Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a Maine dairy farmer, had a business dispute with Defendant, his neighbor, and the former Commissioner of the Maine Department of Agriculture (DOA). Soon after taking office, the Commissioner recused himself from regulatory matters involving Plaintiff. The DOA eventually took four adverse regulatory actions against Plaintiff, including the action of ceasing to protect Plaintiff from the regulatory authority of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The DEP then issued several notices of violation of Plaintiff’s license conditions. As a result, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began administrative and judicial proceedings against Plaintiff that resulted in Plaintiff losing his farm. Plaintiff brought this suit for damages against Defendant, claiming that Defendant had violated his First Amendment rights through the adverse actions taken by the DOA. The district court awarded summary judgment against Plaintiff. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was correctly granted with respect tot he three adverse regulatory actions that the DOA was alleged to have taken after the Commissioner’s purported recusal; but (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the Commissioner’s retaliatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in the one alleged adverse action that occurred prior to the recusal. Remanded. View "McCue v. Bradstreet" on Justia Law

Wharf Resources, Inc., a mining company, terminated Lisa Davis for “disruptive behavior in the workplace.” Several months later, Davis filed a gender discrimination claim and a retaliatory discharge claim with the South Dakota Department of Labor, Division of Human Rights (Department). The Department concluded that there was no probable cause for Davis’s claims. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) affirming the Department’s finding of no probable cause; (2) determining that Davis was terminated for permissible factors; and (3) affirming the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the Department. View "Davis v. Wharf Res. (USA), Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal prison inmate, filed suit alleging that the BOP failed to adequately respond to his requests for records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and that several policies adopted by the BOP violate the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the BOP on the FOIA claims and dismissed the constitutional claims. The court concluded that because it cannot determine whether the BOP conducted an adequate search based upon the declarations in the record, the judgment of the district court on the Code 408 FOIA claim is vacated and the court remanded for further proceedings. The court held that sovereign immunity does not bar plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the BOP and the individual defendants in their official capacities; plaintiff exhausted all the administrative remedies “available” to him with respect to his claim that defendants unlawfully retained interest earned on money held in inmates’ deposit accounts; the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim that the prices charged for commissary items and telephone calls are “too high;” the court vacated the district court’s order insofar as it dismisses plaintiff’s claim that Code 334 is unconstitutional and remanded for further proceedings; and the court affirmed as to the remaining claims. View "DeBrew v. Atwood" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of a felony requiring his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed an order that Petitioner be removed. Petitioner petitioned for review, arguing that because Padilla v. Kentucky described deportation as a “penalty,” his removal violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment or related constitutional protections unless a court conducted an individual assessment to determine whether his order of removal was a proportional punishment relative to his underlying criminal conviction. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Padilla has not signaled a break from long-settled law that removal operates simply as “a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want,” not as a punishment within the meaning of the Constitution intended to acutely sanction a noncitizen for his underlying criminal conviction. View "Hinds v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were five women who were formerly incarcerated at the Hillside Community Corrections Center in Oklahoma City. They filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against multiple defendants, alleging they were sexually abused and harassed in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiffs’ complaint named fifteen defendants, including Defendant-Appellant Charlotte Day and Defendant-Appellant Mary Pavliska, both of whom were guards at Hillside during the relevant period. Plaintiffs alleged Day and Pavliska were aware of the abuse and did nothing to prevent it. The claims against several defendants were dismissed without prejudice. The remaining defendants (except the alleged perpetrator Anthony Bobelu) moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to all movants except Day and Pavliska. The district ruled a jury could conclude from the evidence presented that Day and Pavliska were deliberately indifferent to a known substantial risk of serious harm to the Plaintiffs. In an interlocutory appeal, Day and Pavliska argued to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that the district court erred by ruling they were not entitled to qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Day’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Pavliska. View "Castillo v. Day" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, eight male, "out-of-status" aliens who were arrested on immigration charges and detained following the September 11th attacks, filed a putative class action asserting various claims arising out of the discriminatory and punitive treatment they suffered while confined at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) or the Passaic County Jail (Passaic). The district court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that: (1) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a substantive due process claim against the DOJ defendants, against Hasty with regard to both official and unofficial conditions, and against Sherman with regard to official conditions only, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (2) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an equal protection claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (3) the free exercise claim is dismissed as to all defendants; (4) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged their Fourth Amendment strip search claim against Hasty and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (5) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; and (6) the MDC plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any claims against Zenk.  The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims brought by the Passaic plaintiffs. View "Turkmen v. Hasty, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s position of employment with the Emergency Services Division of the State of Montana Department of Military Affairs was eliminated during implementation of the Division’s reduction-in-force policy. After her position was eliminated, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Department of Labor and Industry Hearings Bureau alleging that the Division terminated her in retaliation for her complaint that sexual favoritism had occurred within the Division. The Bureau dismissed the complaint, and Plaintiff chose not to appeal. Instead, Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau of the Department of Labor and Industry, restating her claims. The Department dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff later filed the present complaint in the district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were time-barred under the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by holding that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to the procedures set forth in the MHRA, and as a result were time-barred. View "Lay v. Dep’t of Military Affairs" on Justia Law

Albuquerque police sergeant Adam Casaus had ended his shift when he drove home in his squad car, lights flashing and going at a high rate of speed. He ran a red light, hitting Ashley Browder's car. Browder died, and her sister Lindsay suffered serious injuries. Casaus was ultimately charged with reckless vehicular homicide in state court. Lindsay and her parents filed a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages. Casaus moved to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied relief, and Casaus appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "Browder v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Sheriff's Department and others, alleging that he was severely beaten by deputy sheriffs while being detained in a holding cell. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court vacated the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings because failure to exhaust under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), is an affirmative defense, and because the evidence adduced by defendants - principally in the form of a conclusory affidavit - does not suffice to establish the defense as a matter of law. The court need not consider plaintiff's remaining arguments. View "Hubbs v. Suffolk Cnty. Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

Appellant was the owner of gas, oil, and other minerals situated within the Ozark Highlands Unit (OHU). SEECO, Inc. applied to create a drilling unit in the OHU and to integrate all unleased and uncommitted mineral interests within the unit. The Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission established the unit and integrated all unleased and uncommitted mineral interests within the unit with the exception of Appellant’s unleaded mineral interests. At a hearing before the Commission to hear evidence related to SEECO’s request to integrate Appellant’s unleaded mineral interests into the drilling unit, Appellant asserted that the Commission’s forced-integration procedures amounted to a taking of his property. The Commission subsequently integrated Appellant’s unleaded mineral interests into the drilling unit. The circuit court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the forced integration procedures do not amount to an unconstitutional taking; and (2) the Commission’s order did not deprive Appellant of his constitutional right to a jury trial to determine just compensation for his property. View "Gawenis v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm'n" on Justia Law