Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Pyles fell down a wet staircase and injured his back while incarcerated at Menard. Since then he has experienced numbness and radiating pain. In 2012, Pyles twice saw Dr.Nwaobasi, an employee of the company that furnishes medical care at Menard. Nwaobasi refused to order additional testing or specialist care. Pyles wanted to photocopy his original grievance before filing it but copies could be made only by the library, which did not accept new photocopying orders until December 21, 2012. On that day, Pyles submitted his grievance for photocopying. He received his copies on January 3, 2013, after the 60-day filing window had passed. Pyles submitted the grievance that day. On January 13, Pyles filed a separate grievance against the library, which was lost in the prison administrative system. On March 1, Pyles saw Dr. Shearing, another Wexford employee, and again failed to obtain relief. Pyles filed a grievance against Shearing on March 27, which was denied on June 12, 2013. Pyles claimed that he never received notice of the denial. On July 30, Pyles filed a civil rights action. After a hearing under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e, the magistrate found that he had not shown good cause for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment. Pyles had good cause for failing to timely file his grievance against Nwaobasi. The defendants did not meet their burden of proving that Pyles failed to exhaust available administrative remedies for the Shearing grievance. View "Pyles v. Nwaobasi" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to his son. At the commencement of the termination hearing, Father told the court that he was unwell and that he wanted to reschedule the hearing. The court allowed Father to leave and told him the hearing would be rescheduled if Father filed a doctor’s note. Father never filed a doctor’s note and no rehearing was scheduled. The court subsequently terminated Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court did not violate Father’s right to due process when it conducted the termination hearing in Father’s absence. View "In re Adden B." on Justia Law

Brenda Puryear filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities on behalf of her minor daughter, Sarah, alleging that Echo Hose Ambulance and the city of Shelton had discriminated and retaliated against Sarah on the basis of her race and color in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Commission’s human rights referee struck the complaint on the ground that Sarah was not an employee under the “remuneration test” used to resolve similar federal causes of action. The trial court dismissed the Commission’s appeal, concluding that the referee properly applied the remuneration test. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Commission appealed, arguing that the Appellate Court erred in applying the federal remuneration test rather than Connecticut’s common-law “right to control” test to determine whether an unpaid volunteer is an “employee” under the CFEPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court did not err in concluding that the remuneration test is the appropriate test for determining whether a volunteer is an employee under CFEPA. View "Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit claiming that the OCC’s enforcement action against him was trumped-up and retaliatory. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of the case on the pleadings. At issue is whether the Constitution places any limit on the governmental policy-making discretion immunized by the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq. The court concluded, in line with the majority of its sister circuits to have considered the question, that the discretionary-function exception does not categorically bar FTCA tort claims where the challenged exercise of discretion allegedly exceeded the government’s constitutional authority to act. The court also concluded that plaintiff's Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics claims are not time-barred because the continuing-violations doctrine applies to extend the applicable statute of limitations where, as here, a plaintiff alleges continuing conduct causing cumulative harm. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Loumiet v. United States" on Justia Law

This case centered around Petitioner’s written request under Maryland Public Information Act (MPIA) for information regarding the value of unclaimed property accounts in the custody of the Comptroller of Maryland. The Comptroller decided that the requested information was prohibited under the MPIA. The circuit court ordered the Comptroller to disclose the requested records in value order. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that Petitioner was entitled to a list of claims but not sorted by value. On remand, the circuit court ordered the Comptroller to submit a modified MPIA request limited to certain accounts without sorting any by value. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the MPIA prohibited disclosure of the comparative value of accounts in the Comptroller’s custody. View "Immanuel v. Comptroller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Planned Parenthood Association of Utah (PPAU) filed this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action claiming that defendant Gary Herbert, the Governor of Utah, violated PPAU’s constitutional rights by directing defendant Joseph Miner, the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Health (UDOH), to stop UDOH from acting as an intermediary for “pass-through” federal funds that PPAU used to carry out certain programs within the State of Utah. PPAU also filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction. Although the district court initially issued a TRO, it ultimately withdrew it and denied PPAU’s request for a preliminary injunction. PPAU filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of its motion for preliminary injunction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay in favor of PPAU to prevent the cessation of funding during the pendency of this appeal, and expedited the briefing and oral argument schedule. After that briefing and oral argument, the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant PPAU’s motion for preliminary injunction. View "Planned Parenthood v. Herbert" on Justia Law

A clinical review panel authorized the forced medication of Petitioner, a resident of a facility operated by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. An administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed. Petitioner sought judicial review, arguing that, on its face, Md. Code Ann. Health-Gen. (HG) 10-708(g) violates the Maryland Declaration of Rights by permitting forced medication without a showing that an individual is dangerous to himself or others. The circuit court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) HG 10-708(g) is not unconstitutional on its face; but (2) the authorization for involuntary medication may only be constitutionally carried out when an overriding justification exists. View "Allmond v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene" on Justia Law

Mohamed Tawid Al-Saffy, an Egyptian-American Muslim employed by the Foreign Agricultural Service, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging that the Agriculture and State Departments each discriminated against him based on religion and national origin, and retaliated against him for filing an EEO complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to the government. The court concluded that, because Title VII requires final agency action to notify the employee of his right to appeal and the governing time limitation, the order dismissing the 2012 Complaint did not trigger the ninety-day deadline for Al-Saffy to file suit. Instead, given the lack of timely final action by the agency, Al-Saffy could have and did file a civil action more than 180 days after the filing of the 2012 Complaint with the agency. Therefore, Al-Saffy’s October 10, 2013 filing in district court thus preserved his claims from the 2012 Complaint. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the government on Al-Saffy's claims against the State Department because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Al-Saffy had an employment relationship with the State Department within the meaning of Title VII, and whether Al-Saffy knew about the State Department’s alleged role in discrimination against him prior to 2013. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Al-Saffy v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against FRBR, alleging claims for interference and retaliation in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., and failure to accommodate and discriminatory discharge in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the FMLA retaliation claim and the ADA claims. The court concluded, however, that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether FRBR interfered with plaintiff’s FMLA rights by providing him defective notice that omitted his right to reinstatement at the conclusion of the medical leave term. Accordingly, the court held that the district court's grant of summary judgment as to that claim was not warranted. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vannoy v. Federal Reserve Bank" on Justia Law

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. (Plaintiff) submitted a freedom of information request to the University of Connecticut Health Center (Defendant) for correspondence between Defendant and the National Institutes of Health regarding potential noncompliance with federal animal welfare guidelines. Defendant provided sixty-one pages of redacted records. The redactions were names of individuals who had violated federal protocols and federal grant identification numbers that could be used to identify those individuals. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant with the Freedom of Information Commission (Commission). While the complaint was pending, the Commissioner of the Department of Administrative Services (Department) determined that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure of the redacted material could result in a safety risk. The Commission upheld the determination. The trial court sustained Plaintiff’s appeal, concluding that the Commission applied the wrong standard of review when it sustained Plaintiff’s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission applied the proper standard of review and properly upheld the Department’s determination. View "People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law