a license under these regulations. DHMH responded by providing copies of the applications but with certain information redacted. DMHM filed a petition seeking judicial confirmation for its continued denial of the information. The circuit court granted the petition, indicating that DHMH’s decision to redact was made on the basis of public safety concerns for those individuals who proposed to operate the facilities. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that redaction and denial of the relevant information in this case was necessary to protect the public interest from a substantial injury. View "Glenn v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene" on Justia Law