Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Class Action
Garcia v. Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities
The case involves a dispute over the interpretation of a statutory provision requiring the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities (HLC) to provide immediate temporary emergency shelter to families who appear to be eligible based on their statements and information already in the agency's possession. The plaintiffs, representing a class of individuals, argued that HLC's requirement for third-party verification of identity, familial relationship, and Massachusetts residency at the time of initial application for emergency assistance shelter was contrary to the statutory language.The Superior Court judge ruled that HLC could not require third-party verification of Massachusetts residency but could require verification of family status and identity, except for pregnant women. Both parties appealed this decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that the plain language of the statutory provision did not permit HLC to require third-party verification at the time of initial application. The court emphasized that the statute mandates immediate provision of shelter based on the family's statements and information in HLC's possession, without delay. The court found that the requirement for third-party verification at the initial application stage would contradict the statute's intent to provide immediate temporary shelter to those in need.The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Superior Court's judgment to the extent it allowed HLC to require third-party verifications before providing shelter under the immediate placement proviso. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "Garcia v. Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities" on Justia Law
FREUND v. MCDONOUGH
The case involves veterans' benefits appeals that were erroneously deactivated by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) due to a computer program error. The VA operates two adjudicatory systems for benefits claims, and the legacy system is relevant here. Under this system, a claimant must file a Notice of Disagreement and, if unresolved, a Substantive Appeal. The VA's electronic database, VACOLS, automatically closed appeals if no timely Substantive Appeal was noted, leading to approximately 3,000 erroneously closed appeals. This affected U.S. Army veterans J. Roni Freund and Marvin Mathewson, whose successors are the named petitioners in this class action.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed the petitions and denied class certification. The court found the case moot as to the individual petitioners after the VA reactivated their appeals. It also held that the petitioners failed to meet the commonality and adequacy requirements for class certification under Rule 23. The court did not address whether the case was moot as to the class or the superiority of class resolution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Veterans Court abused its discretion in its commonality and adequacy findings. The Federal Circuit held that the inherently transitory exception to mootness applied, as the VA's practice of reactivating appeals quickly made it likely that individual claims would become moot before class certification could be ruled upon. The court also rejected the Secretary's argument that the class was not ascertainable due to the difficulty in identifying class members.The Federal Circuit vacated the Veterans Court's order denying class certification and remanded the case for further consideration of class certification and appropriate relief. View "FREUND v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law
Jackson-Mau v. Walgreen Co.
A consumer of a glucosamine-based dietary supplement filed a putative class action lawsuit against the supplement’s manufacturer and retailer under New York law. The plaintiff alleged that the supplement was mislabeled because it contained a different formulation of glucosamine than what was displayed on the front of the label and disclosed as the main ingredient on the side. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the product contained blended glucosamine rather than single-crystal glucosamine, which she believed to be more effective for alleviating joint pain.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment for the defendants on federal preemption grounds. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s state law mislabeling claims were preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which establishes national standards for the labeling of dietary supplements. The district court found that the FDCA’s comprehensive regulatory scheme and its broad preemption clauses foreclosed the plaintiff’s state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff’s state law mislabeling claims were expressly preempted by the FDCA. The court reasoned that the FDCA preempts any state law that imposes labeling requirements not identical to those set forth in the FDCA and its regulations. The court found that the product’s labeling complied with the FDCA’s requirements, as the dietary ingredient “glucosamine sulfate potassium chloride” was identified using methods endorsed by the FDA. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims were preempted, and the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Jackson-Mau v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law
Malmquist v. City of Folsom
The case involves a class action lawsuit filed by plaintiff Harold Malmquist against the City of Folsom (City). The plaintiff alleged that the City failed to maintain proper corrosion control measures at its water treatment plant, causing the pH level of its water to rise and become corrosive. This, in turn, led to pinhole leaks in copper pipes receiving the water, damaging persons and property. The plaintiff sought class certification, defining the class as all individuals and entities who have owned or leased real property in the City, plumbed with copper piping receiving water from the City’s plant since February 23, 2015.The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification. The court found that the plaintiff had not shown that common issues predominated over individual ones. The court reasoned that the existence, cause, and extent of damage to copper piping required individual proof. The court also overruled the plaintiff's objections to the City's expert witness, concluding that the expert was qualified and his opinion was founded on reliable information.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. The court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that individual issues predominated over common ones. The court also found no error in the trial court's decision to overrule the plaintiff's objections to the City's expert witness. The court concluded that the expert was qualified and his opinion was founded on reliable information. View "Malmquist v. City of Folsom" on Justia Law
Montoya v. Jeffreys
The case involves a class action lawsuit brought against the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) by four parents who were convicted of sex offenses and were on mandatory supervised release (MSR). The plaintiffs challenged an IDOC policy that restricts contact between a parent convicted of a sex offense and their minor child while the parent is on MSR. The plaintiffs argued that this policy violates their Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural and substantive due process.The district court upheld the policy, with two exceptions. It ruled that the policy's ban on written communications was unconstitutional and that IDOC must allow a parent to submit a written communication addressed to their child for review and decision within seven calendar days. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the policy's restrictions on phone and in-person contact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the district court that the policy does not violate procedural due process. However, it held that the policy's ban on phone contact violates substantive due process. The court found that call monitoring is a ready alternative to the phone-contact ban that accommodates the plaintiffs’ right to enjoy the companionship of their children at a de minimis cost to IDOC’s penological interests. View "Montoya v. Jeffreys" on Justia Law
Mohr v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania
In a class action suit, the plaintiffs, a group of patients, alleged that the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania (Penn), who operate the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania Health System (Penn Medicine), were in violation of Pennsylvania privacy law. The plaintiffs claimed that Penn Medicine shared sensitive health information and online activity of its patients with Facebook through its patient portal. Penn removed the case to federal court, asserting that it was "acting under" the federal government, referencing the federal-officer removal statute. However, the District Court rejected this argument and returned the case to state court.This case was primarily focused on whether Penn was "acting under" the federal government in its operation of Penn Medicine's patient portal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to remand the case back to state court. The Court of Appeals determined that Penn was not "acting under" the federal government, as it did not demonstrate that it was performing a delegated governmental task. The court declared that Penn was merely complying with federal laws and regulations, which does not qualify as "acting under" the federal government. The court noted that just because a private party has a contractual relationship with the federal government does not mean that it is "acting under" the federal authority. In conclusion, the court determined that the relationship between Penn and the federal government did not meet the requirements for Penn to be considered as "acting under" the federal government, thus the case was correctly returned to state court. View "Mohr v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law
MANEY V. BROWN
A group of current and former inmates, or their representatives, filed a class action lawsuit against Kate Brown, the Governor of Oregon, and Patrick Allen, the Director of the Oregon Health Authority, claiming that the state's COVID-19 vaccine rollout plan, which prioritized corrections officers over inmates, violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim, asserting immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act. The district court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding that the defendants were immune from liability for the vaccine prioritization claim under the PREP Act. The court held that the statutory requirements for PREP Act immunity were met because the "administration" of a covered countermeasure includes prioritization of that countermeasure when its supply is limited. The court further concluded that the PREP Act's provisions extend immunity to persons who make policy-level decisions regarding the administration or use of covered countermeasures. The court also held that the PREP Act provides immunity from suit and liability for constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if those claims are federal constitutional claims. View "MANEY V. BROWN" on Justia Law
Villarroel v. Recology
This case revolves around the filed rate doctrine and its applicability in instances where rates approved by a municipal board are questioned. The plaintiffs, a group of customers, sued Recology, a waste management company, alleging that the company violated the Unfair Competition Law and other laws by bribing a city official to facilitate the approval of Recology’s application for increased refuse collection rates. The trial court ruled in favor of Recology, holding that the claims were barred by the filed rate doctrine. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three reversed the decision, stating that the California version of the filed rate doctrine does not bar this action because the purposes underlying the doctrine – “nondiscrimination” and “nonjusticiability” strands – are not implicated by plaintiffs’ claims. The court also concluded that the judgment in the prior law enforcement action does not pose a res judicata bar to this putative class action. The court remanded the case for the trial court’s consideration of Recology’s remaining challenges in the first instance.
View "Villarroel v. Recology" on Justia Law
Pinkston v. City of Chicago
The Municipal Code of Chicago included provisions concerning public parking, including parking meters. The fine for exceeding the time purchased at a parking meter differs depending on whether the violation occurs in the “central business district” or the “non-central business district.” At the time of the alleged violation, failure to comply with the parking meter regulations in the central business district resulted in a $65 fine. A $50 fine applied to similar violations outside the central business district.Pinkston filed a class-action, alleging that Chicago had engaged in the routine practice of improperly issuing central business district tickets for parking meter violations. The circuit court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings and voluntarily paying his fine. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. The underlying issue—whether Pinkston received an improper parking ticket—is routinely handled at the administrative level; an aggrieved party cannot circumvent administrative remedies “by a class action for declaratory judgment, injunction or other relief.” View "Pinkston v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law
James v. Hegar
Plaintiffs are three Texas residents whose assets escheated to the State under Texas’s Unclaimed Property Act. Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against the Texas Comptroller and a director in the Comptroller’s office, alleging that the State is abusing the Unclaimed Property Act to seize purportedly abandoned property without providing proper notice. The district court dismissed most of Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot invoke Ex parte Young because they lack standing to seek prospective relief and have not alleged an ongoing violation of federal law.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with Defendants and reversed the district court’s denial of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and remanded with instructions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ remaining claims for prospective relief without prejudice. The court explained that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts indicating that Texas’s alleged abuse of the UPA is ongoing or will continue in the future. As there is no ongoing violation of federal law sufficiently pleaded in the complaint, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the Ex parte Young requirements, and their claims for prospective relief are barred by sovereign immunity. View "James v. Hegar" on Justia Law