Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated appeals, plaintiff challenged the regulations implementing the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a), arguing that the regulations’ accommodation for nonprofit organizations with a religious objection to providing contraceptive coverage violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, et seq. The court concluded that the regulations do not substantially burden plaintiffs' religious exercise and, alternatively, because (1) the government has compelling interests to justify the accommodation, and (2) the accommodation is the least restrictive means of furthering those interests. The court rejected EWTN’s challenges under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses because the accommodation is a neutral, generally applicable law that does not discriminate based on religious denomination. The court also rejected EWTN’s challenge under the Free Speech Clause because any speech restrictions that may flow from the accommodation are justified by a compelling governmental interest and are thus constitutional. View "Eternal Word Television Network v. Secretary" on Justia Law

Haines operates a tour bus company. In 2000, he modified the luggage compartment in a bus to become a sleeper area, designed to comply with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulations. In May, 2011, FMCSA informed Haines that he could use the luggage compartment as a sleeper area without additional approval if he complied with 49 C.F.R. 393.76. On May 29, 2011, Haines permitted family members to ride in the sleeper area while the bus was in motion. An unidentified individual notified authorities. On June 10, FMCSA placed all of Haines’ busses, including three without sleeper areas, out of service, and identified Haines Tours as an “imminent hazard” to public safety based on its finding that the “unauthorized transportation of passengers in the cargo area . . . substantially increase[d] the likelihood of serious injury or death.” The suspension lasted five days. Haines sued, alleging that the handling of the temporary suspension violated his due process and equal protection rights and gave rise to a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal without leave to amend; “Bivens” claims were time-barred by Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations and a Bivens remedy was not available because Haines had an adequate, alternative remedy. View "Haines v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin." on Justia Law

Lionel Simeus filed a complaint against RGR Company LLC with the Lincoln Commission on Human Rights for housing discrimination in violation of section 11.06.020(b) of the Lincoln Municipal Code and 42 U.S.C. 3604(b) of the federal Fair Housing Act. The Commission determined that RGR discriminated against Simeus on the basis of race and national origin and, on behalf of Simeus, filed a charge of discrimination against RGR. After a hearing, the Commission found in favor of Simeus. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that RGR’s proffered reasons for its negative treatment of Simeus were a pretext for discrimination or that Simeus was the victim of intentional discrimination. View "RGR Co., LLC v. Lincoln Comm’n on Human Rights" on Justia Law

In 2011, Samuel Pauly was shot to death through the window of his New Mexico home by one of three state police officers investigating an earlier road rage incident on Interstate 25 involving his brother. His father, on behalf of Samuel Pauly’s estate, filed a civil rights action against the three officers, the State of New Mexico Department of Public Safety, and two state officials, claiming defendants violated his son’s Fourth Amendment right against the use of excessive force. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motions, and they appealed. Taking the facts as the district court determined them, in the light most favorable to plaintiff estate, the issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was: whether an officer outside someone’s home in the dark of night with no probable cause to arrest anyone and behind the cover of a wall 50 feet away from a possible threat, with no warning shot a man pointing his gun out of his well-lighted window at an unknown person in his yard while the man’s brother fired protective shots in the air from behind the house, a reasonable jury could find that one of the officers was not in immediate fear for his safety or the safety of others. The Court concluded that any objectively reasonable officer in this position "would well know" that a homeowner has the right to protect his home against intruders and that the officer had no right to immediately use deadly force in these circumstances. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to the officer. View "Pauly v. White" on Justia Law

The 1983 Shakman Accord resulted from resolution of political patronage litigation; to eliminate political considerations in employment decisions the city agreed to create and implement a hiring plan to effectuate the goal of eradicating political patronage. Shakman “adds speech and political affiliation to the list” of impermissible bases of employment discrimination delineated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Eight applicants for the position of police officer with the Chicago Police Department, disqualified from consideration, sued the city, claiming violations of the city’s 2011 Hiring Plan, violation of the Shakman Accord, and equal protection violations under the Illinois Constitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals of the Shakman claims, which were filed beyond the 180-day time limit and were, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations.. View "Bonnstetter v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leslie Taylor asked the Colorado Medicaid program to combine the benefits she received through two assistance programs to help her get to medical appointments. If approved, this combination would allow the agency to pay attendants for time driving Taylor to and from her appointments. The agency refused, and the plaintiffs in this case alleged that the refusal constituted discrimination against Taylor based on her disability. The Tenth Circuit concluded that this refusal did not constitute discriminate against Taylor based on her disability. View "Taylor v. Colorado Dept of Health Care" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified a question of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The issue centered on whether the City of Englewood's Ordinance 34 (effectively barring sex offenders from residing within the city) was preempted by Colorado law. The federal district court in this case concluded that such a conflict did exist because Colorado had generally opted for a policy of individualized treatment of sex offenders, and the ordinance acted as a bar to residency. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with the federal district court and found no conflict. With no conflict between state law and the ordinance, the Colorado Court concluded Ordinance 34 was not preempted. The case was returned to the Tenth Circuit for further proceedings. View "Ryals v. City of Englewood" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought an enforcement action under Section 707(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e‐6, claiming that CVS Pharmacy violates Title VII by offering a severance agreement, with waivers of claims against CVS, that could deter terminated employees from filing charges with the EEOC or participating in EEOC proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment for CVS, interpreting Title VII as requiring the EEOC to conciliate its claim before bringing a civil suit. The EEOC had refused to engage in conciliation. The court was also skeptical that an employer’s decision to offer a severance agreement to terminated employees could serve as the basis for a “pattern or practice” suit under Title VII, without any allegation that the employer engaged in retaliatory or discriminatory employment practices. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Section 707(e), the EEOC is required to comply with all of the pre‐suit procedures contained in Section 706 when it pursues “pattern or practice” violations. Because the EEOC has not alleged that CVS engaged in discrimination or retaliation by offering the Agreement to terminated employees, the EEOC failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ohio Republican Party (ORP) sent a public-records request to Cuyahoga County seeking the County’s key card swipe data for five individuals, including Edward FitzGerald, the County’s former county executive. At the time of the ORP’s request, the key-card-swipe data were security records exempted from release because FitzGerald had received threats and release of that data would have diminished the County’s ability to protect him and maintain the security of the office of the county executive. Subsequent to receipt of the public-records request, the County moved its administrative offices to a new building, FitzGerald’s term of office expired, and the County released the records to members of the media. The ORP filed this mandamus action alleging that the County had failed to respond to its public-record requests. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus and ordered the release of the records, holding that FitzGerald’s key-card-swipe data were public records, and the County failed to demonstrate that they were exempt from disclosure. View "State ex rel. Ohio Republican Party v. FitzGerald" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a public-records mandamus case in the court of appeals to obtain records she had requested from the City of South Euclid. During the litigation, the City and its employee (collectively, Appellees) produced all of the requested records. The court of appeals granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denied Appellant’s request for statutory damages and attorney fees. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellant was entitled to damages and remanded with instructions to determine damages. On remand, the court of appeals awarded damages. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for sanctions against Appellees and their counsel. The court of appeals denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in determining that the motion for sanctions was untimely and that the actions of Appellees and their counsel in defending the case were not taken in bad faith or with the purpose of delay. View "State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid" on Justia Law