Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging a state law redrawing the Wake County Board of Education electoral districts, arguing that under the new redistricting plan, some citizen’s votes will get significantly more weight than other’s in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of one person, one vote and the North Carolina Constitution’s promise of equal protection. The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend as futile. The court concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations in support of their claim that the law violates the one person, one vote principle suffice to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Thus, plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief could be granted against the Wake County Board of Elections and the district court therefore erred in dismissing their suit. The court affirmed, however, the denial of the motion to amend because the state officials plaintiffs proposed to add as named defendants are not amenable to suit. View "Wright v. North Carolina" on Justia Law

Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and refused to submit to a secondary breath test. Respondent’s driver’s license was subsequently revoked by the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles for both DUI and the refusal to submit to the designated chemical test. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) rescinded the driver’s license revocation on the grounds that (1) Respondent was misled to believe that he had a choice as to whether he wanted to take a breath test or a blood test, and therefore, revocation for refusing the secondary chemical test was inappropriate; and (2) Respondent was effectively denied his right to obtain an independent blood test. The circuit court upheld the OAH’s order. The Supreme Court found that Respondent’s license revocations for refusal to submit to the secondary breath test were proper but his license revocations for DUI were erroneous, holding (1) the lower tribunals erroneously concluded that Respondent had a rational basis for perceiving that he had a choice between the breath test and the blood test, and therefore, revocation for refusing the secondary chemical test was appropriate; and (2) Respondent was denied his statutory and due process rights to have his blood tested independently. View "Reed v. Hall" on Justia Law

The State Commission for Human Rights brought an action on behalf of an employee who alleged that her employer’s racist and insensitive remarks created a hostile work environment. The Commission ultimately found that the employee did not suffer a hostile work environment, but it denied the employer’s request for attorney’s fees. The employer appealed on the issue the fees, arguing that it was entitled to fees as the prevailing party and because it raised affirmative defenses under the Alaska and United States Constitutions. After review of the specific facts entered on the Commission's record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Commission’s denial of fees. View "Ace Delivery & Moving, Inc. v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights" on Justia Law

Kimberli Hirst, an employee of American Forensic Nurses, Inc. (AFN), brought a Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claim against the City of Oceanside (City), alleging she was sexually harassed by an Oceanside police officer, Gilbert Garcia, while she was providing phlebotomist services on behalf of the Oceanside Police Department. The jury found Hirst proved her claim and awarded her $1.5 million in damages against the City. After reducing the amount for which Garcia was found responsible, the court entered judgment in Hirst's favor for $1.125 million. The City moved for a new trial and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). In the new trial motion, the City contended the damages award was unsupported by the evidence. In the JNOV motion, the City argued Hirst was not entitled to recover under the FEHA because she was not a City employee, special employee, or a "person providing services pursuant to a contract" under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j)(1). The court denied the motion, but granted the new trial motion finding the damage award was excessive. The court ordered a new trial on both liability and damages because "the issues are so interrelated that damages cannot be separated from the facts underlying liability." Hirst did not appeal the new trial order, but the City appealed the denial of its JNOV motion, contending Hirst did not have standing to recover damages on her FEHA claim against the City. The Court of Appeal determined the evidence supported that Hirst was a "person providing services pursuant to a contract" and therefore she was entitled to recover against the City for its employee's sexual harassment. Based on that conclusion, the Court did not reach the additional asserted ground for standing (whether Hirst was a "special employee" of the City). The trial court's denial of the City's JNOV motion was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings under the new trial order. View "Hirst v. City of Oceanside" on Justia Law

Melanie M., who lived in North Platte, Nebraska, received benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as the Food Stamp Program. In 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services (Department) informed Melanie that it was going to change her benefits. Melanie requested an administrative hearing regarding the proposed changes. The Department informed Melanie that it would hold the hearing in Lincoln, Nebraska and that Melanie could participate in person or telephonically. Before the administrative hearing occurred, Melanie filed a complaint alleging that the Department’s regulations and procedural due process required that the Department grant her a face-to-face hearing at the Department’s North Platte office. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the summary judgment as to Melanie’s due process claim, holding that the due process clause did not require a face-to-face hearing at the North Platte office; but (2) reversed on Melanie’s prayer for relief under the Department’s regulations, holding that the regulations required that the Department hold the face-to-face hearing at the local office. View "Melanie M. v. Winterer" on Justia Law

Respondent T.S.S. appealed a Superior Court decision granting the commissioner of the Department of Mental Health's application for a continued order of non-hospitalization (ONH) compelling T.S.S. to continue undergoing mental-health treatment. T.S.S. argued that the superior court erred in interpreting 18 V.S.A. 7101(16) and applying it to the evidence. T.S.S. suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. T.S.S. "has demonstrated a clear pattern that for a short period of time, despite denying that he has a mental illness, he, on orders of non-hospitalization, will take medications and improve significantly. But when he is off the order of non-hospitalization, he quickly goes off medications and deteriorates." Over the fifteen-year history testified to at the hearing, there was no evidence that T.S.S. exhibited assaultive behavior or posed a danger to others. There was evidence, however, that at times T.S.S. posed a danger to himself. In June 2013, the commissioner filed an application for continued treatment. T.S.S. did not contest the application and stipulated to entry of the order. On May 27, 2014, the superior court granted the commissioner's application. T.S.S. appealed. Upon review of the Superior Court's interpretation of 7101(6), the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court applied the wrong legal standard to the evidence, and that the evidence and findings did not support a continued ONH in this case. View "In re T.S.S." on Justia Law

The Festus City Council terminated Draper from his position as City Administrator six months into a three-year employment contract, after the election of a council member who was critical of Draper’s performance. The city had refused to reschedule or continue the hearing regarding Draper’s job performance. Neither Draper nor his attorney was present. Several witnesses testified. The council concluded that Draper had manipulated the evaluation process to choose an engineering firm to complete a road project; that Draper had authorized heating system repairs and the purchase of new windows without competitive bidding, in violation of Festus policy; that Draper had sent a memorandum stating that the sick-leave-bonus program had been abolished when it had not been; and that Draper had requested reimbursement for a hotel room he had paid for with his Festus credit card. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting claims of violations of procedural and substantive-due-process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a section 1983 conspiracy claim, breach of contract, and violation of the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 536.010-536.160. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The evidence supported the city’s decision to terminate Draper, so and that its decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. View "Draper v. City of Festus" on Justia Law

In Texas, individuals under the age of 25 cannot obtain driver’s licenses unless they submit a driver education certificate to the Department of Public Safety (DPS). Driver education certificates, in turn, are only available from private driver education schools licensed by the TEA. The named plaintiffs were all deaf individuals who contacted a variety of TEA-licensed private driver education schools, all of which informed the named plaintiffs that the schools would not accommodate them. Because they cannot obtain driver education certificates, the named plaintiffs cannot obtain driver’s licenses. Plaintiffs requested injunctive and declaratory relief requiring the TEA to bring driver education into compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. The district court denied the TEA's motion to dismiss but certified its order for immediate appeal.On appeal, plaintiffs essentially argued that the TEA’s pervasive regulation and supervision of driver education schools transforms these schools into agents of the state. The Fifth Circuit held, however, that the mere fact that the driver education schools are heavily regulated and supervised by the TEA does not make these schools a "service, program, or activity" of the TEA. "Admittedly, this case is further complicated by the fact that the benefit provided by driver education schools - a driver education certificate - is necessary for obtaining an important governmental benefit - a driver’s license. Given the broad remedial purposes of the ADA, it would be extremely troubling if deaf young adults were effectively deprived of driver’s licenses simply because they could not obtain the private education that the State of Texas has mandated as a prerequisite for this important government benefit. [. . .] the DPS may well be required to give exemptions to certain deaf individuals who cannot obtain driver education certificates, given that using these certificates as an eligibility criteria allegedly 'screen[s] out or tend[s] to screen out' deaf people and may not be 'necessary for the provision of the' driver’s license program. But the named plaintiffs have not sued the DPS, so we need not decide this issue." View "Ivy v. Williams" on Justia Law

Paul Stavenjord, a Buddhist inmate, asked to receive a Kosher diet and to be permitted to purchase a prayer shawl. Prison officials at the Alaska Department of Corrections denied his requests. Stavenjord filed a complaint alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and various constitutional provisions. The superior court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Stavenjord had failed to demonstrate: (1) that a Kosher diet and prayer shawl were necessary for the practice of his religion; (2) that he was sincere in his requests for religious accommodation; and (3) that the Department's lack of accommodations substantially burdened the practice of his religion. Under Alaska's summary judgment standard, the initial burden falls on the moving party: the Department. Furthermore, religious necessity was not an element of RLUIPA. Because summary judgment was granted by placing the initial burden on the non-moving party and by focusing on Stavenjord's failure to make an evidentiary showing not required under RLUIPA, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stavenjord v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Attorney Daniel Faber filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of three assistant attorneys who alleged alleging gender discrimination in connection with their salaries. The Attorney General filed a motion to stay litigation pending resolution of his motion to dismiss the complaint based on an immunity defense. The federal district court entered a memorandum opinion and order granting the Attorney General’s motion to stay all proceedings, including discovery; the stay was lifted a few months later. Prior to lifting of the stay, Faber filed an Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) request in his own name seeking employment data for every attorney who had been employed by the Attorney General’s Office since January 1987. The records custodian of the Attorney General’s Office denied the IPRA request, stating that “[t]his request is being denied as these records involve a current lawsuit and appear to circumvent the discovery process and the current Order Staying Discovery (attached).” Faber filed a complaint for damages and a petition for writ of mandamus in the state district court against the Attorney General alleging that his IPRA request had been wrongfully denied. The state district court found that the stay of discovery entered by the federal court did not preempt the statutory rights granted to New Mexico citizens by IPRA, and that the Attorney General violated IPRA by denying Faber’s request. The court also issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Attorney General to comply and ruled that damages would be considered at a later date. Faber subsequently moved for an award of damages. The state district court awarded damages of $10 per day from the date of the wrongful denial to the date the stay was lifted and thereafter “damages of $100 per day until the records are provided,” and $257.19 in costs to Faber. The Attorney General appealed the state district court’s award of damages. The determination of the IPRA violation was not at issue on appeal. The issue in this case focused on what type of damages were authorized by the Legislature in Section 14-2-13 12(D). The Supreme Court held that Section 14-2-12(D) permitted compensatory or actual damages because the plain language, purpose, and history of IPRA indicated that neither punitive nor statutory damages were intended by the Legislature. The Court also held that Faber was not eligible for nominal damages. View "Farber v. King" on Justia Law