Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, South Carolina public employees, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the South Carolina State Retirement System Preservation and Investment Reform Act, 2005 S.C. Acts 1697. The Act amended South Carolina's retirement laws by requiring public employees who retire and then return to work to make, beginning on July 1, 2005, the same contributions to state-created pension plans as pre-retirement employees but without receiving further pension benefits. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that their claims under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment are exempt from the protection of the Eleventh Amendment. The court agreed with the district court that the pension plans and the Trust are arms of the State and have sovereign immunity; the state officials sued in their official capacities for repayment of pension-plan contributions have sovereign immunity; and the state officials sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief have sovereign immunity because their duties bear no relation to the collection of the public employees' contributions to the pension plans, excluding application of Ex parte Young. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "Hutto v. SC Retirement System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State, challenging the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. 414.0652, which requires suspicionless drug testing of all applicants seeking Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The court granted a preliminary injunction barring the application of the statute against plaintiff and the State stopped the drug-testing program. Then the district court granted final summary judgment to plaintiff, declaring the statute unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing a substantial special need to drug test all TANF applicants without any suspicion; even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the State has not demonstrated a more prevalent, unique, or different drug problem among TANF applicants than in the general population; the ordinary government interests claimed in this case are nothing like the narrow category of special needs that justify blanket drug testing of railroad workers, certain federal Customs employees involved in drug interdiction or who carry firearms, or involve surpassing safety interests; and the State cannot circumvent constitutional concerns by requiring that applicants consent to a drug test to receive TANF payments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "Lebron v. Secretary of the FL Dept. of Children and Families" on Justia Law

Whitaker, formerly employed by Milwaukee County, alleged that she was discriminated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 when the county failed to accommodate her disability by refusing to extend her period of medical leave, refusing to transfer her to another position, and then terminating her for reasons related to her disability. The district court granted the County summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s conclusion that the complaint impermissibly went beyond the scope of the EEOC charge and that the County was not her “employer” under the statute. Although Milwaukee County was Whitaker’s official employer and was responsible for her compensation, it had no involvement in the principal decisions that she claims violated the statute and no authority to override those decisions, made by the State Department of Health Services. With respect to whether the County is liable for any of its own actions,. Whitaker’s allegations on these matters were outside the scope of her EEOC charge, and, therefore, not subject to judicial consideration.View "Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cnty." on Justia Law

This case involves a challenge to Mississippi's disclosure requirements for ballot initiatives proposing amendments to the state constitution. Plaintiffs, Mississippi citizens, contend that the disclosure requirements impermissibly burden their First Amendment rights. The district court agreed and enjoined Mississippi from enforcing the requirements against small groups and individuals expending "just in excess of" Mississippi's $200 disclosure threshold. The court concluded that plaintiffs have standing where they have shown that they have a legitimate fear of criminal penalties for failure to comply with Chapter 17 of the Mississippi Code's disclosure requirements; plaintiffs' as-applied challenge, asserted both as a collective group and by each plaintiff individually, failed because the record is bereft of facts that would allow the court to assume that plaintiffs intend to raise "just in excess of" $200 as a group or as individuals; the requirements that Mississippi has enacted under Chapter 17 survive plaintiffs' facial challenge under the exacting scrutiny standard where the government has identified a sufficiently important government interest in its disclosure scheme to have an interest in knowing who is lobbying for Mississippians' vote, and is substantially related to this informational interest; and, therefore, the court reversed the district court's order and rendered judgment in favor of defendants were plaintiffs' as-applied and facial constitutional challenges failed.View "Justice, Jr., et al. v. Hosemann, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the owners of 26 properties in the city of Eureka, sued the city and several individuals, alleging harassment, intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, abuse of process, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, general negligence, municipal liability, public entity liability-failure to train, and supervisor liability, including three claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The city claims the properties have code violations; the plaintiffs claim that the city is attempting to gain control of their properties. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion (Code of Civil Procedure section 415.16), which the trial court granted as to the first seven causes of action, allowing plaintiffs to conduct discovery on the others. Following that discovery, defendants filed a renewed anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted, concluding that plaintiffs had not shown a probability of prevailing on any of their remaining claims. The court of appeals affirmed, noting that plaintiffs’ claims against defendants “involve actions allegedly taken by the defendants in the investigation and prosecution of plaintiffs regarding code enforcement violations occurring at real properties owned by plaintiffs.”.View "Squires v. City of Eureka" on Justia Law

At issue in these consolidated cases is whether a regulatory accommodation for religious nonprofit organizations that permit them to opt out of the contraceptive coverage requirement under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), itself imposes an unjustified substantial burden on plaintiffs' religious exercise in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb. The court concluded that the challenged regulations do not impose a substantial burden on plaintiffs' religious exercise under RFRA. All plaintiffs must do to opt out is express what they believe and seek what they want via a letter or two-page form. Religious nonprofits that opt out are excused from playing any role in the provision of contraceptive services, and they remain free to condemn contraception in the clearest terms. The ACA shifts to health insurers and administrators the obligation to pay for and provide contraceptive coverage for insured persons who would otherwise lose it as a result of the religious accommodation. Because the regulatory opt-out mechanism is the least restrictive means to serve compelling governmental interests, it is fully consistent with plaintiffs' rights under RFRA. The court also found no merit in plaintiffs' additional claims. The court rejected all of plaintiffs' challenges to the regulations and affirmed the district court's opinion in Priests for Life in its entirety. As for the RCAW decision, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for Thomas Aquinas and its holding as to the unconstitutionality of the non-interference provision and affirmed the remainder of the decision.View "Priests For Life v. HHS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff James Conrad appealed a Superior Court order granting the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on grounds that they were entitled to sovereign, official, and qualified immunity. Plaintiff sued both defendants, New Hampshire Department of Safety (NHDS) and New Hampshire State Trooper Lieutenant Mark Myrdek, for false imprisonment, and against Myrdek for a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2012), seeking damages for events that occurred on November 28, 2007. Plaintiff alleged defendants falsely imprisoned him and violated his civil rights when defendants tried to calm plaintiff down after he made disparaging remarks about his wife (who was leaving him), tried to resign his position with the Department, and threatened to commit suicide. The defendants cross-appealed, raising evidentiary issues. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's order.View "Conrad v. New Hampshire Department of Safety" on Justia Law

Anita Cooper, who was employed as principal of the Oark, Arkansas schools, was removed from her duties as principal. The Superintendent of the Jasper School District No. 1 of Newton County listed nine reasons as bases for the termination. The District’s Board of Directors then terminated Cooper’s employment. The circuit court reversed the Board’s decision, reinstated Cooper to her position, and awarded Cooper $64,998 in damages. The Superintendent and District appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that Defendants failed to comply with the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act; (2) the circuit court did not err in concluding that the contract in the case at bar created a property right in Cooper’s position as principal of the Oark schools; and (3) the circuit court’s award to Cooper was neither excessive nor amounted to an award of “double retirement.” View "Jasper Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Sandy Womack was convicted and sentenced to a term of confinement with the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). While Womack was housed at the Whiteville Correctional Facility in Hardman County, which was owned and operated by Corrections Corporation of America (CAA), a private entity, Womack filed suit against CAA in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, alleging that CAA had negligently failed to address his medical needs. CAA moved to dismiss the complaint or to transfer it to Hardeman County in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. 41-21-803, asserting that section 41-21-803 “effectively localized actions brought by prisoners.” The Davidson County court granted the motion and transferred the case to Hardeman County. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 41-21-803 did not apply to Womack’s lawsuit because his cause of action accrued while he was housed in the privately operated Whiteville Correctional Facility rather than in a facility operated by the TDOC within the meaning of the statute.View "Womack v. Corr. Corp. of Am." on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit in federal court seeking a declaration that Nevada’s Live Entertainment Tax (NLET) was facially unconstitutional for violating the First Amendment. The federal court dismissed the suit. Appellants then filed a de novo action (Case 1) in a Nevada district court seeking similar remedies to those sought in federal court and asserting an as-applied challenge to NLET. While Case 1 was pending, Appellants filed individual tax refund requests with the Nevada Department of Taxation on the grounds that NLET is facially unconstitutional. The Department denied refunds, and the Nevada Tax Commission affirmed. Appellants then filed a second de novo action (Case 2) challenging the administrative denials of their refund requests and asserting an as-applied challenge to NLET. The district court (1) dismissed Appellants’ as-applied challenge in Case 1; and (2) dismissed the entirety of Case 2 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Appellants failed to file a petition for judicial review after the completion of their administrative proceedings. This appeal challenging the district court’s dismissal of Case 2 followed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Nevada law required Appellants to file a petition for judicial review.View "Deja Vu Showgirls of Las Vegas, LLC v. Nev. Dep't of Taxation" on Justia Law