Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Relator requested public records from the City of South Euclid and its employee (together, South Euclid) for, inter alia, financial records associated with several city-owned properties. South Euclid sent some, but not all, of the requested records. Relator later filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus and statutory damages under the public-records act, alleging that South Euclid only partially responded to her requests and did not produce the records that she did receive within a reasonable period of time. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering that responsive records be produced if they exist and have not yet been produced and awarded costs and statutory damages in the amount of $600 to Relator, holding that South Euclid took an unreasonable amount of time producing some records responsive to Relator’s request. View "State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid" on Justia Law

Michael Aronow, an orthopedic surgeon at the University of Connecticut Health Center, filed a grievance with the Health Center Appeals Committee against Jay Lieberman, the chairman of the orthopedic surgery department at the Center, accusing Lieberman of attempted intimidation and harassment. Aronow requested copies of the Committee’s report of its findings regarding Aronow’s grievance as well as the report written by the president emeritus of the University, but the Center denied Aronow’s request, concluding that the reports were exempt from disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 10a-154a. The Freedom of Information Commission, however, concluded that the reports were not exempt from disclosure under the statute and ordered the center to provide Aronow with a copy of the reports free of charge. The trial court dismissed Lieberman’s appeal, concluding that the Commission properly determined that the reports did not constitute a “record of the performance and evaluation” of a faculty member under section 10a-154a and were therefore not exempt from disclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the reports in this case did not constitute a “record of the performance and evaluation” of a state university faculty or professional staff member within the exemption created by section 10a-154a. View "Lieberman v. Aronow" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an occasional employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), filed an administrative claim of discrimination on the basis of her race, age, and sex. While the suit began as an administrative proceeding within the DHS, it molted into a judicial proceeding. Both the lawsuit and the administrative proceeding were based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The federal district court granted DHS’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by failing to amend her original administrative complaint to add her retaliation claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s suit because it was the fault of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that the retaliation claim did not become part of the original case. Remanded. View "Moreland v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Keepers appealed, and the City cross-appealed, from partial summary judgment awards. At issue are two questions related to Chapter 2.3 of Milford’s municipal code, which regulates “adult‐oriented establishments.” First, whether the district court improperly considered the affidavit of the police chief in granting partial summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that the district court did not “abuse its discretion” in considering the affidavit and therefore affirmed as to this issue. Second, whether the City’s requirement that sexually oriented businesses publicly post the names of their operators, officers, and significant owners violates the First Amendment. The court concluded that the district court should not have reached the merits of that issue, nor does this Court do so, because Keepers’ First Amendment challenge does not present a justiciable case or controversy under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Even if Keepers originally had standing to challenge the public‐posting requirement based on its asserted right against compelled speech, the case has become moot on appeal. Therefore, the court vacated as to this issue and remanded with directions. View "Keepers Inc. v. City of Milford" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases arose from a sting operation designed to determine if police officers in the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department’s (KCKPD) “SCORE” Unit were stealing from residences while executing search warrants. As a result of the sting operation, three officers were indicted and pled guilty to federal crimes. The remaining officers brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting violations of their Fourth Amendment rights for arrests without probable cause. The individual Defendants-Appellants appealed the district court’s denial of their motions for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. The entity Defendant-Appellant (Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City) also appealed, arguing that should the Tenth Circuit determine a constitutional violation did not occur, it should reverse and render judgment in its favor. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the basis that the law was not clearly established at the time of the arrests in question. The Court dismissed the Unified Government’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Callahan v. Unified Govt of Wyandotte" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of allegations that AKC, a child with autism, suffered abuse at school by her special-education teacher, Vickie Cantrell. AKC’s parents, Ted and Bella Carroll, filed suit in federal district court against Cantrell, the school district, and others, seeking damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and a variety of state-law theories. The district court dismissed the Carrolls’ federal claims, concluding the Carrolls had not exhausted their administrative remedies before filing suit as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the IDEA). The district court then dismissed the Carrolls’ complaint, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims. The Carrolls appealed. The single issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court erred in determining the Carrolls’ federal claims were subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. Because the Court concluded the Carrolls’ complaint alleged educational injuries that could have been redressed to some degree by the IDEA’s administrative remedies, it agreed with the district court that exhaustion of those remedies was required before the Carrolls could file suit. View "Carroll v. Lawton Independent School" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against Robinwood West Community Improvement District, alleging that Robinwood violated the Sunshine Law by not disclosing various public records, including those relating to Robinwood’s settlement of a personal injury lawsuit. Appellant also requested attorney fees and a civil penalty, asserting that Robinwood knowingly and purposely violated the Sunshine Law. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Appellant and ordered Robinwood to disclose the documents regarding the settlement agreement and the sums of money expended on the lawsuit. The court, however, denied Appellant’s request for attorney fees and a civil penalty. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Robinwood could not have knowingly or purposely violated the Sunshine Law. Remanded. View "Strake v. Robinwood W. Cmty. Improvement Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging violation of his due process rights and that defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously by terminating his employment. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff does not have a private right of action under the Due Process Clause of the sort recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Therefore, the court concluded that this claim was properly dismissed. However, the court found that the district court erred in determining that it lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Atterbury v. U.S. Marshals Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a former school property from the Town of Dexter for future redevelopment, and the Town initially supported Plaintiff’s redevelopment efforts. After Plaintiff contested the Town’s tax assessment of the property, the Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) issued a stop work order and notice of violation prohibiting all work on the property. Plaintiff filed this civil rights action against Defendant, the Town of Dexter, alleging that the Town’s actions, through its CEO, were arbitrary and capricious and deprived him of equal protection of law and the use and enjoyment of property, in violation of both the federal and state constitutions. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and damages. The superior court granted the Town’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on the grounds that Plaintiff (1) failed to allege that the CEO’s actions were taken pursuant to a municipal policy, (2) failed to pursue available administrative relief, and (3) failed to allege that he faced discriminatory treatment as compared with others who were similarly situated. View "Marshall v. Town of Dexter" on Justia Law

This case involved Barbara Johnson's claim against the City of Mobile in which she alleged retaliation based on several complaints and lawsuits she filed against the City under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA"). Johnson, an African-American woman over 40 years of age, began working for the City in 1996. Johnson previously filed several complaints and lawsuits against the City pertaining to her employment with the City. In 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2012, Johnson filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC") complaints against the City alleging various forms of discrimination. Johnson also unsuccessfully sued the City in 2007, 2008, and 2010. Johnson filed the underlying action in 2013, alleging that, in violation of Title VII and the ADA, the City retaliated against Johnson because she had filed discrimination charges against the City with the EEOC. Johnson's deposition testimony indicated that in 2008 or 2009 Johnson had surgery to correct a problem with her toe. As a result of her surgery, Johnson was "taken off of work" for what "could have been a month." Johnson's time off work to recover from her injury was preapproved by the City, and she was paid for her time off. Once Johnson returned to work, she had to wear a boot to protect her toe, and her doctor "wanted [her] on light duty." Johnson's supervisor, Terrell Washington, informed Johnson that there was no light duty available at that time so Johnson remained at home on paid leave. Once Johnson returned to work, Johnson was ordered by her physician to wear a certain kind of shoe that did not comply with the City's dress code: the City required Johnson to wear black shoes, but her physician-prescribed shoes were white. Johnson subsequently received an unsatisfactory-annual performance rating from Washington for the period ending June 8, 2010. Thereafter, Johnson used the MCPB's appellate process for review of her unsatisfactory-performance rating. Ultimately, the MCPB affirmed Johnson's rating. Johnson received a "Letter of Determination" concerning the complaint she filed against the City from the EEOC. The Department of Justice did not elect to sue on Johnson's behalf, but advised that she was free to file suit on her own. The underlying matter in this appeal is the suit Johnson filed with regard to her EEOC complaint. The matter ended with judgment entered in favor of the City. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the merits and its denial of Johnson's post-judgment motions. The Court also affirmed the trial court's decision to award the City attorney fees. However, the Court reversed the judgment insofar as it set the amount of the fees, and remanded the case for recalculation of fees with reasons supporting the recalculation. View "Johnson v. City of Mobile" on Justia Law